• Apr 2024
  • The Traditional Media's Role in Sculpting Truth: the Origin ...

    As the global community grapples with various regulatory frameworks and policy recommendations put forward by states, social media companies, and academia, the pivotal role of traditional media and journalists often slips under the radar. The article discusses information integrity efforts in East Asia, including digital provenance and fact-checking. In specific, considering the vital social responsibility that the media holds in democracy, media organizations in Japan and South Korea have been exploring unique approaches to address the issue of online misinformation in a manner that safeguards freedom of expression with minimal government intervention. The Originator Profile (OP) project, tested and sponsored by the Japanese mainstream media, and the Unfair Election Report, operated by South Korean internet news portals, illustrate how traditional media can practically use existing laws and governance systems to provide more transparent and accurate information during critical national events while minimizing chances of possible government regulatory interventions. The Originator Profile (OP) A noteworthy endeavor in this field comes from Japan, where a novel initiative known as the OP is taking shape. In September 2023, at the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) meeting in Taipei, Japan’s largest news media, Yomiuri Shimbun, introduced their sponsorship of OP as a part of the media’s efforts to combat the spread of misinformation. The OP was devised by the researchers at Keio University’s “Cyber Civilization Research Center (CCRC)” in 2022 aimed to provide easy identification of high-quality, third-party verified news articles and media by embedding verifiable information about web content creators and advertisers. The overarching goal of OP is to establish information integrity of online news reports, particularly in the face of challenges posed by false narratives and online propagandists. 

    <Source: WAN-IFRA. Shows how the electric identifiers are embodied to the news website>

    The OP technology systematically embeds an electronic identifier into digital content, including news articles and advertisements, to enhance the transparency and credibility of online information. This unique marker not only stores data about the content's creators, such as basic company information, editorial policies, and privacy practices, but also facilitates the immediate distinction between authentic content and potential misinformation. When digital content is created, the embedded OP marker provides verifiable details about the originators and the distribution channels, which is then independently verified by a third party. This verification process, reinforced with an authentication icon visible within the browser, confirms the existence and authenticity of the content originator, covering extensive information such as the corporate stance, reporting obligations, and editorial guidelines. Consequently, this sophisticated verification mechanism supports the validation of the content's reliability, empowering users to make informed decisions regarding the trustworthiness of the information they consume online.

    <Source: Originator Profile. Shows how OP informs corporate stances>

    The implementation of the OP requires collaboration among various stakeholders, including media companies, advertising firms, technology providers, and notably, academic researchers. In this effort, multiple Japanese media organizations, prominently the Yomiuri Shimbun, have sponsored the CCRC and established the Originator Profile Collaborative Innovation Partnership (OPCIP). Currently, OPCIP includes 37 Japanese news media agencies, advertising companies, and online magazines. Dr. Jun Murai of Keio University's CCRC leads OPCIP, with representatives from partnering corporations and media industries serving as stakeholder members. OPCIP operates as a non-profit organization and is currently preparing to start trial demonstrations of the technology, aiming for its practical application by 2025.  Following the disinformation incidents during the natural disasters, the Japanese government has demonstrated significant interest in developing and deploying Originator Profile (OP) technology. This initiative aims to counteract disinformation and safeguard intellectual property rights in the era of generative artificial intelligence. The AI Strategic Council, under the Cabinet Office, has affirmed the efficacy of OP technology in defending intellectual property rights against the challenges posed by generative AI. The council further identified that Japan's existing copyright law could offer legal frameworks to employ OP technology against AI-generated misleading narratives within online news portals and the advertisement sector. Additionally, it has outlined proposals that incorporate OP technology as a means to determine the origin of content, differentiating between human and AI-generated information.  Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has underscored the significance of OP technology in the Hiroshima G7 AI Process that the implementation of electronic markers in OP technology stands as a pivotal strategy in combating the misuse of AI-generated content, particularly during electoral events. As a follow-up, the OPCIP is diligently working to promote OP technology as a global standard. They are focused on refining and practically applying this technology, starting with real-world tests to ensure the OP system functions correctly across actual network environments. The plan includes progressively increasing the integration of OP markers in articles and advertisements. After thorough development and testing, OPCIP aims to submit the technical specifications for OP to the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), a main web standards development organization. OPCIP’s goal is to establish OP as a universal standard that enhances the reliability of web content globally. Unfair Election Reports The 2024 general election in South Korea, held on April 10th, was notable for the resounding victory of the left-wing Democratic Party, which won nearly twice as many votes as the conservative People's Power Party. This election was also significant as it marked the first time Korean media implemented the 'Unfair Election Reports' on the country's three most influential online news portals—Naver, Daum-Kakao, and Nate, which act as intermediaries within the media structure, linking news articles published by traditional media to online users. These portals aggregated news articles identified by the press and the Internet Election News Deliberation Commission (IENDC) as violating fair reporting standards during the campaign period. Subsequently, these intermediary news portals listed the offending articles in a designated Unfair Election Report section. This initiative was part of a voluntary effort by the media to enhance the accuracy and integrity of the information available to voters. The IENDC, an independent body under the National Election Committee (NEC) and detached from any executive or political influence, adjudicates these violations according to the Public Official Election Act. The Act delineates the IENDC's role, which includes maintaining the impartiality of election reporting as stated on the websites of internet press agencies, and managing personnel. Specifically, 11 commissioners are appointed by the NEC, recommended by various groups including political entities, scholars, the legal community, the press, and the Korea Communication Standards Commission, as outlined in Article 8-5. Article 8-6 further specifies how the IENDC reviews online election reports to determine if they result from proper deliberations, and it authorizes the IENDC to mandate corrections or removals of reports. The article particularly emphasizes the need for deliberation in judging the fairness of the reports. Finally, based on the Public Official Election Act, the IENDC develops criteria for violations of the law and publicly shares detailed descriptions of these violations, thereby clarifying what types of election reports can be sanctioned and for what reasons <Source: IENDC. Violation typology and number of unfair election reports data> Although the IENDC has been active since 2009 and has published its data on its own website, the public has seldom recognized it due to a lack of publicity and limited motivation to seek it out. However, this year's election marked the first time that intermediary news portals collectively displayed the unfair election reports identified by the IENDC on their platforms, making them visible to every voter. While there is no legal requirement for online news portals to publicly display these reports, the intermediaries in South Korea have voluntarily collected individual unfair election reports and made them publicly accessible, including the names of the news agencies. Generally, news agencies opt to delete reports deemed unfair rather than correct them due to fears of losing credibility. However, the Unfair Election Reports have rendered such secretive efforts futile, as the intermediary portals archive all identified unfair reports, both existing and previously deleted, and make them available to the public. This is primarily feasible because Naver, Daum-Kakao, and Nate are the three most widely used online news portals in South Korea, and without maintaining contracts with them, news agencies risk losing their platforms for publishing their reports. The Unfair Election Reports archives of Naver, Daum, and Nate comprise news articles published during elections from 2012 to the present year. These archives were made publicly accessible on their web portals starting this year. Common themes identified in this year’s reports include character defamation of candidates and their families, controversies over election fraud, distortions of historical facts, and, most notably, the repeated biased coverage of specific candidates and political parties without presenting counterarguments or providing information sources deliberately. Intriguingly, from this year onwards, these news portals began to identify deepfake and other AI-generated content that violated fairness standards, in collaboration with the NEC, and have included these in their archives. While AI-generated unfair election reports have not been identified this year, it is crucial to remain vigilant about the potential for such occurrences in future elections. <Source: Nate, Daum. Unfair Election Reports webpages> Implication  Both the OP and Unfair Election Reports are initiatives designed to combat misleading and imbalanced news articles on their respective news portals, thereby enhancing transparency and providing more accurate information to readers. While the Unfair Election Reports are tailored to address specific, temporary national events, the OP aims to develop a more comprehensive online news originator identification system, with the long-term goal of establishing it as an international standard. Despite differences in scope and objectives, both initiatives highlight significant implications for the role of traditional media in the digital age and the regulatory frameworks aimed at countering misinformation and disinformation that are currently being explored in various countries.  Firstly, these initiatives underscore the enduring importance of traditional media as a conduit of information, despite the rising influence of social media platforms and their content moderation efforts. Traditional media can play a proactive role in providing accurate information and contributing to a less harmful and healthier online environment. Secondly, the cases of OP and Unfair Election Reports demonstrate that existing laws and governance systems can still be effective in addressing some aspects of disinformation, suggesting that more flexible interpretation and application of the current regulations may be more effective than the creation of new laws and community guidelines observed in other nations. This approach emphasizes leveraging and improving upon existing frameworks rather than overhauling them completely.  Moreover, OP and Unfair Election Reports differ notably from other media fact-checking entities like EUvsDisinfo, Logically, and NewsGuard. EUvsDisinfo, funded by the European External Action Service (EEAS), primarily targets disinformation related to Russia, reflecting the EU's official stance. In contrast, Logically (based in the UK) and NewsGuard (based in the US) operate as market-driven entities, with NewsGuard engaging in contracts with governments and private organizations to provide comprehensive disinformation analyses. Logically runs an independent fact-checking subsidiary, Logically Facts, which is part of Meta’s Third Party Fact-Checking Program and collaborates with TikTok in India. Unlike these entities, both OP and Unfair Election Reports are non-profit, non-public initiatives that engage multiple stakeholders, including academia, traditional media, and government for OP, and news portals, media, and independent election committees for the Unfair Election Reports. This multifaceted collaboration highlights the diverse East Asian governance approaches to combatting misinformation during critical national events. 

  • Feb 2024
  • Understanding National Security in a Digital Age: Summary of ...

    On November 10, 2023, we convened a diverse group of experts at the National Academies of Sciences in Washington D.C. for our 8th Annual Workshop. Our goal? To examine the critical question: what should national security look like in a globally connected digital economy?

    Today, we're excited to release a summary report of our workshop discussions. Leading voices in the field provided a range of perspectives and found common ground in recommending the following actions to the United States Government (USG):

    1. Move beyond country-of-origin as the primary risk factor for the digital economy. In cybersecurity discussions, the USG should avoid focusing solely on a technology's country of origin as a risk indicator.

    2. Prioritize open markets, not mirroring restrictions. When addressing techno-economic security concerns, the USG should aim to negotiate for greater openness in China's ICT and data markets instead of mirroring China's restrictive approach to information flows.

    3. Foster real collaboration between national security and economic interests. To ensure a balanced approach, the USG should appoint "dual-hatted" individuals to serve in both the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Economic Council (NEC). This would allow for simultaneous evaluation of potential benefits and risks, informed by appropriate metrics.

    We hope the full report can help foster a more nuanced public policy discussion about how to optimize the security-growth equation.

    Access the report here.

  • Jan 2024
  • OpenAI's GPT Store: New Competition in the Global Digital Ec ...

    OpenAI's recently launched GPT store potentially marks a significant shift in the global digital economy landscape, presenting a viable competitive threat to established platforms like Apple's App Store. Competition in the global digital economy is all about creating platforms that bring different sides of a market together to create value. These shifts always appear significant with the benefit of hindsight but they start subtly if one knows where to look. Apple launched its App Store in 2008. “Apps” were aggregations of data, compute, and algorithms designed to play nicely in the Apple iPhone ecosystem. Figure 1 below, based on data from Statista, traces the journey of iPhone sales versus the number of apps in Apple's App Store from 2008 to 2022.  The early years witnessed robust growth – iPhone sales and the number of apps grew exponentially. This surge symbolized a booming platform, innovating new technological solutions as more than a billion people became glued to their iPhone devices. However, more recent trends paint a different picture. A noticeable slowdown in growth rates, both in terms of iPhone sales and app proliferation, began in the last decade suggesting a market approaching maturity. The once steep curve of expansion is now leveling off. Stable smartphone penetration rates imply that the majority of potential consumers are already reached, and the focus is shifting from market expansion to market retention (Did you upgrade to the latest iPhone?) and enhancement (How many apps on your iPhone? What new features does iOS offer?). Although the total number of apps continued to grow in the last decade, the rate of growth has decelerated. This slowdown can be attributed to market saturation, where the App Store has already amassed a vast number of applications, covering a wide array of functionalities and user needs. In this context, the technological innovation of generative models based on the transformer architecture and the creation of the GPT store have emerged as significant disruptors. This new platform, bringing together GPT developers and users, is not merely an alternative; it could be a paradigm shift in how digital services are conceptualized, developed, and delivered. Data-driven machine learning techniques and chatbot interfaces providing feedback to natural language queries may come to reign supreme.   The GPT store has several potential advantages. First, by making massive datasets and computational power accessible at reasonable cost, OpenAI's GPT store levels the playing field for developers. This breaks down barriers to entry and fosters innovation, allowing even smaller developers to create sophisticated applications, evident from OpenAI’s claims that more than 3 million users have created custom versions of ChatGPT. Second, ChatGPT-based applications are not tied to a specific hardware or software ecosystem. They can be accessed across various devices and browsers, removing the limitations imposed by platform-specific app stores. Third, the technology's flexibility, from underlying foundational models to finely tuned, specialized instances, means it can be applied across a vast array of domains, from simple task automation to complex problem-solving, making it appealing to a broader audience. The explosive growth of ChatGPT is a testament to the potential of this new platform. It's not just an alternative to traditional apps; it's a new way of thinking about and interacting with digital services. This positions the GPT store not just as a competitor but as a potential market leader, capable of reshaping the landscape of the digital economy even more than regulatory actions, such as the Department of Justice's purported antitrust scrutiny of Apple's App Store. The transformative impact of technological and industrial organizational innovation like the GPT store is likely to be more immediate and profound.

  • Dec 2023
  • The Narrative: December 1, 2023

    Dispatches from the evolving digital political economy

    Is De-Dollarization fueled by the rise of Digital Currencies?

    Nations, particularly within the BRICS alliance, are increasingly exploring alternatives to the US dollar. The rise of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) is playing a pivotal role in shaping the conversation around De-dollarization. The success of China's digital yuan project, though questionable in terms of adoption rate with e-CNY accounting for a mere 0.16% of China’s M0 money supply, has inspired other member nations to explore CBDCs, with Russia, India, and Brazil set to launch pilots in the coming year. The alliance's collective move towards a digital currency is likely a signal of a potential challenge to the traditional dominance of specific currencies. China's recent success in settling a crude oil trade deal in e-CNY has proved to become a catalyst for broader adoption in the international market. The transaction resurfaced an unsettled debate around the practicality and efficiency of digital currencies. China's exploration of cross-border applications for the digital yuan is indicative of a strategic effort to expand its influence in the realm of digital finance and perhaps of an increased interest in de-dollarization. The geopolitical and economic potential of a BRICS alliance around digital currency is substantial, though there are also many obstacles to it. As countries like India and Brazil plan to launch their CBDCs, the landscape of currency competition could undergo a transformative shift. The emphasis on de-dollarization within the alliance suggests a reevaluation of the traditional reliance on the US dollar, potentially paving the way for increased economic autonomy among member nations. However, it currently seems geared more towards developing alternatives to increase the options for means of payments and reducing vulnerabilities arising from economic interdependence. The trend of de-dollarization is not confined to the BRICS nations alone though. Countries worldwide are exploring digital assets and alternatives to the US dollar. The move towards settling trade in local currencies, as seen in China and Saudi Arabia's recent agreement, exemplifies a broader global effort to reduce dependency on the US dollar. As nations navigate the complexities of digital currency adoption, and the extent and scope of de-dollarization, challenges and opportunities emerge. For instance, Argentina's consideration of replacing its local currency with the US dollar, driven by economic challenges, highlights the importance of trust in the existing currency systems. Additionally, the use of Bitcoin as an alternative, as suggested by Argentina's president-elect, adds another layer to the evolving narrative of currency dynamics. The convergence of de-dollarization efforts and the rise of digital currencies initiatives represents a shift of dialogue in the global financial system. The BRICS alliance, along with other nations, is at the forefront of this shift, signaling a potential recalibration of economic power dynamics. As digital currencies continue to gain traction, traditional currencies may face unprecedented challenges and digital alternatives become increasingly integral to the global economic landscape.

