Response to Professor Zittrain

Thanks, Jonathan, for a more comprehensive statement of your position. (See JZ's reply to my August 6 post)

If I may summarize your rejoinder, you make the following points: 1) Too much time is spent on ICANN, diverting scarce time and attention from more important venues; 2) Censorship of public labels would have “near zero effect” on access to content; 3) We are guarding the wrong door, the strongest threats to freedom of expression come from private firms, such as Google or Myspace or ISPs.

I pretty much disagree with all of them, although your point number 3 raises some intriguing issues and I simply may not understand where you are going with it.

What Zittrain Doesn't Get

Dawn Nunziato has developed a strong paper on the connection between Internet governance and freedom of expression. Her law review article, published on SSRN and freely available here, argues that the Internet governance regime centered around ICANN “has failed to implement substantive norms of democratic governance, most importantly, protection for freedom of expression.” In her article, she challenges “the prevailing idea that ICANN's governance of the Internet's infrastructure does not threaten free speech.”

Efforts to alert the global community to the significance of global internet governance regimes has been undermined repeatedly by the insistence of a few well-placed intellectuals that the whole thing doesn't matter. These people, many of whom profess to be supporters of free expression, seem surprisingly cavalier about the whole problem. Witness in particular Professor Jonathan Zittrain, who wrote in reaction to the “Keep the Core Neutral Campaign:”

“I find it hard to really care if ICANN wants to allow some names and deny others. I don't see how a willingness to have some content-based process for determining new TLDs can become “a convenient lever of global control by those seeking to censor unpopular or controversial expression on the Internet.” How would this global control transpire, when one needs no particular domain name to put content up on the Net?”

I must confess that this comment astounds me. Only someone completely divorced from the realities of international politics and Internet control could make such a comment. Let us examine this comment first from the most basic, common-sense level, and then move to a more sophisticated analysis of politics and institutions.

IANA's DNSSEC testbed signs root zone

Over the last few months much has been made of the digitally signing the root as a critical step in widely deploying DNSSEC. At our May Symposium on Internet Governance and Security, one panelist wondered aloud if ICANN/IANA would ever sign the root like they agreed to do in 2006. Similarly, RIPE's recent letter urged ICANN/IANA publicly to act, lest RIPE go ahead and create its own trust anchor repository as one large European ISP suggested. And finally, the FIPS requirement to deploy DNSSEC technology within medium and high impact federal IT systems is bearing down, with the effort taking on a new sense of urgency with the launch of the NIST/SPARTA/DHS SNIP testbed early this month.

Well, it now seems that some of the pressure has started to work. At the informal IEPG gathering prior to the 69th IETF being held in Chicago this week, an IANA representative explained some technical specs and operational details behind its recent deployment of a DNSSEC testbed that includes a signed root zone.

Money and Advice for the Internet Governance Forum: The structure of the MAG and financing the IGF Secretariat

The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is now moving through its second year and two institutional issues have emerged in the open-ended consultations and in the discussions among stakeholders: how is the Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) that is supposed to provide advice on management of the IGF to be structured and...

IETF DNS Working Group defines DNS as “critical infrastructure?”

In the process of drafting its revised charter (which came about because it is now largely finished with the DNSSEC standard), the IETF's DNS Extensions Working Group (DNSEXT) has identified the Domain Name System as “a critical Internet infrastructure.” Given that the DNS handles billions of queries mapping human readable domain names to IP adresses of network hosts daily, it only makes sense that it be considered critical to the function of the Internet. Without the DNS protocol, much of the value of the Internet to humans would not exist.

DNSSEC: (Dis)incentives to deploy, signing the root, and the “keys to the Internet kingdom”

[Editors Note: Apologies for the belated writeup of an informative panel discussion on the implications of DNSSEC deployment and signing the root.]

“If you hold the [DNSSEC] keys you can decide who is the root zone file editor and who are the root servers. You hold the keys to the Internet kingdom.” – Paul Vixie

On May 17, 2007, IGP, George Mason University Law School's Critical Infrastructure Protection Program and the EPFL eGov program hosted a panel on DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) at the Swiss Embassy in Washington DC. Several recognized technical experts from the private sector, ICANN and the US government discussed the deployment of DNSSEC, and in particular the policy dimensions of digitally signing the Internet’s root zone file. The audience of nearly 80 people included Department of Commerce officials, US government contractors, policy-makers, public-interest advocates and graduate students.  Moderated by Brenden Kuerbis of the Internet Governance Project, the panel included Paul Vixie (ISC), David Conrad (IANA), Scott Rose (US Department of Commerce-NIST), Matt Larson (VeriSign), and Thierry Moreau (Connotech). The discussion highlighted major technical challenges facing DNSSEC deployment, and the effects of root signing on tld zone operators and the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS).

ICANN confronts Free Expression Debate

At the San Juan, Puerto Rico ICANN meeting today a large audience turned out for a workshop organized to discuss the free expression implications of ICANN's proposed policy for adding new top level domains. The issue has proved controversial because governments and ICANN staff are concerned about the appearance of controversial words or concepts in the domain name space. Some of them were traumatized by the .xxx debate and think they can get around those problems simply by blocking TLD applications that might be “offensive” or “sensitive” to some people.
ICANN staff searched very hard for international law and treaties that would justify these actions. One was a 19th century trademark treaty known as the Paris Convention which excludes from trademark registration words that are “scandalous” or contrary to “generally accepted legal norms relating to morality and public order.” Until we insisted on amendments, the report also selectively quoted the UN Charter on Human Rights, avoiding the free expression guarantees of Article 19. The main problem, however, was the U.S. government-supported GAC principles, which among other things tried to give governments a veto power over any new TLD and required that any proposal respect “the sensitivities regarding terms with national, cultural, geographic and religious significance.” These were seen as opening the door to casual censorship based not on law but opinion and preference.
Moderated by Robin Gross (IP Justice, Noncommercial Users Constituency), expert speakers challenged the proposed policy’s challenges to freedom of expression and an open and neutral administration of Internet core resources.

Drezner Muffs Internet Governance

Tufts political scientist Daniel Drezner has produced an appealingly simple model to explain the typology of global economic governance. You can get a quick summary of his position at Cato Unbound. His basic thesis is that global governance is still driven by the power of states — well, not states exactly, but “Great Powers.” There are at the moment only two Great Powers, the US and the EU. From this, he derives a useful typology. When the US and EU interests are congruent, and the rest of the world isn't adamantly opposed, we will get harmonized and effective global governance. When the EU and US agree, but the rest of the world won't go along, the Great Powers will avoid universal institutions and forum shop, and we will get “club” standards.

When the EU and US disagree, and there is wide divergence of interest among the rest of the world, we will get “sham” standards, putative global governance principles that don't mean anything and can't be enforced. Drezner puts our beloved Article 19 in this category. Ouch. But he's right about its effectiveness, isn't he? And when the EU and US disagree and have clusters of allies around the world we will get rival governance standards, like in the case of genetically modified foods.

The MAG is dead, long live the MAG? or, “Maybe it's only a Ban Ki Moon….”

We are still waiting for the UN Secretary General to pronounce on the future of the Internet Governance Forum's multistakeholder advisory group (known as the MAG). The decision is so untimely that Nitin Desai, the Chair of the Forum, was unable to hold a private planning meeting of the MAG after the conclusion of the IGF's public consultation May 23. What was supposed to be a deliberative meeting of anointed nominees of business, government, civil society and the technical community turned into a kind of semi-open, free-form discussion. Anyone could wander into the meeting, presuming they were hanging around Geneva that day and well-enough informed to learn that it was going on.