A new article by Bloomberg exposes the presence of bandwidth optimization equipment in the network of an Iranian Internet Service Provider. The equipment comes from an Israeli company, Allot Communications. This is treated as a perfect example of how governments need to crack down on the sale of threatening technology to dictatorships by Western companies. But when the actual facts of the case come out, you will find that it proves the opposite.
Activists and investigative journalists are highlighting the linkage between modern surveillance technologies and repressive governments. The emerging narrative around surveillance technology provides the perfect frame for public activism. You have a clear bad guy – a Gadhafi, an Assad, the Iranian theocrats, the Chinese Communist Party. You have a symbolic token, a technology, which links the bad guys and their bad actions to reachable actors – the corporate vendors – who are part of our own society and jurisdiction. You can then campaign on a simple moral impulse – the reachable actors must not be allowed to aid, abet or profit from the violence and political injustice of the bad guys. This in turn leads to what seems like a simple and effective policy response – to sever the link between reachable actors and the bad guys by somehow banning or regulating the transfer of this technology on a global basis. This blog post offers a critique of this budding movement, turning a critical eye upon a righteous cause.
Last week Dutch Telecom giant KPN held its shareholder meeting at the Mayfair Hotel in London. All four hours of the presentation are viewable online here along with the slides used. Those who watch can see a startling revelation about the use of deep packet inspection (DPI) by a mobile operator.
A few days ago ICANN quietly posted this letter from David Holtzman of Depository Inc. to ICANN CEO Rod Beckstrom. The letter, dated January 27, has gone almost totally unnoticed, but it is important. It means the first warning shots have been fired in a prospective litigation duel between ARIN, which is the IP address registry for North America, and a company positioning itself to compete with ARIN in the provision of certain IP address-related services. What is at stake here is the control of IP address Whois data – or more precisely, whether ARIN owns this data and can withhold it from other organizations in order to maintain exclusive control over certain services.
IGP has spent a lot of time trying to get people to appreciate the massive global governance issues caused by adding security to the Internet's core infrastructure. We just didn't expect them to become this obvious so quickly. Case in point: various technical lists are abuzz with news that Cisco, the world's largest router manufacturer, is discussing the possibility of making every one of its products do DNSSEC validation by default.