    Mastercard enters China

    China recently decided to allow international payment processing giant MasterCard into its list of bank-card clearing institutions. MasterCard, in a joint venture with NetsUnion Clearing, can now issue yuan-dominated credit cards in China. American Express had a similar breakthrough in June 2020. The entry of MasterCard and VISA into China's bank card clearing market can have far-reaching implications. These global payment giants bring advanced technologies, expertise, and a vast network of international transactions. Chinese consumers, businesses, and visitors alike can now benefit from a broader range of payment services, increased accessibility, and improved cross-border transactions. China has historically implemented strict regulations and restrictions on foreign firms entering its financial market, including payment services. There has been a strict regulatory environment for certain tech companies, especially those operating in areas such as social media, e-commerce, and fintech. It is no surprise that the government has imposed restrictions and, in some cases, outright bans to control the influence of these companies. This was often viewed as a protective measure to nurture the growth of domestic players and ensure regulatory control. Foreign firms were traditionally met with skepticism, and collaboration opportunities with domestic players were limited. The decision to allow international payment networks suggests a different approach in the financial sector. The recent approval of MasterCard and Amex suggests a more streamlined process for market access. While stringent regulatory oversight remains, there appears to be a willingness to facilitate the entry of reputable international players, at least in the payment space. The ban on certain tech companies has often been justified on national security grounds. Concerns about data privacy, surveillance, and potential foreign influence have been key factors in these decisions. The entry of international payment networks has not raised similar national security concerns so far. It will be interesting to see what data protection requirements are raised from these collaborations. The focus currently appears to be more on enhancing the efficiency and global integration of the financial system. Since these companies are classified to operate in bank card clearing market, it’s likely that PBOC’s administrative measures for such institutions would be applicable here as well. These companies might be required to establish a legal entity in China and obtain the necessary permits to operate. The PBOC outlines a detailed application and licensing process, specifying the information and documentation that applicants need to provide. This includes financial reports, capital contribution resolutions, qualifications of major capital contributors, and plans for internal control systems, AML, and CFT. Mastercard and Amex would need to comply with these requirements during the application process. This move is made under the recent efforts made by the Chinese government to further its opening-up internationally and supporting the private sector domestically. The low confidence in domestic markets, increasing outflow of international capital, and the opportunity window created by the Xi-Biden meeting in November contributed to a momentum in Beijing to approve central and local level policies to further relax market restrictions for both international and domestic business sectors. For example, the state council recently supported Beijing municipality’s ‘around 170 measures’ of opening up the services sector, including lifting the foreign investment cap on internet access providers, as well as other restrictions in finance, healthcare, and cultural services. Visa-free travel policies were also granted to citizens from Germany, France, and other 4 countries.  Such momentum for liberization and personnel mobility will likely accumulate, adding some counterweights to the unbalanced policy-making calculation of solely focusing on the national security rationale in the past a few years.

    Google's Removal of North Korean YouTube Channels 

    In June, the South Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS) announced the removal of various North Korean state-sponsored propaganda channels from the YouTube platform. These channels, including 'NEW DPRK,' 'Olivia Natasha-Yumi Space DPRK Daily,' and 'Song A,' had been sharing content depicting daily life in North Korea, Korean culture, North Korean films, and scenes from Pyongyang since the beginning of the Covid pandemic. Initially, the NIS asked Korean National Security Commission to block these channels from South Korean internet users; how this was implemented is unclear. After that, NIS strongly urged Google to remove the content from the international viewers in YouTube. In response, a spokesperson from Google stated that they chose to comply with the NIS's request and take down the channels, citing adherence to U.S. sanctions and trade compliance laws concerning North Korea. While Google's collaborative content moderation efforts with U.S. authorities are not novel, this particular case of addressing North Korean propaganda serves as a new case study illustrating how the U.S. platform industry engages in cooperation with foreign governments regarding social media content moderation. It also shows how efforts to counter foreign state propaganda can lead to censorship. The South Korean government has characterized the North Korean channels as integral to North Korea's soft propaganda campaign, portraying the country as normal, peaceful, affluent, and stable while concealing its actual and contrasting realities. As an illustration, an attractive female vlogger from 'Olivia Natasha-Yumi Space DPRK Daily' showcased luxurious dining and shopping experiences in Pyongyang. Similarly, 'Song A' depicted a serene North Korean school life, her affectionate family, and traditions associated with Korean Thanksgiving. The NIS asserted that many scenes in these channels were orchestrated and did not accurately represent life in North Korea. Consequently, the NIS collaborated closely with Google to eliminate these channels, aiming to curb the creation of sympathizers for North Korea worldwide. From the South Korean standpoint, the removal of social media content and the imposition of limitations on freedom of expression are viewed as lawful responses. This perspective stems from the fact that both Koreas officially designate each other as enemy states, and the absence of a peace treaty following the Korean War which means that the two nations remain legally in a state of war. The National Security Act, established in 1948, specifically allows for the restriction of freedom of expression in cases where certain actions are perceived to support North Korea. These actions include praising the North Korean communist ideology (Juche Idea), venerating Kim Jong-un and his regime, and inciting anti-government or terrorist activities. This legal framework bears similarities to Germany's laws restricting freedom of expression concerning Nazism and Hitler. Nevertheless, Google's compliance with the NIS request raises important questions about free speech. It is essential to note that Google chose not merely to remove specific North Korean propaganda videos but instead opted to delete entire video lists and channels. This decision prompts inquiries into whether sharing Korean culture and cuisine with global viewers is deemed as threatening propaganda. On YouTube, numerous vloggers, both individual and government-affiliated, showcase Korean food, music, films, travel destinations, daily life in Seoul, and other facets of Korean culture. The distinction between these activities and North Korean propaganda videos comes into question. Does South Korea exclusively possess the right to represent Korean culture to the world? It is customary for nations to accentuate their positive aspects while concealing their challenges, a practice Western governments do, too. Certain open source intelligence experts express apprehensions that restricting North Korea's access to global social media platforms might exacerbate the country's isolation, as YouTube channels could serve as a means of communication with the international community. Intriguingly, following the content removal, pro-North Korean TikTok accounts have surfaced, leading South Korean experts to speculate that North Korea may have shifted its platforms from YouTube to TikTok to persist in its propaganda efforts. Given these considerations, there is a sentiment that Google should have targeted specific harmful videos from North Korean channels rather than removing entire channels and their content. There is no sympathy here for North Korea's brutal and reprehensible actions, including human trafficking, arms smuggling, cyber crimes, nuclear threats, mass starvation, and concentration camps. However, this condemnation does not negate North Korea's right to present Korean traditions and culture to a global audience, potentially fostering shared understanding within the international community.

  • Sep 2023
  • The Narrative: September 15, 2023

    Reports on the evolving digital political economy

    A Victory for Free Speech on Social Media

    A federal appeals court has upheld a finding that U.S. federal officials violated the First Amendment by coercing or strongly encouraging social-media platforms to censor content. The court also narrowed the scope and targets of the lower court's preliminary injunction, finding it "both vague and broader than necessary to remedy the Plaintiffs’ injuries." The decision singled out the President's office, the FBI and the CDC for overstepping their powers, but absolved the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the State Department.  Unless overturned by the Supreme Court, the decision erects an important safeguard against governmental attempts to turn the dominant social media platforms into tools of governmental public opinion management. The Court wrote "... the Supreme Court has rarely been faced with a coordinated campaign of this magnitude orchestrated by federal officials that jeopardized a fundamental aspect of American life." Invoking the “the close nexus test,” which makes private editorial decisions unconstitutional if they are coerced or significantly encouraged by the government, the Court wrote:
    • "We find that the White House, acting in concert with the Surgeon General’s office, likely (1) coerced the platforms to make their moderation decisions by way of intimidating messages and threats of adverse consequences, and (2) significantly encouraged the platforms’ decisions by commandeering their decision-making processes, both in violation of the First Amendment." 
    • We find that the FBI, too, likely (1) coerced the platforms into moderating content, and (2) encouraged them to do so by effecting changes to their moderation policies, both in violation of the First Amendment.
    • We find that, although not plainly coercive, the CDC officials likely significantly encouraged the platforms’ moderation decisions, meaning they violated the First Amendment. …Ultimately, the platforms came to heavily rely on the CDC [and] adopted rule changes meant to implement the CDC’s guidance." 
    The Appeals court ruled that there was not enough evidence that NIAID, the State Department, and CISA coerced or significantly encouraged the platforms. Dr Fauci’s NIAID was just trying to promote its own view, and State Department officials did not flag specific content for censorship or suggest policy changes. Although CISA flagged content for social-media platforms, the court held that its conduct was an “attempt to convince,” not an “attempt to coerce.”  The Court (correctly, in our opinion) ruled that the July 4 preliminary injunction issued by the District Court was too vague, and broader than necessary. The court wrote, "It is axiomatic that an injunction is overbroad if it enjoins a defendant from engaging in legal conduct. Nine of the preliminary injunction’s ten prohibitions risk doing just that. Moreover, many of the provisions are duplicative of each other and thus unnecessary." "The injunction’s carve outs do not solve its clarity and scope problems. Although they seem to greenlight legal speech, the carve outs, too, include vague terms and appear to authorize activities that the injunction otherwise prohibits on its face." The new, modified injunction reads:  "Defendants, and their employees and agents, shall take no actions, formal or informal, directly or indirectly, to coerce or significantly encourage social-media companies to remove, delete, suppress, or reduce, including through altering their algorithms, posted social-media content containing protected free speech. That includes, but is not limited to, compelling the platforms to act, such as by intimating that some form of punishment will follow a failure to comply with any request, or supervising, directing, or otherwise meaningfully controlling the social-media companies’ decision-making processes."  That wording seems to us to be right on target. The injunction delayed itself to allow the Biden administration to appeal to the Supreme Court, however, which unfortunately the government chose to do. It is disturbing that our government is to intent on retaining the power to manipulate social media content. 

    Google Antitrust and the Ghost of Microsoft 

    Three years after the Trump administration initiated an antitrust lawsuit, the trial of Google has begun. The trial is supposed to determine whether Google’s dominance in search and advertising came from illegal exclusionary acts. Defenders of Google cite the relative ease with which users can access other search engines and say it is used by 90% of the market because it is the best; detractors point to the power of default settings and the huge sums Google pays to Apple and others to be the default search engine.  We think the Justice Department’s case for consumer harm is extraordinarily weak in this case, but whatever the courts decide about that, we need to focus on the question of what is an appropriate remedy if Google is found guilty. The DoJ’s request for relief says only “Enjoin Google from continuing to engage in the anticompetitive practices.” So, what if Google stops the allegedly anticompetitive practices and still remains dominant?  European antitrust attacks on Google have produced enormous fines and a few structural adjustments, but they have had no effect on its dominance of search. The DoJ also says “Enter structural relief as needed to cure any anticompetitive harm.” OK, what “structural relief”?  Supporters of the lawsuit wistfully invoke the Microsoft case from 23 years ago, which the government won, sort of. It should be noted, however, that despite the court’s 2000 finding of monopoly power, proposals to “break up” Microsoft were quickly abandoned once antitrust authorities started thinking about what that would entail. A forced separation of applications and OS monitored by federal regulators did not sound like a good way to run the software industry. All the lawsuit accomplished, ultimately, was a settlement in which Microsoft made the Internet Explorer browser a distinct application outside the OS. Yet for all that, we are still debating whether the 2001 Microsoft antitrust settlement did anything. Those who think it did, claim that the encounter with antitrust law and the separate browser made it easier for new players such as Google and Mozilla to arise. Those who think it did not matter point to the changing techno-economic conditions over the 14-year long case. Middleware browsers were a disruptive technical change. The rise of Google could not have been stopped by Microsoft even if the government had done nothing - the industry was progressing inevitably toward a network interface in which browser and cloud-based applications would undermine the desktop monopoly. They also assert that the Netscape Navigator browser lost its competition with Microsoft not because of the software firm’s unfair tactics, but because Navigator was full of bugs and performance problems by 1998.  Market conditions change. It took three years just to move from lawsuit to trial in this case. The Microsoft trial started in 1998, the settlement was implemented in 2002, and the consent decree didn’t expire until 2012. If this trial goes on, will the market conditions of 2020 still be relevant? We offer Google free advice: save yourself the hassle; settle this one out of court by generalizing the European solution everywhere, prompting consumers to choose a search engine when initiating a device. Google loses an insignificant amount of users, and uses the money it saves on lawyers to focus on emerging market, Large Language Models (LLMs) - which seem to have emerged despite Google’s alleged stifling of innovation. What we have here is Schumpeterian competition based on new production functions, not neoclassical competition over margins. The Google trial replays another round of antitrust lawyers’ inability to come to grips with the effects of direct and indirect network externalities. In a separate fast-tracked suit set for trial in 2024, Democrats will be focusing on Google's alleged abuse of the ad tech market, where publishers monetize eyeballs for advertisers who pay the publisher for the AdSpace. We will explore this more nuanced antitrust suit in a forthcoming blog post.

    An “ambitious” technology agenda for the G20 devoid of civil society

    The 2023 G20 Leaders' Summit in India, where the African Union was welcomed as a full-fledged group member, concluded with the issuance of the New Delhi Declaration. India's ability to achieve consensus and secure support from global leaders for a rules-based and inclusive global trade system, while advocating for fair competition and discouraging protectionism amid ongoing geopolitical tensions, is being hailed as a significant diplomatic accomplishment. In addition to addressing challenges related to economic growth, sustainable development and climate change, the declaration emphasizes the importance of technological transformation and digital public infrastructure (DPI), with a specific focus on responsible AI development, digital security, and Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). The document defines DPI as a continually evolving concept and a collection of shared digital systems created and leveraged by both the public and private sectors. These systems are based on secure and resilient infrastructure and can be constructed using open standards, specifications, and open-source software to facilitate the delivery of services at a societal scale. The leaders have endorsed voluntary and non-binding policy recommendations to advance DPI, acknowledged the significance of the free flow of data with trust and cross-border data flows while respecting relevant legal frameworks, and reaffirmed the role of data for development. G20 countries have also committed to integrating DPI into the Financial Inclusion Action Plan for the next three years and have adopted the G20 Framework for Systems of Digital Public Infrastructure. This framework is voluntary and serves as a suggested guideline for the development, deployment, and governance of DPI. India has also put forward a proposal to establish a Global DPI Repository and has introduced the One Future Alliance, which aims to support the deployment of DPI in low and middle-income countries. However, the G20's failure to adequately involve civil society in its decision-making processes and policy discussions is a significant shortcoming. The G20 represents some of the world's largest economies and wields considerable influence over global policies. However, it operates without the direct representation of civil society organizations, which are essential stakeholders in addressing complex global issues. G20 meetings and discussions are typically conducted behind closed doors, without opportunities for civil society organizations to observe or contribute. G20's failure to involve civil society in its decision-making processes and policy discussions is a significant drawback that undermines the effectiveness, transparency, and legitimacy of this influential international forum.

