Milton Mueller Named First XS4ALL Professor

IGP Partner Milton Mueller, a scholar known for his work on global Internet governance and professor at the School of Information Studies (iSchool) at Syracuse University, has internationalized his academic post and strengthened ties to the Internet industry by accepting a chair at Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. The three-year research position was created by the Dutch Internet service provider XS4ALL, and will be located in the Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) section.

Homeland Security Department was warned about DNSSEC key ownership and trust issues

A consulting group (DNK LLC) report to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security stated clearly that the problems of who would own the DNSSEC keys and mistrust of the U.S. government's intentions could be barriers to DNSSEC deployment. While the August 2006 report covers developments only from March 2005 to July 2006, it makes two important points that are relevant and timely today. First it makes clear, if it weren't already, that the issue of root signing and key management has been recognized as a political issue for long time. It also offers some interesting insights on how DHS has approached the politics of DNSSEC and Internet security.

In developing the government's message about DNSSEC, DNK clearly identified barriers to adoption across several relevant interest groups, including the Internet community, the private sector, other governments and public sector actors, consumers/end users, and the media. Tellingly, “ownership of DNSSEC keys and registration” and “trust in government's [i.e., the USG] intention” were specifically identified as potential tripping points across many of the groups.

DNSSEC-Deployment Group Now Discussing Distributed Root Signing

DNSSEC and the issue of signing the root have been hot topics in Internet governance over the past year. Most recently, the IGP co-sponsored workshop at IGF-Rio saw several interested parties (see the workshop writeup) vigorously debating if the root should be signed. Perhaps anticipating that discussion, ICANN released a ccNSO survey of 61 ccTLD operators on DNSSEC just before IGF-Rio. It highlighted that the majority of interviewed operators preferred ICANN/IANA sign the root, but numerous other arrangements were identified as well. In Rio, the CEO of the largest ccTLD argued that deploying DNSSEC at the root entails making a decision about whether to dedicate trust to one or multiple entities. She and a representative of CGI.br openly expressed concern about a single entity controlling such a critical piece of the DNS.

In a promising sign that policy discussions regarding critical internet resources are responding to IGP advocacy and IG Forum discussions, the DNSSEC-Deployment group is now discussing options for distributing root signing authority. This turn in the debate shows that constructive criticism and discussion of DNSSEC governance arrangements can indeed lead to improvements, despite early resistance to even discussing the topic.

IGF Workshop Summary: DNSSEC: Securing a Critical Internet Resource

[Editors note: Below is a summary of discussions which will feed into a report on the “DNSSEC: Securing a Critical Internet Resource” workshop held at IGF-Rio on November 14th.]

This informative workshop, co-sponsored by the Internet Governance Project, CGI.br, and EuroISPA, drew approximately 80-90 attendees from government, civil society, the private sector and technical communities. While the multi-stakeholder panel brought a diversity of opinions regarding DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), they agreed that improving the security of the Internet’s infrastructure is an important activity which should be pursued.

In general, there are two camps concerning the deployment of DNSSEC, which is a technical standard that requires coordination among many actors to be successfully deployed on a wide-scale basis. One side is ready to proceed with deployment, particularly the hurdle of creating a “trust anchor” key and digitally signing the root zone file. The other is more cautious in its approach, believing that the successful deployment of DNSSEC is subject to many open technical and governance questions.

An IG Research Home: A Long Term Role for IGF?

It is quickly becoming apparent that an important function of the UN's Internet Governance Forum could be to serve as a long term clearinghouse for knowledge acquisition and assessment concerning Internet governance. Despite its structural imperfections, the IGF is becoming a magnet for the academic community to discuss Internet governance ideas. As such, it may be finding its role in the global Internet governance regime.

IGP Releases New Paper on “Net Neutrality as Global Principle for Internet Governance”

As a contribution to the 2007 UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF), IGP has released a new paper showing how network neutrality can serve as a globally applicable principle to guide Internet governance. The paper defines network neutrality as the right of Internet users to access content, services and applications on...

.uk Registry: DNSSEC Needs “Enhanced Cooperation”

As ICANN opened its in Los Angeles on Monday, the .uk registry released a short position paper on DNSSEC — and focused on the issue of signing the root zone. Intentionally or not, Nominet's paper validates IGP's long-held contention that there are major public policy issues around DNSSEC. In it they highlight the need for a single trust anchor and warn against alternative solutions. They emphasize the need for the keys to be managed by ICANN/IANA and used by the root zone maintainer to sign the root, and, most importantly, the necessity of opening up root management through “enhanced cooperation.”

IANA's DNSSEC testbed signs root zone

Over the last few months much has been made of the digitally signing the root as a critical step in widely deploying DNSSEC. At our May Symposium on Internet Governance and Security, one panelist wondered aloud if ICANN/IANA would ever sign the root like they agreed to do in 2006. Similarly, RIPE's recent letter urged ICANN/IANA publicly to act, lest RIPE go ahead and create its own trust anchor repository as one large European ISP suggested. And finally, the FIPS requirement to deploy DNSSEC technology within medium and high impact federal IT systems is bearing down, with the effort taking on a new sense of urgency with the launch of the NIST/SPARTA/DHS SNIP testbed early this month.

Well, it now seems that some of the pressure has started to work. At the informal IEPG gathering prior to the 69th IETF being held in Chicago this week, an IANA representative explained some technical specs and operational details behind its recent deployment of a DNSSEC testbed that includes a signed root zone.