The small working group created at the Paris meeting has come to an agreement about the voting distribution in ICANN’s policy making Council for domain names (the GNSO Council). It remains to the ICANN Board and staff to accept and implement this proposal, but the Board is expected to follow the consensus of the working group. (If it does not, you will hear about it here!)
The proposed solution is a victory for civil society representation. The new structure is bicameral and involves two distinct voting “houses,” one for the domain name industry that holds ICANN contracts (registries and registrars) and one for users or non-contracting parties (commercial and noncommercial users). In the user house there is an even number of votes for commercial and noncommercial stakeholders. IGP’s Milton Mueller participated in the working group as the representative of the Noncommercial Users Constituency (NCUC).
ICANN has made major strides towards increasing its transparency, but the point about openness and transparency is that you do it all the time, not just when its convenient or when the results won't challenge you. In that regard we find it interesting that ICM Registry's precedent-setting call for an...
Abstract: We are running out of Internet addresses. A newly released paper by the IGP evaluates address transfer policies that Internet governance agencies are considering as a response to the depletion of the IPv4 address space. The paper focuses on proposals to allow organizations holding IPv4 addresses to sell address blocks to other organizations willing to buy them. This paper analyzes the economics of the proposed transfer policies, and conducts a systematic comparison of the policies proposed in the three main world Internet regions.
Some critics argue that a transfer market would slow down or harm the transition to IPv6. A transfer market, they say, might encourage organizations to consider purchasing more IPv4 addresses instead of firmly committing themselves to an IPv6 migration strategy. Note that this argument implicitly concedes that a transfer market would work. In this fourth installment we consider the effect of transfer markets on incentives to migrate to IPv6.
At its Paris Board meeting two weeks ago, as ICANN passed its policy authorizing the creation of new generic top level domains, GAC spokesperson Janis Karklins expressed the governments’ concerns that not enough attention had been paid to promoting competition in the formulation of the policy. A reasonable and good sentiment, that. But wait: hasn’t the GAC also been insisting that existing country code top level domain monopolies be given new TLDs in any language scripts of their choosing? And didn’t GAC members also advocate that these new “internationalized” top level domains be handed to the incumbent ccTLD monopolies without being attached to any ICANN contract? Isn't this the same Janis Karklins who said in the same meeting that ccTLDs should get new multilingual TLDs “without any compulsory financial arrangements?” What kind of a competition policy is that?
To the credit of the RIRs and their associated communities, the problem of IPv4 address depletion has led to some innovative policy proposals. Each of the three largest RIRs is considering proposals to permit market-based address transfers. In this third installment we conduct a systematic analysis of the proposals according to five key dimensions: 1) Trigger Date; 2) Territorial restrictions; 3) Eligibility restrictions/speculation controls; 4) Fees; and 5) Route Aggregation.
In the second installment of our analysis of how we are running out of IPv4 addresses, we examine how Regional Internet Registries allocate IPv4 addresses. Despite the appealing ideology of common resource stewardship that appears to underlay RIR policies, there are major failings in the application of the common pool model to IP address resources. Notably, appropriation from the common pool is not based on a simple and uniformly applicable appropriation limit, but on expensive case-by-case administrative procedures in which a central planner tries to determine whether organizations “need” addresses. Worse, when IP addresses are not used by those to whom they have been allocated, they do not automatically return into the common pool for use by others. Those who have been allocated or assigned address resources retain exclusivity over an address block regardless of whether they are using the resources. Given the major imperfections in the application of the common pool model, it is not surprising to discover large amounts of unused and wasted resources, misappropriation and underground transfers taking place.
What happens when the Internet addresses run out? That question has been generating growing concern among Internet operators and policy analysts. The problem is fundamental to the future of the Internet. This blog post is part of a paper that evaluates a transitional policy that Internet governance agencies are considering as a response to the depletion of the IPv4 address space. In particular, it focuses on proposals to allow organizations holding IPv4 addresses to sell address blocks to other organizations willing to buy them. IP address transfer markets, as they are called, have been proposed as a pragmatic way to extend the life of the legacy IP address space.
[Abstract] Drafter: Milton MuellerWe are running out of Internet addresses. This paper evaluates address transfer policies that Internet governance agencies are considering as a response to the depletion of the IPv4 address space. The paper focuses on proposals to allow organizations holding IPv4 addresses to sell address blocks to other...
ICANN claims incessantly to be an open, fair policy making venue based on "bottom up" participation. At the ICANN meeting in Paris, the organization came face to face with the prospect of making good that claim, and it....delayed. Over the next month, we will see how that issue is resolved....