    Assessing disinformation: Logically’s report on Fukushima 

    On August 24, Japan initiated the release of treated wastewater from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean, with the support of the Japanese government, the scientific community, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Logically, a British tech startup specializing in identifying disinformation, published a report on China’s propaganda campaign related to the Fukushima wastewater release. Since early 2023, IGP has also monitored instances of disinformation regarding the Fukushima issue as part of the IAEA’s Coordinated Research Project. We aim to cross-referencing Logically’s findings with our own comprehensive account of disinformation practices, including data from Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station. Logically’s analysis reveals a series of concerted efforts by Chinese officials, state media, and pro-China influencers to spread disinformation and narratives about Japan’s Fukushima wastewater release. Logically utilized their AI-driven threat intelligence platform and conducted primary and secondary research to scrutinize the narratives amplified by Chinese State officials and media. They observed content on platforms such as Weibo, Meta, and X, which included identifying paid advertisements through Meta's ad library. They found social media posts that:
    • Challenged IAEA’s safety report as flawed, and cast doubt on IAEA’s support for Japan’s plan.
    • Claimed that the wastewater release will contaminate Japanese seafood.
    • Amplified concerns about the plan expressed by Japanese fishermen and South Korean and Chinese people.
    • Referred to “treated wastewater” as “nuclear-contaminated water.”
    They also found examples of a Chinese propaganda campaign in traditional media, claiming that:
    • The Global Times published 126 English articles, and the People's Daily produced 74 articles in English and 60 in Japanese. Between January and August 2023, the Global Times published 126 English articles, and the People's Daily produced 74 articles in English and 60 in Japanese related to Fukushima wastewater release.
    • China Central Television, and other Chinese organizations ran at least 22 paid advertisements on Meta on the risks posed by wastewater release.
    • There was a 1509% increase in posts mentioning "Fukushima" by Chinese state media, officials, and pro-China influencers.
    Examples of top Weibo hashtags related to the Fukushima wastewater included:
    • “Japan will use 70 billion yen to deal with negative information about nuclear-contaminated water” - 430 million reads.
    • “Are China’s Japanese restaurants going out of business in droves?” - 320 million reads.
    • “Provinces most affected by Japan's nuclear sewage” - 130 million reads.
    The data and methods used by Logically aren’t divulged, a common problem in the cottage industry of disinfo monitoring. Logically’s report about this campaign is not inconsistent with IGP's findings to date. IGP has reviewed over 200 governmental and corporation statements and content pieces from various online sources, encompassing both traditional media and social media platforms across East Asian nations. They also underscore that Chinese state media disseminated inaccurate and provocative narratives concerning the Fukushima wastewater release, including doubts about the IAEA's independence, emphasizing Japan's lobbying activities within the IAEA and the scientific community, and amplification of public resentment in South Korea, Japan, and China.  However, Logically's report also highlights a limitation in grasping the broader Fukushima wastewater disinformation context. To fully comprehend ongoing disinformation activities related to the Fukushima wastewater release, we should broaden our perspectives beyond state-led actors like the Chinese government, and focus also on non-state actors. IGP's has found that many of the examples and revelations in Logically's report could also be applicable to regions like South Korea and Japan, where governments support the wastewater release plan. For instance, South Korean media has highlighted the potential harmful consequences of releasing Fukushima wastewater, emphasizing its potential to adversely affect marine life and disrupt the local ecosystem. Japanese media has also extensively covered the apprehensions raised by the Japanese fishing industry well in advance of the commencement of the wastewater release. Essentially, IGP suspects individuals and media outlets in East Asia actively engage in debate, misinformation and possibly even disinformation dissemination, irrespective of their governments' positions, and they play an equally important role in spreading disinformation. For instance, we’ve identified that several civic groups in South Korea and Japan ran paid advertisements on Meta to propagate false narratives concerning the wastewater release and environmental concerns. The IGP team believes that disinformation surrounding the Fukushima wastewater release is more complex than just state-led disinformation.

    Huawei Mate 60 Pro Leaps over the “High Fence” 

    Huawei took DC insiders by surprise with its release of its flagship Mate 60 Pro. In China, Mate 60 Pro was framed as a success that broke the US’s coordinated chip manufacturing blockade. US export controls have definitely hindered Huawei, which blocked its access to TSMC chips, lithography equipment, and the latest design automation intellectual property, but a teardown  investigation into Mate 60 Pro has shown that sanctions have not prevented Huawei's chip supplier SMIC from manufacturing 7nm chips with decent parametric yields.  While SMIC is not self-sufficient yet, loopholes within current export control policies made it possible for them to source tools from equipment companies typically used in 28 nm processes and adapt them for the more advanced 7nm process.  The Mate 60 pro release was timed when U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo was still in Beijing. The US government has begun a check on the “character and composition” of the phone. Despite a clear failure of their stated goals, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan maintained that the United States “should continue on its course of a ‘small yard, high fence’ set of technology restrictions focused narrowly on national security concerns (…) regardless of the outcome.” Any add-ons to the existing export control regime targeting SMIC will raise the stakes of the technological standoff between China and the US. The only way to fully fix these loopholes would be full measures that further limit the basic equipment and tools of chip-making to an unprecedented scale. Such an unfortunate outcome would only serve to heighten tensions, harm US manufacturers and accelerate decoupling. After the recent Huawei release, any further possible US export controls will only strengthen Beijing's tendency to pursue self-sufficiency in its technological capacity, and reinforce its distrust towards US intentions.

    Don’t Rely on Foreign Policy Think Tanks for Global AI Governance Advice

    The venerable Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has published its September issue, which explores The Hype, Peril, and Promise of Artificial Intelligence. In it, Rumtin Sepasspour of @CSERCambridge and defense policy oriented think tank Global Catastrophic Risk Policy authors a “premium” (apparently the latest iteration of data, compute and algorithms only impacts premium readership?) piece, "A reality check and a way forward for the global governance of artificial intelligence”. It makes several useful observations about the need for targeted and focused governance, and clearly identifying “what policy outcomes are being sought and which institutional functions are needed to reach those outcomes.”  Yet, in typical fashion of the AI community, the author confines its proposed solutions to multilateral ones. We continue to be surprised at the AI community's lack of awareness of the range of institutionalized global governance options, particularly those engaged in Internet governance (which is arguably a hell of a lot closer topically to AI than hypothetical “existential” threats), where recognition of stakeholder incentives results in active, voluntary participation in collective action to address a variety of serious transnational problems. For some background on how and why these networked governance structures work where hierarchical (e.g., state led) solutions don’t, start with our 2013 International Studies Review article  

  • Webinar Analyzing India Stack

    In an era where digitalization is rapidly transforming societies and economies, the question of digital sovereignty has taken center stage. How can nations harness the power of technology while safeguarding their autonomy and interests? India, with its burgeoning digital landscape, is at the forefront of this conversation. As part of its G20 presidency, India has been pushing the need for a framework for digital public infrastructure (DPI) and has secured the agreement of all 20 nations to work towards a global framework and the establishment of a global repository of DPI. To delve into this vital topic, we are excited to announce an upcoming webinar where IGP researcher Jyoti Panday will discuss her new research India Stack: Public-Private Roads to Data Sovereignty (September 1, 2023). We will discuss IGP's research on India Stack and the impact of sovereignty on governance of digital technologies and markets. The webinar brings together experts to reflect on the rise of state-market collaboration related to DPIs including identifying shared opportunities, challenges and learnings as well as the trade-offs associated with the emergence of DPIs. Webinar Details:

    • Date: 20 September, 2023
    • Time: 
      • Asia - New Delhi (6:30 pm)
      • Europe - Berlin (3 pm)
      • Africa - Kenya (4 pm) 
      • United Kingdom (2 pm)
      • South America - Rio (10 am)
      • North America  - Atlanta (9 am)
    • Duration: 1.5 hrs 
    • Platform: Zoom 
    Discussant/ Speakers:
    • Dr Pramod Varma, Former Chief Architect Aadhaar & India Stack, CTO EkStep Foundation, Co-Founder FIDE.org and Creator of becknprotocol.io, Co-Chair at Center for DPI (CDPI.dev)
    • Anupam Chander, Scott K. Ginsburg Professor of Law and Technology, Georgetown Law
    • Smriti Parsheera, Fellow, CyberBRICS Project, Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) Law School 
    Why Should You Attend?  Discover insights and milestones of the development of India Stack. Our panel of professionals, researchers and academics will unpack the emergence of DPIs and their impact on internet governance. The webinar will provide an opportunity for the academic community and other practitioners to share their experiences and build valuable connections with stakeholders involved in the development of DPIs in India and beyond.  Reserve a spot here to access the webinar. 

  • The Narrative: September 1, 2023

    Reports on the evolving digital political economy

    Human Authorship and AI Images

    A lot of bad policy about AI is being made because people are overstating its risks. These overstatements usually derive from overestimating the autonomous nature of the AI. Now we are getting some bad law for the same reason. Stephen Thaler applies to the U.S. Copyright office to copyright a picture generated by his AI system. Thaler alleges that the image was generated “without human involvement.” The Copyright Office accepts this as fact and refuses to grant a copyright. Thaler sues the Copyright Office. Predictably, the Judge grants the Copyright Office’s motion for summary judgment, saying: “U.S. copyright law protects only works of human creation.”  The Judge treated this decision entirely as a matter of law. Procedurally correct, but substantively wrong. There are, in fact, factual issues here that have not been properly aired. Specifically, we question the plaintiff’s claim that the art was generated with no human involvement. Every AI-driven image generator we know of (e.g., Midjourney or DALL-E) requires humans to enter prompts to generate an image. Interesting, useful images coming out of these systems often involve multiple prompts as the human seeks an output more to their liking. Saying there is no human authorship in an AI-generated image is like saying there is no human authorship in a photograph. Yes, machines make the image but humans tell it what and how to image. Since 1884, U.S. law has recognized photography as a form of original authorship. Other than the spurious claims of “no human involvement” It’s hard to understand why AI image outputs are less humanly-authored than photographs. In honor of Stephen Thaler’s legal blunder, however, we have appropriated the image he tried to copyright as our illustration for this week’s Narrative. So sue us.

    Sauron called - He wants his Orb back!

    If you haven’t heard of the controversial orbs popping up around the globe and scanning people’s eyeballs, that would be the work of the Worldcoin Foundation, based in the Cayman Islands. Together with World Assets Ltd., a British Virgin Islands limited company, they govern the World ID Protocol. The rapidly expanding subsidiary organization doing the work behind this technology is the cleverly named - Tools for Humanity. The Worldcoin foundation has two primary products - the worldcoin itself and the world ID. Both of these are interlinked. World ID is an identity protocol that allows a user to prove they are uniquely human and (optionally) perform a specific action only once. The aim is to extend this “proof of personhood” (POP) service for companies and governments to leverage through a software development kit. The unique ID is generated to every user only once using a unique pair of a public and a private key whose integrity derives from privacy-preserving zero-knowledge proof schemes. The “coin” part in “Worldcoin” appears for now to only be an incentive to encourage adoption by issuing tokens to early adopters, more on that later. According to the Worldcoin whitepaper, iris scans are locally processed in the orb hardware and then generate a unique “iris code”  to "numerically represent the texture of an iris." The user can then choose to store or delete their biometric data. In the latter case, only the hash remains and the user gets to store their private key in the app. The foundation claims they don’t collect any personal information (name, email, phone number etc), but that other third parties leveraging the World ID might. The foundation collects facial and iris scan which is again proactively deleted if the user doesn’t opt into a data custody arrangement. It is done in the name of proof of personhood; to check if you are a human and the individual you claim to be.  A potentially significant flaw in this type of single-party trusted system is that the foundation needs to be trusted to delete the parameter, scans in this case. Failure in doing so risks the protocol. This trust is not easy to bootstrap in an open system and yet as of today, around 2.2 million people have signed for a worldID. We know that it’s 2.2 million people and not random bots because, well, that’s what worldID is for.  The Worldcoin foundation doesn’t want us to take their word for it. They requested two security audits to examine the soundness of their cryptographic constructs and how they’re implemented. Nothing stands out in particular about the auditing security firms, one based in Germany founded in 2011 called Least Authority and the other in the UK founded in 2017 called Nethermind. But their claim to fame is the examination of WorldCoin. Nethermind’s audits shows that some “critical” vulnerabilities were addressed and one issue pertaining to ActionIDs (a unique proof of action for applications leveraging WorldID) remains unresolved. Least Authority focused on elliptic curves finding insufficient security in the current implementation. Better implementations with higher computational hardness to break the cryptographic scheme would come at a cost to system performance.  While the foundation was transparent in acknowledging the significant security issues, it’s surprising to see that such a sensitive project from a privacy standpoint is able to launch a minimum viable product and allowed to fix critical security issues as they evolve. One could claim that the only way to detect software flaws in a complicated socio-technical system is by using it in the real world. Then again, using low-income people in Kenya and other places for whom a monetary incentive of $30-$60 goes a long way is a bad look. We don’t know if, broadly speaking, people are signing up to get their eyes scanned because they buy into the threat of AI, are in it for speculative gains, or for the monetary rewards.  El Salvador tried that approach as a way to bootstrap their Bitcoin Standard and its associated “Chivo” wallet but has been failing miserably. It seems the lesson wasn’t learned. There’s nothing wrong in signing up for incentives or speculative gains, as long as the conditions are well understood, but we doubt that is the case if one considers the implementation strategy or the fact that the Worldcoin foundation doesn’t consider its token a security. Despite that, the Worldcoin General Purchasing Term and Tools for Humanity end user license agreement sets out to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in the courtroom, a move common in the securities industry when it comes to broker-dealer relationships.  While the technical protocol has gone through a security audit, the orb itself presents potential security risks. We don’t know of any backdoors in the hardware component yet but the probability of installing one by an attacker is not zero. There have been reports of leaked credentials of orbs operators on the black market already which suggests a potential for gaming the system. This is why the centers and orbs are limited in number.  All right, the Sauron reference may be a bit much. After all it’s not the same right? Frodo prevailed in the end and we don’t know how this will turn out. The foundation and their advocates are pitching a “privacy-preserving solution” to “AI-jobs displacement” by providing “universal basic income”. This ambiguous marketing narrative is a contrived attempt to appeal to the broadest possible polity where weariness of BigTech is the common denominator. Sam Altman told Coindesk, “the hope is that as people want to buy this token, because they believe this is the future, there will be inflows into this economy. New token-buyers is how it gets paid for, effectively.” If you’re thinking that sounds a lot like a Ponzi-scheme, you may be right, but it’s too early to tell.  We suspect the lack of a well-specified problem-solution statement and engineering around it will yield unexpected results in the real world. Are we solving for AI-generated disinformation, age verification, or universal basic income? It can’t be all of the above. These are thorny problems with different requirements we will explore in more depth in a forthcoming blog post. WorldID is an impressive and promising technical solution in search of a specific problem that isn’t well-defined yet.

    The Camp David Statement

    The White House issued the Spirit of Camp David statement following the Trilateral Summit with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan on August 18th. The statement reflects an agreement by the three countries to work together to facilitate decoupling from China In high technology areas like semiconductors, batteries, technology security, clean energy, biotechnology, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, and scientific research. It is also supposed to divert supply chains away from China toward ASEAN developing countries. The trilateral collaboration is intended to lead to a greater distribution of semiconductor import sources away from Taiwan and across various ASEAN nations. As a follow up, the United States, South Korea, and Japan agreed to explore ways to provide new World Bank Group concessional resources and support for the poorest countries in ASEAN.  Additionally, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan have agreed to enhance trilateral cooperation on export controls to prevent cutting-edge technologies from being misused for military or dual-purpose capabilities. Aligned with the technology protection efforts, the countries will enhance joint scientific and technological innovation. This involves establishing new trilateral collaborations through National Labs, expanding joint research and development, and facilitating personnel exchanges particularly in STEM sectors. These actions are intended to counter China's potential use of its economic power as leverage over ASEAN nations. Enhancing safeguards for cutting-edge technologies and using National Labs can also be interpreted as part of the United States' endeavors to manage China's increasing technological impact on South Korea and Japan. Although the statement outlines general goals and agreements, the finer details of these commitments will be institutionalized during the upcoming meeting in October. Will the isolation of China from the global supply-chain economy and the reinforcement of export controls on specific technologies through these pledges genuinely contribute to our national security? We might gain a more comprehensive understanding of these nations' specific commitments in October and our annual IGP conference meeting in November.

    Openness Doesn’t Necessarily Work Against Bigness

    A recent paper by David Widder from CMU, Meredith Whittaker from Signal, and Sarah West of AI Now, “Open (For Business): Big Tech, Concentrated Power, and the Political Economy of Open AI” finds that,
    a handful of maximally open AI systems exist, which offer intentional and extensive transparency, reusability, and extensibility – [but] the resources needed to build AI from scratch, and to deploy large AI systems at scale, remain ‘closed’—available only to those with significant (almost always corporate) resources.
    Those aren’t actually “resources” in the economic sense, rather they are possible qualities of AI systems. The resources that are inputs to current generative AI systems are data, compute, and algorithms. Since the emergence of the transformer model era those resources are incredibly important to producing value. So, it’s logical that contention over those resources and creating exclusivity around them is now at the center of many AI debates, from art to semiconductors and software. What’s important to pay attention to is the parties involved and what they are advocating. In the authors’ opinion, current “AI systems don’t operate like traditional software – they require distinct development processes and rely on specialized and costly resources currently pooled in the hands of a few large tech companies.” Perhaps, but these firms are investing and risking millions on the resources needed to possibly create value. Likewise, those same firms rely on openness to help produce value too. E.g., some data used to train models is co-produced. Proprietary and open approaches co-exist, each creating value, just in different ways. Over recent months, advancements in open models and fine-tuning techniques have significantly reduced the cost and simplified the process of experimenting with LLMs on domain specific data sets. In short, the paper does give the reader an idea of how the political economy perspective provides insight on AI and more generally, digital issues, something IGP has advocated for some time. It’s a critical examination of the notion of “open” or “open source” and Open AI touches on issues of property rights without saying it (because info-communists hate those, yuck!) and how it relates to openness, exclusivity, and production of value.

