Cybersecurity Archives - Page 17 of 20 - Internet Governance Project

A more detailed look at the proposed Cybersecurity Act of 2009

Posted on April 3, 2009November 20, 2017 by Milton MuellerCybersecurity

The Rockefeller-Snowe bill emerges from an environment of blind hysteria around cyber-security problems that has developed in recent months. Section 2 contains 150 lines of silly hyperventilating that exaggerate the threats – but more importantly, misconceives the nature of Internet-based threats and the best way to respond to them. The bill succumbs to the tendency to take a national, hierarchical and centralized approach to problems that are best met through the organic evolution of decentralized, flexible, adapative and transnational, private sector-based cooperative solutions that leverage the peer production capabilities of the Internet.

Still, it is not as bad as it could have been. The bill does not turn over cybersecurity responsibilities to the NSA, nor does it completely centralize authority in a single government agency. Instead, it creates a multistakeholder Cyber-security Advisory panel appointed by the President. Here is a section-by-section review of the most outstanding parts of the proposed law…

ICANN gets “securitized”

Posted on April 2, 2009November 20, 2017 by Milton MuellerCybersecurity, IG Institutions

This is no April Fool's joke: here is a bill that is almost a caricature of what the rest of the world fears about U.S. control of the Internet DNS root and ICANN. Legislation unveiled today by Senate Commerce Chairman John (Jay) Rockefeller and Sen. Olympia Snowe, R-Maine, would require...

Cyber-security for people? Or nations?

Posted on January 31, 2009November 20, 2017 by Milton MuellerCybersecurity, Geopolitics of IG

The Internet is organized around “autonomous systems” — independently managed networks most of which are privately owned or, if public, managed at the agency or department level. The current institutional structure for public governance, on the other hand, is organized around nation-states.

That disjunction encourages some actors to construct Internet security as a national security issue. Political claims that invoke “national security” can inflate budgets and provide for more effective political mobilization within bureaucracies and the political class. A recent report from a “Commission on Cyberspace Security for the 44th Presidency” assembled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington DC-based think tank with longstanding roots in Cold War dialogue, exemplifies this problem. Written late in 2008, it urged the incoming President to proclaim that “cyberspace is a vital asset for the nation and…the United States will protect it using all instruments of national power.” This is a fundamentally misguided approach; this post explains why.

Security at the IGF: Just Give Me the Money

Posted on December 5, 2008November 20, 2017 by Michel van EetenCybersecurity

Day two at the IGF focuses on cybersecurity, meaning the main sessions are devoted to it. After the first session, I heard a participant say: “I know nothing about Internet security, but I didn’t hear anything new.”

DNSSEC, Incentives and the Color of Bicycle Sheds

Posted on December 4, 2008November 20, 2017 by Michel van EetenCybersecurity, Internet Identifiers

It is the first day of the program of the Internet Governance Forum itself. The first workshop I attended was on “Understanding Internet Infrastructure.” It could also have been called “Everything you always wanted to know about the Internet, but where afraid to ask.” The answers revealed some surprising gaps in how we think about infrastructure issues.

IGP files comments with NTIA on DNSSEC at the root

Posted on November 25, 2008November 20, 2017 by Brenden KuerbisCybersecurity, Internet Identifiers

IGP submitted comments yesterday to the Department of Commerce regarding the deployment of DNSSEC at the root zone. The Notice of Inquiry raised numerous questions, and put forth six proposed process flows, including ones submitted by ICANN and VeriSign. Just over 35 comments had been submitted by last night, with comments filed by organizations and individuals from the technical community, registries, government contractors involved with DNSSEC deployment, and others. We'll have more analysis on the comments filed later, but my first impression after quickly scanning them is that while there is general agreement that signing the root would obviously be helpful for DNSSEC deployment, it should not be done in haste for a variety of reasons. And numerous parties raised the point that it is critical that any process flow implemented serve the global Internet community, otherwise the presumed benefits of signing will be for naught.

Our comments argued that the act of signing the DNS root raises political and economic issues as well as technical ones.

11.2008 Comments of the Internet Governance Project on Enhancing the Security and Stability of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (Docket Number: 0810021307-81308-01)

Posted on November 2, 2008November 20, 2017 by Scott HuangCybersecurity, Internet Identifiers

[Abstract] Suggested citation: Comments of the Internet Governance Project on Enhancing the Security and Stability of the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System (Docket Number: 0810021307-81308-01) (November 24, 2008). Internet Governance Project. Paper IGP08-004. Available at https://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/NTIA_DNSSEC_comments_final.pdf

Inaugural Address: “The Future of Freedom on the internet: Security, Privacy and Global Governance”

Posted on October 10, 2008November 20, 2017 by Brenden KuerbisCybersecurity, Free Expression Online, Privacy & Surveillance

Milton Mueller, appointed as professor to the Chair of Security and Privacy of Internet Users within the Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management at the Delft University of Technology will present an Inaugural Address, "The Future of Freedom on the internet: Security, Privacy and Global Governance" on Friday, 17 October...

ICANN's DNSSEC root signing proposal d.o.a.?

Posted on October 3, 2008November 20, 2017 by Brenden KuerbisCybersecurity, Internet Identifiers

What is technical and what is political? Some of you may recall various members of the technical community scolding us about how implementation of DNSSEC at the root was a “purely technical issue” and that the world should ignore the governance questions and just “get on with it.” This plea of urgency gained steam this summer during the Kaminsky attack episode, with some blaming the Department of Commerce as the “the show-stopper.” What some technical experts failed to recognize was the underlying power struggle involving ICANN, the U.S. Commerce Department and VeriSign over the arcane business of how the root zone of the DNS might be signed, an important step in the implementation of DNSSEC. And more importantly, how the US Government is making sure this process unfolds in a way that keeps it in control of the root.

VeriSign's plan to sign the root

Posted on September 28, 2008November 20, 2017 by Brenden KuerbisCybersecurity, Internet Identifiers

VeriSign has publicly released its proposal to sign the root, which it sent to the NTIA on September 22. Their proposal comes on the heels of ICANN submitting their own (yet to be publicly released) proposal to the NTIA on September 2. VeriSign adds a much needed dimension to the root signing debate, introducing a well known threshold cryptographic technique. But the proposal's reliance on root server operators needs to be considered carefully.

Cybersecurity

Declaring Independence in Cyberspace