New research on how ISPs could combat botnets

New analysis, by a group of researchers including IGP's Michel van Eeten, suggests that by focusing mitigation efforts on a subset of ISPs could eliminate the bulk of zombie computers responsible for generating spam and initiating other online threats.
As reported in MIT Technology Review:

The researchers analyzed more than 63 billion unsolicited e-mail messages sent over a four-year period and found more than 138 million unique internet addresses linked to sending out the spam. Typically such machines have been hijacked by hackers and are corralled into a vast network of remote-controlled system known as a “botnet.”

Who do you trust to sign the root?

ICANN's Trusted Community Representative (TCR) program, which proposes to distribute signing authority for the DNS root zone among representatives of the Internet community, was launched by ICANN about two weeks ago.

DNSEXT Working Group participant Thierry Moreau observes that

basically, the concept (and details) of TCRs is the ICANN answer to the concern over a strengthening of DNS control, [and over allowing] international participation. The concept of TCR is also original – no other crypto deployment ever required, or seemed to require, a similar level of transparency.

But, despite the good intentions there are questions.

Committee OK's funding for cybersecurity R&D, including Internet standards and assessing methods

As reported last week, the House Homeland Security Committee has passed a $2.7 billion appropriations bill, H.R. 4842 Homeland Security Science and Technology Authorization Act of 2010. The bill allocates $150 million over two years to the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate.

The bill continues the funding of Internet standards works dealing with securing critical Internet resources, as well as offers an opportunity for improving our understanding of how domestic efforts to improve cybersecurity impacts global Internet governance.

Internet Society Attacks Beckstrom's DNS “sky is falling” talk

It's not often you get to see the Internet Society butt heads directly with ICANN, which some consider its creature. In comments filed today with ICANN, the President and CEO of the Internet Society (ISOC), Lynn St. Amour, sent some sharply-worded criticism to ICANN President and CEO Rod Beckstrom. The comment, which was sent to the entire ICANN Board, criticized Beckstrom for his comments before the Governmental Advisory Committee at the Nairobi meeting last month, when he claimed that the domain name system is “under attack as never before” and implied that it is likely to collapse at any moment. Beckstrom made these comments by way of promoting his idea of a “DNS CERT”.

Cyber-Spin: How the Internet gets framed as dangerous

At the beginning of this year, a set of powerhouse organizations in cybersecurity (CSO Magazine, Deloitte, Carnegie Mellon's CERT program, and the U.S. Secret Service) released the results of a survey of 523 business and government executives, professionals and consultants in the ICT management field.

The media coverage generated by this survey provides an unusally clear illustration of how cyber security discourse has become willfully detached from facts. It shows clearly how there is an organized industrial and political imperative to drill into our heads the idea that the Internet is a dangerous thing and its threats are spiralling upwards at an uncontrollable rate. It doesn't matter what facts are uncovered, they are all interpreted to support this preconception.

With that intro, here is the lead sentence from the January 25 2010 Carnegie-Mellon University news release about the 2010 CyberSecurity Watch Survey: “Cybercrime threats posed to targeted organizations are increasing faster than many organizations can combat them, according to the 2010 CyberSecurity Watch Survey…”

Stop right there. A careful review of both the survey and the ensuing responses to it quickly reveals that that conclusion did NOT come from the survey itself, and was not supported by its data.

Ruling the Root part II: RPKI and the IP address space

The Internet Architecture Board issued a little-noticed statement February 12 that has the potential to revolutionize Internet governance – and not in a good way. The IAB is now claiming that the application of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to addressing and routing is “a prerequisite for improving the security of the global routing system.” What may get lost in all the technical mumbo-jumbo is that RPKI is a technology of control and identification. We need to think long and hard before embarking on a path that would lead to the global centralization of such authority in a single institution's hands.

ITU on root signing and ccTLDs

The ITU, in its comments submitted to the UN Secretary-General for a report to the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on “Enhanced cooperation on public policy issues pertaining to the Internet,” states that concerning management of critical Internet resources, specifically domain name system security extensions (DNSSEC) root signing authority:

The root signing authority is of critical importance to the security, stability and reliability of the Internet. The role and functions related to policies governing the harmonized and global coordination of such services for country-code top-level domains (ccTLDs) must be assumed by a relevant intergovernmental body with the mandate from Governments and the experience in providing such services so that concerns and interests of sovereign States can be taken into account.

DNSSEC requirement for new gTLDs raises concern outside US

As noted by previously by IGP, it is not entirely clear where requirements for DNSSEC in the Draft Applicant Guidebook emerged from within the ongoing consultation. Public comments to date from several organizations are mostly negative, including China Organizational Name Admininstration Center (CONAC), Uninet Bulgaria, Domain the Net (Israel), DotAfrica, Regtime (Russia), and CORE (Switzerland). They cite a variety of concerns, ranging from potential conflicts with deploying IDNs, to conflicts with local and national laws, to concerns about data escrowing, and question whether it is appropriate for all registries. In general, they argue that requiring DNSSEC could prevent new gTLDs.

Emerging Threats to Internet Security: Incentives, Externalities and Policy Implications

The Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management has published a new article by IGP's Michel van Eeten and Johnannes Bauer, Emerging Threats to Internet Security: Incentives, Externalities and Policy Implications. The paper, based in part on numerous interviews conducted with network operators, is particularly useful for cutting through the often analytically empty cybersecurity dialogue. Using a marginal security (law enforcement) vs. precluded-event security (national security) framework, the authors identify why the issue of botnets leads to such controversy when it comes to policy responses.