    Amazon Takes Up The Digital Sovereignty Agenda 

    Last year, Amazon Web Services (AWS) announced the Digital Sovereignty Pledge, a commitment to provide a spectrum of controls and functionalities within the cloud environment to allow customers to control the location and movement of their data. AWS has launched services like AWS Regions anand AWS Local Zones that enable customers to deploy their data in a region of their choice to comply with data residency regulations. In line with efforts to transform itself into a "sovereign-by-design platform", last week, AWS launched a new cloud service called Dedicated Local Zones, a type of exclusive on-premise infrastructure that is fully managed by local AWS personnel and includes features such as “data access monitoring and audit programs, controls to limit infrastructure access to customer-selected AWS accounts, and options to enforce security clearance or other criteria on local AWS operating personnel.”  It is easy to see why AWS is pushing through these infrastructural controls. Data sovereignty regulations vary significantly from one country to another, and may necessitate the establishment of local data centers and infrastructure. This environment has resulted in fragmentation of data storage and management practices,  and a complex web of requirements for organizations to navigate making it challenging for global businesses to maintain a cohesive data strategy.  Disagreements over data sharing and storage might escalate political tensions between countries.  There are two confused notions of sovereignty here. One just means the owner of data controls it. The other is the 500 year old political notion of sovereignty which refers to the exclusivityand supremacy of state power in a territory. While data sovereignty aims to protect a country's digital interests, forcing data to be stored within national borders introduces a range of challenges, including economic burdens, potential hindrance to innovation and exposing data to threats. For cloud-based services, which often rely on distributed data storage, striking a balance between safeguarding data and facilitating global data flows is a complex task that requires careful consideration and adaptation to the evolving digital landscape. At the same time, policies being pursued by AWS to respond to digital sovereignty demands could end up providing governments with greater control over citizens' data, potentially infringing on privacy rights and enabling surveillance. 

  • May 2023
  • The Narrative: Panic over Generative AI Risks; WebPKI GIG-AR ...

    15 May, 2023

    More Wrong Thinking on Generative AI Risks

    Civil society is in trouble if the musings of an anonymous philosopher on the LESSWRONG website, most likely by a national security official with access to a closed CISA meeting, reflects the current zeitgeist inside governments concerning generative AI. The piece asks the question, Are Advances in LLMs a National Security Risk?  While there are legitimate reasons to be concerned with generative AI risks (and even take action like requiring system cards) the author’s argument is that only governments have the ability and should mitigate possible harms through controlling the technology. Troublingly, the author ignores their own evidence leading them to that false conclusion. E.g., if cybersecurity insurance premiums are indeed growing then that means there are even stronger incentives for decentralized, but interconnected actors to develop defenses instead of transferring risk. The author goes on to argue the need for international diplomacy with adversaries (which is fine in principle), citing nuclear arrangements and that “under even modest assumptions [LLMs] constitute a threat to order larger than any other weapons system to date.” The conceptualization and logic here are baffling. First of all, yes, militaries are using AI in their operations and we should all be concerned about it, but the fantasy that algorithms equate to kinetic weapons that can annihilate hundreds of thousands or millions of humans in seconds is absurd (remember the similar Cyber Pearl Harbor threat that hasn’t materialized?). Moreover, low-level, interstate cyber conflict is omnipresent, this is because the benefits of engaging in that activity outweigh the costs and there are limited (if any) consequences, states exist in a condition of anarchy. Thus a more likely outcome is that, even if adversarial states were to engage in developing international mechanisms (e.g., norms) for controlling generative AI, states will continue to use the technology to their advantage when "necessary" while civil society endures the associated costs (e.g., a Manhattan Project for AI safety) of the controls.

    GIG-Arts 2023

    We will be presenting our analysis on "WebPKI and Non-Governmental Governance of Trust on the Internet" at the GIG-ARTS conference on Tuesday, May 16th, 2023. The conference theme revolves around the Governance of Cybersecurity and our analysis delves into the development of transnational, cooperative, and private-sector-driven governance within the Certificate Authority and Browser Forum (CAB Forum). We investigate how this governance structure addresses the challenges of collective action problems in order to promote the adoption of security standards. Over the past decade, the Forum has led various notable initiatives, including Network Security Requirements, the progressive Baseline Requirements for Certificate Issuance, and the recent implementation of Certificate Transparency. The Forum has successfully managed these reforms through a distinctive governance framework that grants voting rights to certificate producers and consumers. Our study employs a mixed-methods approach to characterize the Forum's stakeholders, governance mechanisms, and voting patterns. Our presentation includes initial findings on external factors that influence the Forum, such as - market share among Certificate Authorities, interoperability across Browser root stores, security incidents, and alternative governance platforms and consistent themes that emerged from qualitative analysis and semi-structured interviews. These themes encompass a preference for consensus-based decision-making, power dynamics between Certificate Authorities and Browsers, and the challenges faced by non-native English speakers in a diverse forum. We synthesize these findings to outline potential opportunities, dynamics of industry self-governance, social trust considerations, and risks to the sustainability of the Forum. Finally, we conclude our findings by offering policy recommendations.

    Oversight Board Consultation 

    IGP attended the Oversight Board "Shaheed" PAO Asia Roundtable" focusing on Facebook and Instagram’s moderation of the word “shaheed” in reference to people on Meta’s “Dangerous Individuals and Organizations” list. The term “shaheed” is translated by Meta as “martyr” in English. It accounts for more content removals under the Community Standards than any other single word or phrase on Meta’s platforms. The roundtable was attended by several human rights and legal institutions, civil society, and digital rights organizations based in Asia. This case provides an opportunity to highlight how ambiguous terms like "shaheed" are being used to automate censorship of individuals that are designated as dangerous by the government. Meta's policies can negatively impact disadvantaged and marginalized communities and lead to extra-judicial censorship of legitimate speech. The discussions focused on the context in which the word is being used, for example freedom fighters in India and Pakistan are referred to using the word shaheed. Shaheed is also an honorific term given to soldiers who have fallen in the line of duty and citizens who are casualties of war, terrorism or heroes who died saving lives during disasters. While context of use is important it does not address wide censorship that is enabled around ambiguous terms like shaheed.  For example, any community fighting for self-determination or standing up against the state's might may use the term "shaheed" or martyr to describe its compatriots. Self-determination by communities and secession efforts are viewed and treated as a threat to the state, until they become politically viable options. Therefore, enabling such wide censorship will eventually contribute to extending power struggles that often are rooted in the history and identities that exist and operate outside of social media.  IGP raised the Burhan Wani case as an example that could be useful in understanding the censorship implications and the wide powers that platforms have in the context of this case. The Indian government shut the internet down to block conversation and protests in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and simultaneously, platforms like Meta and Instagram censored conversation beyond J&K. Though it is not clear whether Meta's moderation team carried out the blocks using the term 'martyr' the official statement from the company acknowledges they removed content that was "praised" or deemed to be supportive of terrorists, terror groups, etc. As the case highlights, Meta's global team exercises a certain amount of judgment. In the case of content from J&K, all posts need to be put in a context that condemns these "terrorist organizations" and their "violent activities". This resulted in the legitimate speech of journalists, and citizens being shut down.  Another related point raised by IGP in the context of community standards around “Dangerous Individuals and Organizations” is the amendment of India's terror law, the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act in August 2019. The amended law includes provisions to enable designating an individual as a "terrorist" and has been used to label critics, activists, journalists, academics, and citizens as such. The UAPA repackages ideas as crimes and enables the government's subversion of principles of justice and due process The UAPA is being challenged in the courts but with the courts coming out to protect the state against individual liberty, it looks like the law is here to stay. Meta needs to take a call on terms like "shaheed" bearing in mind how these measures contribute to shaping the restrictions on liberty in India and elsewhere. By allowing broad censorship based on such ambiguous terms, social media companies are wading into political conflict. 

  • Apr 2023
  • The Narrative: AI regulation frenzy; An assault on proof of ...

    15 April, 2023

    The AI Regulation Frenzy

    Technology panics now seem to go through fashion cycles. Last month it was Tiktok. The new trend in town is AI regulation. Would-be policy influencers are falling all over themselves to advance the idea that “We are hurtling forward in a way that is not the right level of responsibility, implementing AI …without any legal barriers, without any regulation.” That statement came from Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Director Jen Easterly. Easterly went on to compare AI to nuclear weapons, as if GPT-4’s weird conversations were comparable to a radioactive explosive that could kill half a million people in minutes. Easterly’s statement follows a hyperventilating statement by the “Future of Life Institute,” calling on “all AI labs to immediately pause for at least 6 months the training of AI systems more powerful than GPT-4.” For a more grounded perspective on AI, here’s a nice paper documenting “Eight Things to Know about Large Language Models. Stimulated by Chat GPT’s success in writing essays, the panic is based on three highly questionable assumptions: 1) AI is a single homogeneous technology rather than a diverse set of applications; 2) its development poses new and unique threats to humanity; and 3) government agencies can define and mitigate those threats by certifying or regulating AI applications in advance of their deployment. No one seems to be thinking critically about any one of those assumptions. We will be.

    US Commerce Department RFC on AI

    Clearly showing who’s the fashion leader among DC agencies, the U.S. Commerce Department’s  National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) issued a formal request for comment on AI regulation April 11. The Wall Street Journal, quoted NTIA director Alan Davidson saying, “We know that we need to put some guardrails in place to make sure that [AI capabilities] are being used responsibly.” “Guardrails” is the new DC buzzword for…practically everything they want to do. The RFC, entitled “AI Accountability Policy” is open for the next two months. NTIA has no regulatory authority but aims to play a lead role in forming policy for the Biden administration. Written comments in response to the RFC must be provided to NTIA by June 12, 2023. IGP will be filing comments. 

    An assault on proof of work: bad policymaking or a power play for ulterior motives?

    Things seem to be moving slowly in the US digital asset space, and SEC enforcement actions aside, we haven’t seen much action coming into Q2 2023. There are pressing concerns with the non-settling war in Ukraine, inflation, failing banks, and shifting alliances on the geopolitical front. So what else has been going on with crypto lately? In early March 2023, the Biden administration released its Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2024 with a laundry list of proposed tax amendments to curb the now cartoonishly large US debt. Page 71 includes a provision labeled “impose digital asset mining energy excise tax.” This provision has not received nearly enough scrutiny as it should have. Proof of work computing which creates the supply of Bitcoin will be subject to a 30% excise tax when mined on US soil based on its “estimated electricity costs”. If approved by the Ways and Means Committee, this proposal will be effective on December 31, 2023, and would be phased in at a rate of 10% per year. The rationale for this tax according to the US Treasury is to curb the negative environmental effects and increased prices for those sharing a grid with a mining operation. The Treasury reasons that reducing mining activity is a viable pursuit for its own sake because of the many harms that it is causing, environmental or otherwise. This proposal is severely misguided for three reasons. First, this tax does not distinguish between electricity generated by a hydroelectric power station in Montana and a coal plant in Wyoming. The first can create clean-energy jobs through a viable agglomeration of data centers, mining pools, and human capital running them, and is a win for everyone. Coal-powered Bitcoin farms would, granted, only appeal to a small minority. But why is there a glaring lack of demarcation? Second, unlike the tobacco industry, taxing the US share of Bitcoin supply at 30% will drive an entire industry offshore to a more favorable operating environment due to the economics of Bitcoin mining. Investors need a predictable environment to offset large capital expenditures over time and mining is only profitable where energy is cheapest. It would be pretty sad/funny if those fleeing miners end up in a coal-subsidized developing economy. Third, the ideological pitting of Bitcoin mining as an antagonist to environmentalism can only serve to further entrench political divides. Instead of seizing an opportunity to realize environmental goals by incentivizing renewable energy use for mining, thereby bridging the urban-rural divide, and creating more jobs, Treasury’s mining tax will rally Republican voices against what will be perceived as paving the way for exclusive public sector digital money. Regardless of how one might feel about Bitcoin, its supply inelasticity, or price volatility, it is likely here to stay, for better or worse. There is also no question that Bitcoin mining is shaping the electricity sector in various ways. Attempts are often made to pigeonhole Bitcoin mining into unconstructive discussions about its carbon footprint. With carefully crafted policies, running proof of work has the potential to help stabilize the energy demand response and release stranded supply. It can instantly transfer the value of renewable energy through the blockchain from places where we can’t afford to otherwise funnel it through ultra high voltage power lines. Instead of creating an environment for consumer choice to decide on crypto adoption while incentivizing clean energy use, the Treasury is going to tax Bitcoin, print more money, and sell us a digital dollar. Good luck with that! Why not explore instead how the BTC mining industry could allow us to fix renewable energy oversupply and one up China by attracting its banned crypto economy, conditional on clean energy requirements? Meanwhile, the state legislatures of Arkansas, Texas, and Montana have moved quickly to protect their crypto-mining industries. The Arkansas House and Senate passed the Data Centers Act of 2023, to protect the right to mine Bitcoin and provide equivalent protection under the law compared to regular data centers. The bill is currently waiting for Governor Huckabee Sanders’ imminent approval. Montana has more recently followed suit and we can expect more to come. Meanwhile, Texas lawmakers are so fed up with the Fed that they are proposing a gold-backed, state-based digital currency and are willing to brave the legal challenges.

    IMF puff piece praises India Stack

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has praised India's digital identification, payments system and data exchange, commonly clubbed under the label of India Stack.   The authors of the paper, which includes a volunteer from iSPIRT the organization developing and marketing India Stack, describe it as "a world-class foundational digital public infrastructure (DPI)" which has helped foster innovation and competition, expand markets, close gaps in financial inclusion, boost government revenue collection and improve public expenditure efficiency. The paper does not provide any insight into why or how India Stack qualifies as DPI and glides over the privacy, security and competition issues raised by the continuous and expansive collection, storage and sharing of data facilitated by India Stack. Unsurprisingly, the puff piece is being celebrated by the mainstream media, government and industry bodies. The recognition of India Stack comes at a time when the IMF and institutions like the World Bank are looking for ways to increase their investment in financial technologies, the digital infrastructure of developing countries and Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). The IMF's endorsement of India Stack sets the stage for the introduction of  interventions for digital identification, payments and data exchanges inspired by the model in other developing countries. 

  • Mar 2023
  • The Narrative: A Plurilateral export control regime; a cyber ...

    March 16, 2023

    New Dutch semiconductor export controls, a global regime grows

    In a March 8 letter, the Dutch Ministry of Economic and Development Cooperation and Ministry of Foreign Affairs notified the elected Parliament of its plan to implement additional export control measures for advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, consistent with unilateral measures implemented by the United States government October 7, 2022 targeting exports to China. Specifically, the measures are aimed at controlling the "most advanced" technologies in the semiconductor production cycle in which a Dutch firm has a unique and leading position. ASML interprets it to mean its Twinscan NXT:2000i and subsequent Deep Ultra Violet (DUV) immersion lithography systems. Citing “technological developments and geopolitical context” without mentioning China, the Cabinet will submit a confidential proposal to the consensus-driven Wassenaar Arrangement  (unlikely to succeed given Russian membership), while simultaneously establishing a national control list through its own public ministerial regulation, and also ask its EU and bilateral partners to adopt these measures through the appropriate dual-use regulation provision. Whether or not other states actually implement or adopt the licensing restrictions is an open question.   The measures are based on existing Dutch dual-use policy and a strategic framework outlined in a December letter to Parliament. The framework defines three additional strategic goals with (inter)national security in mind, specifically;
    1. preventing Dutch goods from contributing to unwanted end use, such as military deployment or in weapons of mass destruction;
    2. preventing undesirable long-term strategic dependencies; and
    3. maintaining Dutch technological leadership.
    Decision making about what dual-use goods to control occurs on a case-by-case basis and involves risk analysis based on confidential and public sources, including state threat actor assessment and domestic and military intelligence community reports, which only highlight a global “tech race” for economic and military development, and claim knowledge and technology espionage threats from China although no evidence is cited. An inconsistency between the goal of preventing military use and the proposed controls is that military applications typically involve more mature semiconductor technology. And, as is the case in dual-use regimes, the technology being controlled here has other widespread applications, for example, the AI field. The Dutch framework is similar to what developed in the United States over the past several years, fusing national and economic security concerns with other measures to protect certain domestic technologies. It includes an “investment test (security test law, investments, mergers and acquisitions) and knowledge security measures” and also bolstering production onshore to “maintain technological leadership” through subsidization efforts like the European Chips Act The Dutch strategic goals suggest an overarching question in need of an answer - how are economic competitiveness and benefits affected when a globalized industry sector that produces instrumental goods is burdened with (inter)national export controls? We can possibly draw on lessons from experience, e.g., in space-related technology or strong encryption. It is unknown whether any economic analysis of the trade-offs involved and potential impacts of the untested regime was performed. 

    A new cyber social contract

    The Biden Administration’s long-awaited cybersecurity strategy is here, and it seems the new office of the National Cyber Director is starting to pay off. The strategy’s language suggests a giant leap forward since the previous iteration in 2018. This new document aims to “reimagine the American cybersocial contract” as acting national cyber director Kemba Walden stated. According to the strategy, cybersecurity is still considered a market failure where stakeholders underinvest and costs are disproportionately borne by some and not others. Critical low-margin sectors like water and sanitation cannot afford to increase cybersecurity investments whereas in the finance sector, the marginal cost of improving cybersecurity is not only absorbable but also tied to their business models with increased digitization. While the strategy keeps the demarcation of stakeholder responsibility purposefully vague, it makes it clear that real cybersecurity is about the protection of critical infrastructure and protecting what is most vulnerable. With this new cyber strategy, the Biden administration is sending a strong signal that they will soon work with Congress to try to pass mandatory cybersecurity requirements for critical infrastructure operators beyond the energy sector. This fundamental shift from industry-self regulation to mandatory cybersecurity regulations has not been attempted since the Liberman-Collins proposal back in 2012. This bill would have granted DHS significant new authority to assess and serve civil penalties on owners and operators of CI that were in noncompliance with cybersecurity regulations. The New Cybersecurity Strategy follows Liberman-Collins in correctly identifying a systemic problem in critical infrastructure protection stating that we are “layering new functionalities and technologies onto already intricate and brittle systems.” The convergence of IT and OT which the strategy refers to as “digital operational technology” has been an ongoing security concern. The failure of Liberman-Collins illustrated significant structural differences between the ICT and energy sectors. The energy sector is the only sector with mandatory CIP Reliability Standards for a reason. The ICT sector is incredibly more complicated and spread across different industry verticals. Platforms, telecommunications providers, and cloud services providers, were also able to lobby against those measures. While the road will be similarly long and controversial today, critical infrastructure operators would be well advised to preempt government-defined cyber requirements with better security. The strategy’s solution to the federal government’s aging OT systems like the Hoover Dam is to modernize and apply zero trust architecture across the board, which is much easier said than done. Assuming “modern” is a euphemism for networked/smart, even Cisco which sells industrial internet of things devices admits that for some systems it’s better to just not connect them to the internet at all.  Otherwise, the strategy came up short of proposing new solutions for the thorny issue of information sharing. Perhaps some of the suggested “interagency deconfliction” will address path-dependency problems in the DHS/CISA regime like having separate communications and information technology sectors. Finally, the software liability and safe harbor framework proposed in the cyber strategy deserves to be addressed in a standalone post.

    India Cracks Downs on Smartphone Manufacturers 

    In yet another move to extend its control over the communications in India, the government is contemplating obligations for smartphone manufacturers operating in India. Most smartphones come with pre-installed apps that cannot be deleted. These pre-installed apps control several critical functions like taking photos (camera), storing documents (wallets), digital payments and accessing the internet (browsers). Smartphone manufacturers also include other proprietary apps in their devices as part of monetisation agreements. According to Reuters, smartphone manufacturers in India may soon be forced to allow removal of pre-installed apps and a lab authorized by the Indian Bureau of Standards will screen devices for compliance. Apart from providing an uninstall option, device manufacturers may also have to seek approval from the government before rolling out major updates to their operating systems.  These obligations appear to be part of the Indian government's crackdown on Chinese companies. Following border skirmishes in 2020, India has restricted Chinese companies access to, or banned them from the Indian market. Mandating removal of apps and screening of each major update to the operating system before it is rolled out to consumers is aimed at addressing concerns about "spying and abuse of user data by foreign players". It remains to be seen how manufacturers respond to these efforts. Representatives of Chinese companies Xiaomi and BBK Electronics which dominate the Indian smartphone market, Samsung, and Apple have met with officials at India's Information and Technology Ministry to discuss these obligations.

  • TikTok’s Project Texas: The wrong template for tomorrow’s di ...

    TikTok’s response to USG concerns about the imaginary threat to national security it poses was heard again at State of the Net 2023. It is hard to conceive of a more iron-clad technical solution than “Project Texas,” given the $1.5 billion that was sunk into it. Like the state it is named after, Project Texas is an enormous undertaking, but also a disturbing one.  We can’t really begrudge TikTok for pioneering a new institutional arrangement that (they think) might keep them in the U.S. market. That said, the arrangement sets a terrible precedent for digital media regulation and the global digital economy writ large. The dangers posed by this approach were quickly illustrated on the same day as TikTok’s SOTN presentation when two Senators unveiled the appropriately-named RESTRICT Act, which proposes to generalize the power to ban any apps, services, or software from foreign countries.  Let’s consider some of the potential long-term implications of Project Texas and what the enduring consequences for users and businesses could be. The relevance of Project Texas goes far beyond the fate of one company. 

    Summary of Project Texas

    In a nutshell, Project Texas is a data localization arrangement involving the forcible intermediation of Tiktok’s American operations by a US-based cloud vendor (Oracle) and a new U.S. government-controlled corporation, U.S. Data Security (USDS). USDS will be independent of TikTok; its board members will be approved by the U.S. government and be subject to layers upon layers of red tape and private audits. Tiktok’s presenter repeatedly said USDS would be like a “government contractor.”  As a result of its negotiations with the secretive and unaccountable Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS), TikTok incorporated United States Data Security back in July 2022 as a new entity to subsume all TikTok operations involving US user data. The entire purpose of USDS is to put the U.S. government in charge of Tiktok’s social media data to handle all aspects of data governance. TikTok US was left in charge of functions like public policy and marketing as a separate corporate entity but all of the actual engineering, operations, privacy, legal, human resources, compliance, and so on, are now under the USDS bureaucratic web. This bureaucracy is set up to coordinate data reviews and software audits with Oracle and other third parties under the auspices of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS).  Oracle, the “trusted technology provider,” is now TikTok’s exclusive cloud services provider. Practically, when the TikTok app is launched on a phone, it is compiled and loaded on a secure enclave that Oracle then sends to the App stores. This technical feat is unprecedented for an App of this scale and it’s amazing how it was pulled off technically without much impact on the user experience. So why should we even care? Because in response to a security threat that really does not exist, this policy is… 

    Straight out of the Communist Party playbook

    China and its allied governments in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consider the free flow of information across national borders to be a cybersecurity and national security threat. They have invoked that principle repeatedly to justify their blocking and censorship of American and Western information sources.  Doesn’t it sound familiar to the attacks on TikTok, and Project Texas? The Chinese Communist Party’s 2017 Cybersecurity Law and its 2021 Data Security Law require all cloud service providers to run on locally owned facilities and all incoming and outgoing data to be approved by the state. Similarly, Project Texas puts the U.S. government in direct control of a media outlet’s data and asserts a blanket right to review and censor its algorithms and content. It gives the government the power to harass a publisher if it releases content that is deemed politically controversial. With Project Texas, should USDS fail to censor the alleged CCP propaganda on the TikTok App, is Oracle supposed to step in and perform content moderation? In a world of thorny content issues, how would they adjudicate, what are their incentives and where do they draw the line? Given how lucrative this arrangement is for them, it is natural to expect Oracle to be heavily influenced by US political pressures lest they become a more convenient target for takedown requests. 

    Trade protectionism 

    The use of “national security” claims to institute trade protectionism is increasingly common. Project Texas is just the latest example of it. A new market entrant, TikTok threatened the dominance of Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube. While American lawmakers and politicians pay lip service to “competition,” they are (in response to heavy lobbying and spending by Meta) greeting a successful new competitor by threatening to ban them or force them to use specific American companies, simply because the entrepreneurs and parent companies are foreign. The nondiscriminatory “national treatment” principle, which the U.S. fought hard for when setting up the WTO, is being thrown out the window.  What Project Texas means is that foreign platforms operating in the US will be unable to react to shifting consumer preferences. That demand signal will be obscured by the deadweight loss of forcible intermediation (or worse) and increasing self-censorship. Welcome to the new software value chain. What our militant Senators don’t seem to realize is that the big losers in a world of digital trade protectionism will be American firms. As other countries follow this model, we will validate entry barriers and the exposure and regulation of source code and algorithms. US platforms should brace for equivalent treatment overseas. 

    Encouraging digital sovereignty

    Last year, the United States announced the Declaration for the Future of the Internet (DFI), a commitment signed by 61 like-minded nations to reclaim the promise of the early internet i.e., keeping it open, free, and global in the face of 21st-century challenges. If we read between the lines of the DFI, this diplomatic exercise was a line in the sand between liberal democracies and authoritarian states. The United States articulated a values-based commitment to an open digital economy.  But the TikTok agreement contradicts that vision. And the world will not fail to notice this. Non-aligned BRICS nations are already prone to techno-nationalist and data-protectionist policies. Many have refused to ratify the principles, citing either procedural or substantive misgivings. Some BRICS countries like India, Brazil, and South Africa typically play on strategic ambiguity, paying lip service to multistakeholder principles steered in one direction or the other as a result of political bargaining and negotiations. They are increasingly abiding by digital nationalism. It should come as no surprise to anyone that the global world order is increasingly shifting to a more fractured rival pro-US and pro-China blocks. But what is often missed by state department officials due to a lack of high-level coherence in national strategy is that digital sovereignty - the insistence on national ownership and control of information flows - contributes to digital authoritarianism globally, including in the US and Canada. Maintaining the Internet as a bastion of free expression and open e-commerce markets cannot succeed if the U.S. tries to play by a double standard. 

    Sets the template for the new US data governance regime

    Project Texas is a security theater with a $1.5 billion price tag. It imposes enormous costs and restrictive policies to address a threat that does not exist. We have in another report fully debunked the claims that TikTok is a national security threat. Absent comprehensive data privacy legislation, the US is creating an ad hoc data governance regime. Worse, Project Texas as a solution reaffirms how since the Trump administration, the USG is tortuously amalgamating the relationship between national interest, national security, economic security, and innovation without a coherent strategy guiding the process. 

  • Jan 2023
  • The Curious Case of the Missing CBDC Users

    According to the Atlantic Council’s tracker, 17 countries currently have their Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) in the pilot phase and 11 countries have rolled it out, with several others in either research or development stage. Three key drivers of interest for the central banks around the world to propose CBDCs have been – increased financial inclusion, improved payment efficiency, and monetary policy and stability. However, for all the stated potential, the adoption rate from the demand side has been painfully slow and limited. Cases in point for this blog post are Nigerian digital currency eNaira, Chinese e-CNY, India’s e-Rupee, Bahama’s Sand Dollar, and Jamaican JAM-DEX.  The e-CNY and e-Rupee are still in the pilot phase and are limited to certain cities, whereas eNaira, the Sand Dollar, and JAM-DEX have been launched at the country level. However, all of these are facing similar setbacks – low adoption on both merchant and customer sides.

    The eCNY

    The e-CNY boasts the largest registered user base of 261 million (as of January 2022) with an outstanding transaction size of approximately $14 billion. The Chinese government has made continuous efforts to expand the scope of transactions for increased adoption. The use case has been broadened to include payments for different services such as payment for public transportation, income tax, stamp duties, and more recently an electronic version of red packets (hongbao), the traditional Chinese way of gifting money. They have also attempted to regulate competition from private market players, banned cryptocurrency and tried to enforce circulation by using an expiration policy.  Despite all of this, the end-user has neither additional benefits nor convenience to make a shift from existing apps like Alipay and WeChat, both of which have a sufficiently large user base and merchant integration. The incentives offered are not lucrative enough for the user to use it consistently. If this user survey is to be believed, e-CNY lacks “attractive promotions, discount coupons, and giveaways” for people to make a shift.  This narrative is not unique to China.

    The e-Rupee

    Indian banks are expressing similar concerns about the e-Rupee. According to them, it adds to the workload of the banks’ accounting process and offers limited advantages in tandem with Unified Payment Interface’s (UPI) payment rails. Banks are burdened with more work since the trade balance has to be settled individually for all cash, e-Rupee, and UPI transactions, making the process ineffective and inefficient. The attempt seems especially frivolous since both UPI and e-Rupee are Central Banks’ endeavors as opposed to competing private players like WeChat and Alipay in China. E-Rupee also doesn’t necessarily solve the problem of financial inclusion, which at this point appears to be conditional on literacy gap and distrust in the digital banking space. 

    Nigerian eNaira

    In Nigeria too, in spite of the  incentives of discounts, eNaira’s adoption has stagnated close to 0.5% as more Nigerians prefer private digital currencies. The eNaira offers no additional benefit but suffers from the fiat Naira’s declining status and valuation.

    The Sand Dollar

    The Sand Dollar uses distributed ledger technology and is pegged to the US Dollar. It was the first officially launched CBDC and yet has very little to show in terms of adoption numbers or use-cases. Only 0.1% of total currency in circulation in the Bahamas comprises Sand Dollar. Very few merchants accept it for payments. JAM-DEX too is in a similar situation where hesitance at merchant level is one of the main cited reasons affecting the overall adoption rate.

    Why the low adoption?

    Learning from the above mentioned cases, slow adoption of CBDCs can be broadly categorized under following main reasons: 1)   Lack of Awareness: One of the reasons given by the Bahamas Central Bank for low adoption is the lack of awareness amongst citizens about the CBDC. They also claim that people often confuse it with cryptocurrency and are hesitant to use it especially in the wake of the FTX fiasco. The ignorance makes it difficult for them to see the value in using them. 2)   Concerns around privacy and anonymity: The adoption of e-CNY and e-Rupee are particularly restricted by lack of clarity around privacy and anonymity rules but are not restricted to those two only. Lack of trust in the system or the Central Bank issuing the CBDC will significantly affect adoption. Since the financial data and transaction history will be linked to the user's digital identity, people are especially cautious about using it for payments.   3)   Habits and Behavior: Most countries already have an existing digital payment system or rely on the legacy of card networks. As such it is difficult to change those behaviors if the actual benefit of adopting a new system is unknown and there’s no clear problem with the existing system either.    4)   Uncertainty around Benefits: It is still largely unclear what the CBDC has to offer. Despite the claims of financial inclusion and system efficiency, none of the use cases have demonstrated positive results for either of those. 

    What next?

    As many have already pointed out, CBDCs appear to be a solution in search of a problem. Surrounded by challenges, the best-case scenario for countries testing it or planning to test it out would be to integrate it with existing payment systems and infrastructures instead of reinventing the wheel. Speculations around cross-border payment efficiencies are still to be tested but that will require interoperable norms and designs which in turn will need some standard setting exploration. Many countries have shifted gears and are now exploring effective regulatory mechanisms for stablecoins for both domestic and cross-border payment settlements. This might be a more worthwhile effort considering that the systems already exist and are more efficient in practice, but comes with its own set of concerns that need to be sufficiently addressed. Most stablecoins currently are either pegged to the dollar or draw algorithmic value where smart contracts manage the token supply. But some like Tether Gold and DGX are also pegged to gold though these are still private currencies. Russia and the UAE are mulling over their own version of gold-backed stablecoins for trade and international settlements. The Hong Kong based company Red Date Technology, also responsible for China’s national blockchain project, has come up with a “SWIFT type infrastructure” Universal Digital Payment Network (UDPN) to bridge the gap between stablecoins and CBDCs. The EU is not lagging behind either. The Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) regulation is expected anytime in 2023 which will closely restrict the issuance and the use of stablecoins along with other crypto-assets. What’s interesting and worth questioning now is the shape that the upcoming monetary competition will take. Will it be a race in the CBDC space to shift/maintain the dollar hegemony and lead the standardization effort or a race to regulate private currency like stablecoin or both? And what should be the US's policy posture? We will be answering these questions in detail, in an upcoming whitepaper.

  • Nov 2022
  • The Narrative: IGF, PIR, Ophelia, Digital Cold War, and FTX

    UN IGF meets in Addis Ababa

    The UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF) convened this week in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, using a fully hybrid format. Avoiding Internet fragmentation and digital sovereignty are two of the most popular topics, along with a somewhat contradictory combination of calls for controlling & regulating AI and calls to use AI to automate the detection of misinformation and disinformation on vast social media networks. While the IGF brings an unparalleled diversity of people together, and the quality of the workshops and discussions we have seen has been high, there is widespread irritation at the clunkiness of the interface for online participants, login problems, the host country’s human rights record, and the decision to force all in-person attendees to surrender their cellphones, laptops and devices to attend the opening session (except “VIPs”!). As expected, the new Leadership Panel spent most of its time in closed meetings with “high level” people. In short, the IGF embodies all the strengths and weaknesses of intergovernmental organizations. On Thursday, Dec 1, IGP and ORF America will host a “Dialogue on the Declaration for the Future of the Internet,” including U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Alan Davidson, the German Cyber Ambassador Regine Grienberger, Observer Research Foundation’s Dhruva Jaishankar, former IGF MAG Chair Anriette Esterhausen of South Africa, and Brazil’s Louise Marie Hurel. Add to your schedule here and get up early (7:30 am US Eastern time) to join us.

    Dot ORG Snubs Noncommercials

    The Public Interest Registry, which was awarded the .ORG domain based on promises that it would support noncommercial participants in the ICANN process, has progressively backed away from supporting the official noncommercial constituencies in ICANN. It took the latest step recently, refusing to appoint any representatives nominated by the Noncommercial Stakeholders Group (NCSG) to its Advisory Board. PIR's Advisory Board has no real power and is largely honorary anyway, but it originally set aside a dedicated slot on the AC for NCUC. That precedent just ended. PIR justifies this by claiming that it chose AC members based on their “quality” not on who they represent. But this is exactly the problem: PIR’s council is just a bunch of people the PIR board likes and feels comfortable with, they are not independent representatives of .ORG users who are involved in the ICANN process. PIR has turned its appointment process into a beauty contest and its Advisory Council into a unilaterally-bestowed privilege that allows it to filter out anyone who might talk back.

    Meet Ophelia

    We’ve converted our “What is Internet Governance” material into an explainer delivered by, well, an AI-powered bot named Ophelia. Don’t worry, though, we still write Ophelia’s scripts and she doesn’t (yet) say anything we don’t approve. Come to think of it, she might make a good nominee for the PIR Advisory Council. Take a look: [embed]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZKWaId1Y12w[/embed]

    Pushback on US Digital Cold War

    It is anybody’s guess right now how the USG’s unilateral export control measures targeting leading edge semiconductor technology and manufacturing equipment will play out, but governments and firms in Asia and Europe are pushing back publicly. Predictably, Chinese government-backed publications are highlighting how the measures disrupted the globalized industry and supply chains, but the feeling seems to be shared outside China. In remarks to the Dutch Parliament, Minister of Foreign Trade Liesje Schreinemacher said that the home of lithography machine maker ASML, should “defend our own interests — our national safety, but also our economic interests.” Others were less diplomatic. It was reported from the Trilateral Commission that Japan’s Establishment is “sick and tired of the decoupling with China imposed by the US.” Meanwhile, industry reports say that firms are ignoring US requests to voluntarily implement the controls and/or devising ways to deliver products around the measures. NVIDIA rolled out a revised GPU chip for export to China that is hobbled to meet the US controls. In its earnings call, Baidu told investors its growing AI Cloud business does not rely on controlled chips, instead relying on its own Kunlun chip, which reflects a broader trend in the industry of purpose- specific, in house development. Experts have noted the disconnect between the US bureaucrats developing the measures and how the industry and specific applications enabled by semiconductor technology work. Whether government resistance is real or posturing will likely be more clear after an upcoming U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) meeting, Dec 5. The undisclosed participants of the TTC’s working groups coordinate “on export controls, investment screening and security risks, and a range of global trade challenges,” as well as (ironically), “countering the harmful impact of non-market, trade-distortive policies and practices on technological development and competitiveness in sectors of shared priority.” The Dutch Minister said the European Commission is working with the US on the possible outcomes to be presented at the TTC.

    New US Bans on Chinese equipment

    On November 25, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) unanimously passed an order to stop authorizing equipment from companies on its "Covered List." US-based firms can no longer import or market products and services from "Chinese state-backed firms" because they allegedly pose an unacceptable risk to national security (or, perhaps, some firms’ market share). The list of covered firms, originally published by the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, includes the usual suspects like Huawei and ZTE but also Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua, suppliers of networked video and radio surveillance apparatus. By tapping into its equipment authorization process, the FCC is carrying out the main provision of H.R. 3919, the Secure Equipment Act of 2021. The Act was introduced in the 117th Congress by rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), in conjunction with lead sponsor Scalise (R-LA) on the house side, and followed with a companion bill by Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) in the Senate. The broad bipartisan support for decoupling the US and Chinese economies is clearly allowing the gears of government to continue to grind down Chinese IT. The congressional "debate" on China competition is sadly more of an echo chamber where political expediency and lack of critical thinking replace viable long-term solutions. In a proud tweet, FCC Chair Brendan Carr recently declared that the decision "represents the first time in FCC history that we have voted to prohibit the authorization of new equipment based on national security concerns." While this bizarre boast may point to a unique turning point in history, FCC actions confirm how the hawkish policies of the Trump administration continue to offer a viable political equilibrium when Democrats are in power. This equilibrium will likely be one of the few points of agreement in a divided 118th Congress. The FCC's "Covered List" can be understood as a means to avoid perceived shortcomings and regulatory inconsistencies especially between inbound and outbound investments with China. In May 2019, the Trump administration added Huawei to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) 's Entity List, starting a cat-and-mouse game of tightening and evading export controls. These short-term measures were somewhat successful in stifling Chinese national champions' growth by limiting US manufacturers' ability to supply them with goods and services- anything from Snapdragon processors to the Google PlayStore. However, the US government needed to make the argument that Chinese IT is a trojan horse for malign Chinese Communist Party (CCP) behavior more palatable. After banning Huawei and ZTE from using the Universal Service Fund to supply rural operators, the US also needed to force cash-strapped rural operators and local governments from importing the cheaper Chinese IT. This latest FCC enforcement action closes the loop on the presence of Chinese hardware in US networks. In the meantime, the big question is whether the Biden administration will risk upsetting Gen Z by banning TikTok. If so, the US will escalate China competition into the already dangerously politicized world of content regulation which, let’s face it, will only benefit the CCP’s censorship agenda. Let's hope the "Grand Strategy commission" will be more astute in protecting long-term US interests.

    FTX Debacle

    If you have been wondering what this whole Fiasco is about, here’s a short summary. It started when Binance decided to sell all of its FTX tokens (FTT) causing a panic in the market. Customers began withdrawing their funds, leading to a liquidity crisis. Things would have been fine if only FTX’s claims about its assets actually matched its balance sheet. Turned out FTX was using the assets to bail out Alameda Research, a firm owned by Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF), the CEO of FTX. The company used customer funds to bail out a branch firm, the holdings of which were mostly in FTT. One thing led to another, and the company soon filed for Bankruptcy. There were varied speculations following this incident. Three additional companies (BlockFi, Voyager, and Celsius) have since filed for bankruptcy. The crypto market has been down. And Miami’s nightlife has been affected negatively. But it doesn’t appear to be all doom and gloom though it has brought several aspects of the crypto industry to a new light. The failure of FTX had little to do with the blockchain or the protocol itself, and more with the structure and composition of FTX. Dealing with crypto didn’t automatically make it decentralized nor did it make the risks dissimilar to those in traditional finance. In traditional finance, intermediaries manage risks partly by converting liabilities into assets and partly by complying with regular reporting and auditing of reserves, assets, and liabilities, thereby diluting the risks and mediating the friction arising from asymmetric information and centralized decision-making. It doesn’t make a crisis impossible, but it does make it less probable. Adhering to this, people are calling for aggressive regulation. So, will regulation solve all the problems of the crypto exchanges? Maybe, but one needs to consider that FTX was in fact a regulated exchange, at least in the derivatives market. So are Coinbase, Binance, and several others. Would it have helped if FTX was not centralized instead? Or to put it differently, is DeFi inherently better because it upholds the decentralized nature of blockchain? Programmable money does not require any custody. A DeFi exchange platform would attract liquidity and the tokens as well as the code for pricing would be embedded in smart contracts. This will allow for the transaction to be immutable and easily auditable since the chain will be public. So, it would solve the friction from asymmetric information. But, as pointed out by WSJ earlier, the risks in DeFi are not addressed or mitigated, just moved around from counterparty risks to technology. It would still be dealing with crypto. The interconnected nature of the ecosystem with no underlying productivity (in an economic sense) creates uncertainty. This coupled with the asset being used as its own collateral, as in the case of FTX, leads to heightened credit risks. So it will eventually run into a different version of the same problem. What will happen remains to be seen but one thing is clear - the skepticism around crypto’s promise of redefining finance is growing strong. And it is not necessarily a bad thing.

  • The Great Reframing, in Text

    For those of you who prefer text to videos, and the enhanced possibilities of editing for clarity and conciseness, we now make available edited transcripts of two riveting discussions on the definition of the field from our conference in The Hague. This includes the initial panel discussion featuring Tatiana Tropina, Milton Mueller, Jan Aart Scholte, Louise Hurel and Michel van Eeten. It also includes the free-ranging presentation/discussion with Professor Laura DeNardis, one of the leaders of the field. "I like the term Internet governance a lot," DeNardis said. "I think that Russia would love for us to not use the term Internet governance anymore. And I think that China would love for us to not use the word Internet governance anymore." Dr Mueller replied, "I do not share the fear many of the people in the community have about [changing the label]. I know that there are threats of greater state intervention and authoritarianism in the digital world. We have been studying these threats carefully; they are fundamentally geopolitical and political economic. That is why I prefer the term digital political economy." DeNardis_transcript_10_31_2022 IG-2-DPE-transcript

  • Oct 2022
  • The Great Reframing: IG2DPE

    So, is it still “Internet governance” that we do, or is it going to be re-framed as “digital political economy”? IG or DPE? Our conference in The Hague hosted fascinating discussions on this question.   The answer to the re-framing question can be summarized as “Yes, but...” Yes, re-framing IG issues around the broader digital political economy is correct and unavoidable. But we must also recognize that a strong political community devoted to multistakeholder governance of critical Internet resources (CIRs) has been forged around the “Internet Governance” label, and re-framing must not undermine or weaken this community.   Because the Internet is just one component of the digital ecosystem, state-driven geopolitics are already impinging on Internet governance in many new ways, ranging from export controls on semiconductors, to Europe’s attempt to regulate DNS root servers in the name of cybersecurity, to calls for restrictions on trans-border data flows in the name of “digital sovereignty.” In this context, situating the traditional IG community in the broader digital political economy can strengthen it, whereas staying narrowly focused on CIR risks isolation and irrelevance over the long term.  IG advocates must be able to explain the value of openness, interoperability and multistakeholder governance to the entire digital ecosystem. This includes the governance of data, software, digital devices, content and privacy as well as network identifiers.   Amid growing geopolitical conflicts among state actors, the IG community must be able to explain why traditional nation-state governance cannot preserve the interoperability, innovation, economic development and freedom we have come to associate with the Internet. Cooperative, transnational governance by coalitions of civil society, business and liberal-democratic states have the potential to solve new problems in content moderation, privacy and cybersecurity. The IG label narrows the scope of these values to CIR exclusively, but there are many other areas where this approach could be applied. And if the IG community leaves these broader digital economy issues to others, its unique approach to governance will surely be eroded.  The Hague was the perfect site for this meeting both because of its historic status as the site of international peace, and because of the support and participation of the Dutch government and local representatives of the established IG institutions, such as RIPE-NCC and ICANN. In her opening statement to the meeting, A.H.M. Heaver of the Ministry of Economic Affairs made clear the Dutch government’s commitment to multistakeholder IG. Her concerns about the re-framing set the stage for a panel discussion consisting of Milton Mueller, Jan Aart Scholte, Louise Hurel, and Michel van Eeten, moderated by Tatiana Tropina. At the end of the conference, Laura DeNardis weighed in with a wide-ranging talk on the definition of the field, followed by a vigorous discussion. We are preparing a transcript and summary of these discussions that will capture their richness.   To summarize, we recognize that “Internet governance” has become more than just a label for a topic for research and policy analysis. It is the flag under which supporters of more liberal and transnational modes of governance coalesced. There is a global “Internet Governance Forum” in the United Nations. There are national IGFs in many countries. There are many positions in

    governmental agencies and intergovernmental organizations based on that label. We support this community and wish to build on it, not disband it. But we remain convinced it can only survive by evolving, not by standing still. 

    Here are links to transcripts and videos of the Conference:

  • Sep 2022
  • The Narrative: Lots of stuff happening!

    September 30, 2022

    ITU Plenipotentiary Conference

    The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is having its Plenipotentiary meeting in Bucharest. These four-year events are always redolent with claims that Russia and China will somehow use the ITU to “take over the internet” (despite the fact that the ITU has no power over Internet standards, routing or identifiers and all repressive Internet policies are developed and enforced at the national level, not by intergovernmental organizations). This year's meeting was dominated by the election of a new Secretary-General, in which the U.S.-backed Doreen Bogdan-Martin  defeated the Russian candidate Rashid Ismailov, by a vote of 139 to 25. For useful live-tweeting of the Plenipot, follow @sgdickinson on Twitter.

    US Congress Pressures NTIA on Whois/Privacy

    Four U.S. Senators and House representatives urged the U.S. National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) to “immediately cease the public disclosure of personal information about users of .US, the United States’ country-code top-level domain.” NTIA, which is the policy maker for the .US top level domain, is being asked to reverse two decades of U.S. policy favoring indiscriminate disclosure of the name, address, email address and phone number of domain name registrants. The passage of GDPR made ICANN redact personal data in gTLD domain name registration records, but since the US domain is a country code and not in European jurisdiction, it has not complied with basic privacy and consent protections, instead bowing to trademark and law enforcement interests who want easy access to that data. The U.S. legislators - all Democrats - are trying to end that.

    Texas Content Regulation Law Headed to Supreme Court

    An appeals court upheld Texas’s HB20 law, an attempt to regulate the content moderation practices of social media companies. NetChoice, a trade organization representing companies affected by the bill, challenged the law on constitutional grounds, arguing that content moderation is a form of editorial discretion, hence the Texas law would interfere with free speech. That argument succeeded in killing a similar law passed in Florida, but the federal 5th Circuit Court of Appeals rejected it. Bizarrely, its opinion shows that the Judges do not grasp the distinction between state actors and private actors; it claims that platforms are engaged in “censorship” when they remove a user’s post for violating the platform's content guidelines. That reasoning blatantly disregards established First Amendment law, notably Miami Herald v. Tornillo. It also clashes with the 11th Circuit decision on the Florida law. So this issue is definitely headed to the Supreme Court for resolution. The problem is that conservative Justices Thomas and Alito have already signaled their willingness to ignore free expression principles because they believe the platforms are biased against conservatives.

    Pentagon Audits US Info Operations

    The Pentagon has ordered a sweeping audit of how it conducts clandestine information warfare after US-based social media companies identified and took offline fake accounts suspected of being run by the U.S. military in violation of the platforms’ rules. The dilemmas of a liberal democracy engaging in IO while committed to free speech and to insulating its citizens from state propaganda were explored in a paper published by IGP partners Milton Mueller and Karl Grindal in the May 2022 issue of the journal Cyber Defense Review. They noted that legal authorities were changed during Trump’s Presidency to enable military IO with few checks. The chickens are now coming home to roost, as the US engages in the same kind of disinformation and misinformation its political leadership tells us is a major problem.

    Spies like US

    China’s National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center has announced reports developed by Chinese threat intel firm 360 [1,2] concerning a June 2022 intrusion into the network of Northwestern Polytechnical University, a key national public research university in China that specializes in aeronautical, astronautical and marine engineering. Citing collaboration with European and Southeast Asian partners and detailing capabilities, technical identifiers, operational missteps and data stolen, it attributes the intrusion to the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations unit, including 13 unnamed individuals. This isn’t the first time Chinese firms have leveled accusations at USG intelligence agencies, but previous attempts lacked sufficient details to be credible. This one appears to be different, showing all the sophistication of Western threat intel reporting. Whether or not the Chinese gov’t takes the next step and pursues the current gold standard in attribution by indicting the suspects remains to be seen.

    Twitter's Ex Security Chief Rakes Up National Security Concerns

    Twitter’s former security boss, Peiter “Mudge” Zatko, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee September 13, alleging that Twitter provided its employees' extensive and unsupervised access to live systems and data, to the detriment of users' privacy and national security. Access to Twitter data is especially valuable for governments seeking to identify and censor critical voices, or keep track of internal developments at the company. Zatko said the Indian government had managed to place an agent on the executive team, who tried to find out whether Twitter's negotiations with the Indian government over censorship were favorable for the ruling party. Zatko emphasized that not only was the Twitter leadership knowingly facilitating foreign government access but it also lacked the incentives and the capacity to restrict such access. When Zatko approached an executive about the person he believed was an Indian agent working at the company, the executive told him “since there was already one suspected foreign agent at the company, what did it matter if there are more?”. The testimony has united lawmakers across party lines who are redoubling their efforts to regulate social media companies.

  • Conference registration: From Internet Governance to Digital ...

    The 7th Annual IGP Conference in The Hague, Netherlands.

    October 17 - 18, 2022, 9:30 am – 4:30 p.m. CEST The Hague Conference Centre New Babylon Anna van Buerenplein 29, 2595 DA Den Haag, Netherlands

    RSVP to attend in person

    RSVP to watch the webcast

    The Internet Governance Project (IGP)’s 7th Annual Conference convenes scholars, practitioners, and government officials under the theme From Internet Governance to Digital Political Economy.

    The conference’s objective is to reframe analysis of Internet governance as digital political economy. That approach provides a more systematic understanding of the forces driving digital policy issues and a better grasp of both the obstacles to solutions and the feasible paths forward.

    During the 2002-2005 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), Internet governance revolved around ICANN, multistakeholderism, and their relationship to intergovernmental modes of governance. As the internet grew to encompass every aspect of society and economy, including digital money, these tensions expanded. Online services, digital data, cryptocurrencies, and software became major drivers of economic development, and the internet underwent a process of securitization, surveillance, and attempts to align it to geographic borders.

    The global governance of the internet is now inseparable from the governance of digital trade, international currency and investment, military conflict and competition in cyberspace, regulation of platform industries, AI applications, and industrial policy debates about semiconductors, 5G, and other digital technologies.

    As the communications infrastructure that supports the ecosystem, the internet is very important, but its policy and governance can no longer be considered in isolation from these other digital developments.

    Join us in The Hague October 17-18 for a field-reshaping conference that can bridge the artificial disciplinary and topical divisions, with political economy as a stronger basis for public policy analysis and intervention.

    For updates on the event, follow @IGPAlert on Twitter and join the conversation using #IGtoDPE.

    Monday, October 17 (9:30 - 17:00, CEST)

    9:00 | Welcome remarks

    • A.H.M. Heaver, Ministry of Economic Affairs, NL
    • Milton Mueller, Georgia Institute of Technology

    9:30 | Panel Discussion: (Re)Defining the field: From IG to Digital Political Economy

    Moderator: Tatiana Tropina, U Leiden

    • Panelists: Milton Mueller, Georgia Tech; Jan Aart Scholte, U Leiden; Michel van Eeten, Technology U of Delft; Louise Marie Hurel, LSE

    10:30 | Break

    Data Governance

    • 11:00 | Exploring the role of data enclosure in the digital political economy, Brenden Kuerbis, Georgia Institute of Technology, US
    • 11:30 | Platform antitrust in China, Hao Wang, Peking University, PRC
    • 12:00 | Critique of the Surveillance Capitalism thesis. Milton Mueller, Georgia institute of Technology, US

    12:30 | Lunch

    Standards and Security

    • 13:30 | Web PKI and Non-governmental Governance of Trust on the Internet: Karl Grindal, U of New Hampshire, Karl Grindal, University of New Hampshire, USA
    • 14:00 | The standardisation of lawful interception technologies in the 3GPP: Niels ten Oever, U Amsterdam, C. Becker, R. Nanni, NL
    • 14:30 | Privacy and Security Implications of Regulation of Digital Services in the EU and US: Mikołaj Barczentewicz, Surrey U., UK

    15:00 | Break

    Platform political economy

    • 15:30 | India’Stack. Jyoti Panday, Internet Governance Project, IN
    • 16:00 | Distributing Power through Distributed Technology? Blockchain Experiments in Land governance. M Campbell-Verduyn, U Groningen, NL
    • 16:30 | Antitrust, Regulation, and User Union in the Era of Digital Platforms. L. Cong, Cornell U& S Mayer, U. Chicago, US

    Tuesday, October 18 (9:00 - 17:00, CEST)

    9:00 | Teaching Digital Political Economy

    • Seda Gürses, Technology University of Delft
    • Milton Mueller, Georgia Institute of Technology

    10:00 | Panel Discussion: Industrial Policy and the Digital Economy

    • Moderator: Shane Tews, American Enterprise Institute, US
    • Panelists: George Calhoun, Stevens Institute of Technology and Forbes Magazine; Dirk Auer, U Liège

    11:00 | Break

    Transnationalism vs. Sovereignty in the International Digital Political Economy, 1

    • 11:30 | Europe and global governance of internet identifiers. Elena Plexida, ICANN, BE
    • 12:00 | EU’ Narratives and Trade Policy on Data Flows Compared to US and China. Svetlana Yakovleva, IVIR, U Amsterdam, NL
    • 12:30 | Governing cross-border data flows, YC Chin & Jingwu Zhou, Beijing Normal U, PRC

    13:00 | Lunch

    Transnationalism vs. Sovereignty in the International Digital Political Economy, 2

    • 14:00 | National Security Creep in Corporate Transactions. Kristin Eichensehr, University of Virginia Law, US
    • 14:30 | Analysis of European Digital Regulatory Efforts. Pierre LaRouche, U. Montreal, CA

    15:00 | Panel Discussion: The new Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework

    • Moderator: Milton Mueller, Georgia Institute of Technology, US
    • Panelists: Peter Swire, Georgia Institute of Technology US; Wolf Schünemann, University of Hildesheim, DE

    15:40 | Break

    16:00 | Reprise: From Internet Governance to Digital Political Economy

    • Reconsidering the definition of the field. Laura DeNardis, Georgetown U, US
    • 16:30 | Plenary Discussion

  • Aug 2022
  • The Narrative: CHIPS Act passes; China's new data strategy; ...

    What do you do when the chips are down?

    Samsung warned that chip demand will weaken if the global economy downturns. Intel also reported disastrous quarterly results this week highlighting operational challenges and managerial missteps. Undeterred, among a wave of governments seeking to build domestic manufacturing capacity, the US Congress passed the CHIPS Act providing about $53 billion in government subsidies as well as $24 billion in tax credits for U.S. production of semiconductors, and $200 billion for related scientific research. The industry sector has long been the target of government intervention, but we are entering a new era, where innovation and competition in semiconductors are not driven by globalization and economic efficiency but national security tensions and control over supply chains. Thus the potential for dramatic economic distortions and, ultimately, additional costs reflected in everything which uses semiconductors as an input.

    China to classify companies based on "sensitivity of data"

    As per the Financial Times, China is preparing a system to sort US-listed Chinese companies into groups based on the sensitivity of the data they hold. Chinese companies would be divided into three broad categories: companies handling non-sensitive data, those with sensitive data and others with “secretive” data. The move comes after months of stalled negotiations between Beijing and Washington over compliance of Chinese companies with US rules that require providing regulators full access to audit records of public companies. Under the tiered scheme, “low-risk” data companies could make their audit records accessible to the Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board (PCAB), while companies handling secretive data would have to delist. As per the report, China is also considering whether "companies in the “sensitive data” category could restructure their operations to become compliant, including by outsourcing the information to a third party." It remains to be seen if the new classification system will help the two countries reach an agreement on the treatment of listed Chinese companies but China's concession will improve the chances. 

    Google kicks 3rd party cookies down the road, again

    On Wednesday, Google announced it was pushing back its plan to drop third-party cookies from its Chrome browser until 2H 2024. Its Privacy Sandbox initiative is developing “privacy-preserving alternatives to third-party cookies and other forms of cross-site tracking” that would allow market dominating Chrome to be privacy competitive with other browsers while preserving targeted digital advertising capability and website functionality. While the firm has delayed its effort several times, the public policy writing is on the wall. Passed or proposed privacy legislation in various jurisdictions (EU, China, United States) now bans outright the building of profiles across sites based on sensitive data, and makes the practice of targeted advertising more transparent by requiring opt out for users, etc.

    India reconsidering data localization?

    India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) is considering relaxing data localization requirements in the draft Data Protection Bill. Under the draft Bill, entities dealing with users’ personal data are mandated to store a copy of such data within India and the transfer of undefined “critical” personal data is prohibited. As per a report in the Indian Express after receiving "hundreds of letters from start-ups" raising concerns that the existing data localization requirements are too “compliance intensive” and could hamper ease of doing business, MeitY is thinking about diluting these provisions. The official said lawmakers are looking into drafting changes for start-ups as it does not want to "stifle innovation" and "does not want to create unnecessary hurdles." India's proposed data protection law has been a long time in the making. The first draft appeared in 2018 and was followed by a revised draft, the Personal Data Protection Bill (PDP Bill) in 2019. Marked by controversies, the draft PDP Bill was referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee composed of members of both Houses of the Parliament. The Committee presented its report consisting of the overarching recommendations on the PDPB and a revised draft of the PDPB, referred to as the Data Protection Bill, to the Parliament on 21 December, 2021. 

  • May 2022
  • The Narrative: Unpacking the digital political economy; W3C ...

    Unpacking the digital political economy

    As the summer begins, with long awaited in-person conferences and intensive research activity, we are busily developing the Call For Papers for our annual IGP conference for fall 2022, which will focus on the global digital political economy. What scholars and policy makers used to call Internet governance no longer exists. Every policy problem that involves the Internet is now a subset of larger policy problems posed by a globally networked system of digital technologies, capabilities and services. To understand these problems, scholars need to focus on the digital political economy as a whole. Take the recent Declaration for the Future of the Internet released by the USG last month. Our quick take noted it as a useful normative initiative, but also suggested it fell short in promoting areas like digital/ICT trade. Where does the Declaration intersect with great power competition (like the US and China) and efforts to influence trade? The Figure below maps out states aligned with: US bilateral agreements in IPR, free trade, investment (USTA); the Declaration (Decl); and Belt & Road Initiative Memoranda (BRIM). Bright blue states are aligned only with US trade agreements, while bright red are aligned only with the B&R initiative. The lighter greenish and orange shades represent different combinations of the three efforts. They highlight the relative importance of economic trade between powerful adversaries (US, China, Russia), and the cohesion between US trade agreements and the human rights norms of the Declaration. In the middle are the yellow states in Eastern Europe and parts of South America, which highlight the importance of global trade and the role of the Declaration. These states participate in all three efforts and probably represent states most up for grabs in a tech cold war view of the world. How independent (isolated?) Brazil appears is interesting. The US and Brazil have a trade and economic agreement but it doesn’t appear to be enforced currently, and the South American continent appears relatively unsettled. On the other hand, the BRI includes African states almost to the total exclusion of Western normative and trade influence.   This descriptive view just touches on the global digital political economy. It ignores multilateral efforts like WTO, WIPO or other state or industry based agreements. It invites research integrating country-level data on ICT exports/imports, data flows, financial systems, regulatory environment, etc. as well as more macro-level analysis.

    W3C attempts to reinvent itself

    The World Wide Web Consortium, which was founded in 1994 by Web inventor Tim Berners-Lee and sets standards for Web technologies, is undergoing important changes in its governance. One of its original host organizations, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (MIT/CSAIL), is ending its status as host at the end of the year. Some are questioning Director Berners-Lee’s role as “philosopher-king” with bottleneck authority over consensus determinations. There is talk of making it an industry-led nonprofit but also some concern about whether the major platform/ browser operators can cooperate adequately. The long-time unincorporated organization has filed incorporation paperwork in Delaware. Given the important role of Web standards in determining the future of advertising and privacy on the Internet and the push in some quarters for so-called Web3, the future of Web standards governance is important. This is a real test for the nongovernmental, networked governance that has been so crucial for the Internet. 

    India’s new cybersecurity directive under fire

    On April 28, the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), which is the nodal agency tasked with performing cybersecurity-related functions, issued directions relating to information security practices, procedure, prevention, response and reporting of cyber incidents for Safe & Trusted Internet (Directions). The directions come into effect from 27 June, and apply to “all service providers, intermediaries, data centers, body corporate and government organizations” (entities). Non-compliance is punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to 1 year or fine of up to INR 100,000 or both. These directions have come under heavy criticism by various civil society, digital rights and international organizations, industry bodies Obligations include the requirement for all entities to connect their infrastructure system to a Network Time Protocol (NTP) server of National Informatics Centre (NIC); National Physical Laboratory's (NPL) or traceable back to above. NTP is a networking protocol used to synchronize computers' internal clocks to a common time source. The requirement has been heavily criticized as it may impact the functionality of companies’ systems, networks, and applications and introduce security vulnerabilities.  Entities must report cyber incidents within 6 hours of identification of such incidents. Industry players have called the 6 hour reporting window unrealistic and are demanding a more reasonable 72 hour timeframe. The reporting mandate also goes beyond the category of cyber incidents provided under the 2013 CERT-In Rules and includes ten new categories of incidents including data breaches and leakages, unauthorized access to social media accounts and attacks on payment systems amongst others. There is no guidance on the threshold, severity and scale of the incidents that are to be reported to CERT-In. This places the burden on various entities to assess what qualifies as a cyber incident. Recognizing this gap the CERT-In is reportedly attempting to provide definitional clarity and guidance through FAQs that are yet to be published The directions require entities to take action or provide information or any assistance to CERT-In towards which they must designate a point of contact to interface with CERT-In and maintain logs of all their ICT systems. The logs must be maintained  for a rolling period of 180 days and within Indian jurisdictions so it is accessible for CERT-In when required. The data retention and data localization mandate increases the cost of operations, creates security vulnerabilities and is also a threat to the privacy of users. Organizations that provide Virtual Private Network (VPN), Virtual Private Server (VPS) and cloud services, as well as data centers mandated to retain a wide range of user data for 5 years or longer if mandated under law. The data points that the listed service providers will need to store include names of users, duration and dates of service subscription or use, purpose of hiring service,  users’ internet protocol (IP), email addresses, validated address, contact numbers, and even the IP address and timestamp used at the time of registration or service initiation. VPNs or other services often do not store any user data as they are designed to protect anonymity and privacy. The data retention mandate will have significant implications for such service providers, and large VPN companies like NordVPN and Proton VPN are threatening to pull out of India. The mandate is also an attack on users' privacy and places users of these services at risk of exposure and surveillance.  Data retention requirements are intense. Virtual assets service providers, virtual asset exchange providers and custodian wallet providers are required to maintain information relating to KYC and financial transactions records for a period of 5 years. Transaction records must be maintained in such a manner so as to enable reconstruction of each individual transaction. Not only does this direction increase the burden on financial intermediaries it may also be an overreach as CERT-In seeks to obtain data which may not have anything to do with cyber security. 

    First ever sanctioning of crypto blender provider

    States' use of intermediaries in governing transnational crypto flows and cybercrime continues to expand. The US treasury recently sanctioned Blendor.io, a virtual currency mixer which was allegedly being used for money laundering by North Korea. A cryptocurrency tumbler or mixer is a service platform that mixes potentially identifiable funds, improving the anonymity of transactions. Blender.io failed to implement Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism policies, which allegedly aided state-sponsored hacking groups like Lazarus to launder funds from illicit activities. This sanction highlights that while virtual currency transactions might be decentralized and anonymous, it can always be regulated at the level of intermediaries. The treasury is working towards identifying more of these intermediaries to tackle increasing use of digital assets to aid criminal and terrorist groups. Meanwhile other countries like India continue to explore ways to tax capital gains from digital assets in order to limit the free market of cryptocurrencies.

  • Feb 2022
  • The Narrative (Metaverse, USITC, Spotify-Rogan, Digital Mone ...

    The Metaverse will be territorialized 

    Metaverses are being promoted as a virtual reality universe where users can interact and feel present “no matter how far apart…” Well, some users, anyway. The technology in VR headsets seems to be so advanced that it’s use is restricted by those on various USG control lists, subjecting the metaverse to the political geography of earth. The Oculus Terms of Service restrict devices to 22 “supported countries” outside the United States.

    Censorship Is A Barrier to Digital Trade: USITC Report

    The U.S. the International Trade Commission (USITC) has unveiled the first report of its investigation into censorship that impedes trade and investment by U.S. businesses in foreign markets. The six countries covered in the report  - China (including Hong Kong), Russia, Turkey, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia - represent key markets where the demand for digital content and services provides a significant commercial opportunity for U.S. firms, but are affected by governments’ censorship policies for digital content.  The report does a good job of tracking the evolution and tracking trends in censorship policies across different markets. For e.g. across all the six markets, it notes a movement towards a multi-pronged approach to censorship, wherein direct censorship (internet shutdowns, filtering, blocking, restricting access) and censorship-enabling measures (internet intermediary rules, data localization, local presence requirements, restrictions on foreign investment or market access) being included in the same law or package of laws. The report also delves into specific elements of censorship policies and practices such as extraterritoriality, self-censorship and the roles of governmental and nongovernmental actors, particularly state-owned entities and private internet companies, in the implementation and enforcement. Although it is advisory in nature, the report can be used as a basis for a probe and action.  Not surprisingly, China is a key focus of the investigations. The report sets aside a separate chapter to explore the Chinese Communist Party's approach to censorship. It notes: "Censorship of content and media services may often be politically motivated, but it can also be used to protect some of China’s largest and most competitive content and media companies that support government policies and are expanding rapidly in global markets." Apart from China’s Great Firewall, which “enables the government to maintain control over the country’s gateway to the global Internet” the impact of the Cybersecurity Law, Provisions on the Governance of the Online Information Content Ecosystem, the Hong Kong National Security Law, and the Data Security Law are also examined. In the case of India, the report notes: "India ranks as less restrictive on some indices but has a worsening censorship environment despite being a large market for U.S. firms." According the USITC the Indian government is exercising censorship by citing relevant laws and regulations to provide notices to “remove content, shut or slow down internet access, file criminal charges, block the release of a documentary or prevent a television station from broadcasting”; and through a “variety of informal mechanisms based on intimidation and harassment”. While the investigation focuses on the new intermediary rules, increased internet shutdowns and limits on foreign investment in digital media, the use of a range of other laws used to target speech that have had a significant impact on US firms operating in India are also noted in the report. The report sends a strong message to China and Russia that have long been using censorship to restrict market access for U.S firms. It is also a warning for countries like India and Indonesia that have recently introduced restrictions targeting digital content, that the U.S. views censorship as a barrier to digital trade. The inclusion of India and Indonesia in the report is particularly interesting given the Biden administration proposed Alliance for the Future of the Internet. The U.S. would benefit from having these countries join the alliance; however as the USITC investigation highlights, based on their approach to censorship of digital content these countries are unlikely to find a place within this grouping of “like-minded countries”. With China and Russia indicating that they may be considering an alliance of their own, what is clear is that censorship as a trade issue has arrived. 

    Culture of Intolerance: The Spotify-Rogan controversy 

    Musicians famous and obscure withdrew their works from Spotify in an attempt to get the music and podcast platform to cancel Joe Rogan’s popular podcast. Rogan’s opponents say he is spreading dangerous misinformation about vaccines and covid treatments; others claim he is a “fascist.” But one thing needs to be made clear: This debate is not about who has the legal right to do what. TechDirt editor Mike Masnick explains in depth here why the Spotify-Rogan controversy has nothing to do with Section 230 or Spotify’s status as a “platform” or a “publisher.” Professor Jeff Kosseff, a First Amendment expert, explained that even if the ideas promoted by Rogan’s guest are deemed “dangerous,” the courts have found multiple times that the First Amendment protects publishers from being liable for dangerous information found in their publications. The bottom line is that it would be legal for Spotify to keep Rogan on, legal for them to kick him off in response to public pressure, legal for Neil Young and others to boycott Spotify.  Debating legal rights completely misses the larger significance of this incident. We need to be focusing on the growing trend toward intellectual and cultural intolerance. Increasingly, people react to messages and information sources they think are wrong by demanding that they be suppressed. They routinely elevate the existence of content that offends them into existential threats to society. Rogan’s December 30 podcast allowed Robert Malone to argue that covid vaccines pose risks. While some of Malone’s concerns had some grounding in science, he seems to have lost sight of the fact that the risks of the vaccine are small compared to not getting vaccinated for the vast majority of people. Another Spotify podcast quickly analyzed and debunked Malone’s ideas. But should it be unacceptable to even air these concerns and doubts in the public sphere? Taboos that circumvent critical thinking and discourse about public issues also create risks that we will suppress legitimate concerns. People who react in this way seem to have lost all faith in the ability of the public to detect and reject false ideas. To quote one random post of this type,”The content Rogan creates is antivaxxers and Neonazis. You can't avoid that by not listening.” This attitude breeds a culture of intolerance which, if not checked, will eventually curb speakers’ legal rights. 

    India Moves on Digital Currency

    India’s finance minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, announced the launch of Digital Rupee, India’s version of a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC); and taxation of virtual digital assets in the recent budget speech. India’s policy toward cryptocurrencies is still rather unclear and these announcements raise several interesting implications, as Vagisha Srivastava writes in her more detailed analysis of the announcement here

  • Jan 2022
  • The Narrative: European DNS policy, Apple & competition, Ukr ...

    Europe’s industrial policy for recursive DNS

    The European Commission’s 2020 Data Strategy is intended “to make the EU a leader in a data-driven society [by] creating a single market for data.” As part of its misguided “digital sovereignty” effort, the plan budgeted an initial 14 million Euro for a recursive European DNS resolver service infrastructure (DNS4EU) (a “European Cloud” was also in the plan, but we won’t cover that here). To justify the need for DNS4EU, the Commission cited cybersecurity, competition, and privacy/data protection. The EC has now published its Call for Proposals for the service. Some requirements like conforming to “the latest” Internet standards like HTTPS and DNSSEC, as well as encrypted DNS like DoT and DoH, are predictable. But we’re perplexed by some other requirements. For example, the service must provide “opt-in paid premium services for enhanced security” like legal/compliance filtering or monitoring and “there shall be no monetization of personal data.” Sounds good, but both features are offered today (sometimes for free) by some current providers. And the reality is that DNS query data underlies $ billions in services produced across multiple sectors (e.g., content delivery, network security, and yes, digital advertising). Even nominal supporters of the policy, like a manager of Europe-based managed DNS provider Open-Exchange, recognize that.

    Apple’s privacy initiatives vs. competition concerns

    Apple has publicly branded its products and services as more privacy-protective than its major platform rivals. But those efforts are facing increasing resistance from business and government interests due to alleged competition policy concerns. For instance, mobile network operators in Europe and the US are voicing their displeasure with Apple by blocking its recently launched Private Relay service, which inhibits monitoring users' DNS query and IP address data by using proxy servers controlled by different organizations. European mobile operators have argued to regulators that the technology impacts “network management,” and “undermines digital sovereignty.” They also say they expect Apple to be classified a “digital gatekeeper” under the EU Digital Markets Act, and flatly admitted that cutting off the data “could prevent operators from competing with the company.” Another example is Apple’s App Tracking Transparency (ATT) initiative, which requires app developers to get users’ consent to track their activity across different apps. According to Apple, this feature is threatened by Sens Klobuchar and Grassleys’ recently-introduced American Innovation and Choice Online Act (AICOA) bill that has Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple in its sights. AICOA seems like a solution in search of a problem. Viewing these platforms as dominant gatekeepers fails to appreciate the multiple areas in which they compete to meet users' demands. In fact, Apple’s enclosure of the identifier data underlying tracking on its platform has taken significant share from Facebook in the digital advertising market. Apple, so far, is not a major player in digital advertising, instead choosing to sell privacy benefits to users instead.

    Cyber Incidents in Ukraine 

    Last week hackers posted politically charged messages on numerous Ukrainian websites. Most reporting focused on the defacement of government websites, but Microsoft security specialists observed destructive malware disguised as ransomware, which they named WhisperGate, in systems spanning multiple government, non-profit, and information technology organizations, all based in Ukraine. Hackers established access to government systems late last summer but the wiper’s components were compiled a few days before they were discovered by Microsoft last week. Two government agencies were impacted by WhisperGate, and as both government agencies were also targeted in the defacement incident, investigators believe both operations were coordinated. While no conclusive links have been publicly shared that attribute the incidents to a specific actor or country, Russia is a prime suspect in the attack.  These incidents merit close attention, for two reasons:  First, some security experts view these incidents as an escalation on Russia's part to apply pressure on the West, and want to term them as "hybrid" or cyber warfare. Aggressive cyber operations are advantageous as they can be used in a targeted, painful way 'before bullets and missiles fly', but can both be walked back easily from and denied at least at the surface level. Even if we were to believe that the Russian government is leveraging its persistence in Ukrainian systems, there were no reported casualties or serious harm due to the incidents. Both the defacement and malware may cause economic or reputational damage but are far from armed attacks. As pointed out by Lukasz Olejnik, a cybersecurity researcher, if a state actor is behind these incidents, they may be violations of state sovereignty or international law, but we should not be labeling it warfare.  Second, the US and Russia were, for the first time since the early 2010s, actually cooperating on cybercrime and addressing ransomware attacks on US organizations that originated from actors in Russia over the last few months. The Russian counterpart to the FBI (the FSB) was making arrests of ransomware actors, by some measures ransomware attacks  were slowing down, and both industry and civil society were benefiting. It is possible that the latest Ukraine attacks, on the heels of the REvil arrests, are provocations on Putin's part. But it is also eye opening that the US can pursue bilateral efforts to address transnational problems that directly impact American organizations (literally millions of dollars), or it can engage in saber-rattling, with ambiguous support from European allies, seeking to contain a perceived Russian threat to Ukraine. Those two seem incompatible, and one approach needs to change.

    New IGP White Paper on Multistakeholder Initiatives in Content Governance

    Can multistakeholder governance make platforms’ content moderation decisions better? The term “multistakeholder” (MS) is now claimed as a legitimizing feature of various international, Internet-related policy development entities. While support for MS governance is generally a good thing, it also means that the term can be applied loosely or even deceptively. Last week IGP released a new white paper that develops criteria that facilitates assessment of multistakeholder initiatives. It then applies those criteria to 3 recent initiatives related to content governance that lay claim to being multistakeholder: the Christchurch Call and its Advisory Network, the Facebook Oversight Board, and the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). The analysis makes it possible to assess what multistakeholderism really means in a particular organization.  

  • Dec 2021
  • The Narrative: IGF16 still on; Insurers confront cyber-attri ...

    Amid Covid concerns, IGF meets in Poland

    As of this moment, the UN Internet Governance Forum will still hold a hybrid meeting in Katowice, Poland. The hosts made an announcement affirming that "it goes ahead with the physical meeting as planned as it has taken all necessary precautions to make the event safe." Our group has organized a workshop on Multistakeholder Initiatives in Content Moderation which involves business, government and civil society representatives involved in the Christchurch Call Advisory Network, the Facebook Oversight Board, and the Global Internet Forum for Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). We are also hosting a Town Hall with colleagues from the UN University and the Free University of Brussels on Digital Sovereignty, entitled “Beyond Hype: What Does Digital Sovereignty Actually mean?”  In the run-up to the Forum, controversy has erupted over the UN Secretary-General’s attempt to create an IGF “Leadership Panel.” IGP and IT for Change issued a joint letter asking the SG to end the plan, claiming that it “foster[s] the increased stratification of IGF participants into status-based categories that undermine the Forum’s original goal of encouraging bottom-up stakeholder participation.” Various civil society and technical community organizations have expressed reservations about the panel, including the Internet Society CEO and the Internet Technical Collaboration Group. IGP will be an active participant in Poland.
    • On Day 0, IGP researchers will present the paper Making Data Private – and Excludable: A new approach to understanding the role of data enclosure in the digital political economy. The Giganet Annual Symposium will take place Monday, December 6, with the panel starting at 14:00 CET. Register to get your Zoom link for Symposium here.
    • IGP and the Free University of Brussels have come together to organize a session titled Beyond hype: what does digital sovereignty actually mean?  As the name suggests, the session will deal with the consequences of widespread use of this contentious concept in policymaking. The session is Town Hall #23 and will take place in Hall A3 on Wednesday, December 8, at 10:45 CET, you can register to join online here.
    • IGP is organizing a session, Multistakeholder initiatives in content governance which examines several content governance initiatives including the Christchurch Call, the Facebook Oversight Board, and the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. These initiatives raise important questions about the relationship between private commercial platforms, governments, law, human rights, and the role of public input in resolving the ongoing tension between freedom of expression and controversial social media content. The session is Workshop #57 and will take place in Ballroom A on Friday, December 10, at 11:15 CET, you can register to join online here.

    Insurers and attribution

    Lloyd's Market Association (LMA), a trade association for insurers, has issued draft Cyber War and Cyber Operation Exclusion Clauses, including guidance on attribution of cyber attacks. Authoritative attribution remains one of Internet governance’s thorniest problems, especially when the adversary is a state or an agent of one. The yet to be settled Mondelez v. Zurich case hinges on the US government’s and allied states’ attribution of NotPetya to the Russian government. The LMA draft clauses lay out conditions for possible exclusions of coverage and how attribution shall be determined. In one version (LMA5565), certain states including “China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, UK or USA” were specified suggesting that cyberspace conflicts between them remain active and particularly problematic for insurers. The language seems pretty reasonable, stating that the "primary but not exclusive factor in determining attribution" resides with the state, but absent that "it shall be for the insurer to prove attribution by reference to such other evidence as is available." The obvious risk is that a state continues to use attribution strategically, blaming another state and thus denying the victim any coverage. But this may incentivize victims to pressure their governments to be transparent in attribution details and rigor, lest their claim be denied. It also indicates that insurers will want to build up their own capacity to evaluate attribution work done by others. An independent body capable of making authoritative attributions still seems like a desirable solution.

    India and cryptocurrencies

    From a proposed outright ban in 2016 to the current administration racing to finalize legislation in time for the last parliament session of the year - regulation of cryptocurrencies in India have come a long way. The Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2021 is listed for introduction in Parliament’s Winter Session. Reports suggest the bill seeks to prohibit all “private cryptocurrencies” in India. However, it allows for certain exceptions to promote the underlying technology of cryptocurrency and its uses. Spurred by losses and misuse of cryptocurrencies for money-laundering, the central bank has been calling for greater oversight of the industry. Last year, the Supreme Court of India had to intervene to reverse Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) order banning banks from supporting crypto transactions. Given the rapid adoption of, and investment in cryptocurrencies in India - a complete ban is unlikely. On Tuesday, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said the bill was being reworked to take into account the rapid changes in the industry, without offering details of the changes to the original draft.

  • Sep 2021
  • CCP Continues to Seal Off Its Digital Economy

    The Chinese Communist Party's focus on building a governance regime for cyberspace has resulted in the rapid introduction of several new laws and regulations on data governance, cybersecurity, the digital economy, and online media content. The targeting of the digital sector with so many new restrictions, laws and regulations is motivated primarily by the state’s security and control concerns. Whatever it’s causes, it is a major pullback from the last 20 years of opening up, and is intended to reassert the Communist Party's supremacy over cyberspace. Below, we break down the regulatory action and its implications for data and platform governance in China. 

    Regulating Competition in Digital Economy 

    On August 17, China's antitrust watchdog, the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR), proposed new rules to curb unfair competition among big internet firms. The rules come after antitrust action earlier this year which culminated in a record fine on e-commerce giant Alibaba. China has also tightened supervision of the sharing economy resulting in a series of fines or restrictions for Tencent, Didi, Meituan, and Pinduoduo for suspected anti-competitive behavior.  These latest rules prohibit a range of anti-competitive behaviors, including discriminatory pricing, the use of data, algorithms, or other technical means to disrupt, limit traffic or restrict users from accessing other platforms, products and services. Fabricating statistics or information about products, sales, consumer views, and user reviews to mislead customers or hurt the reputations of rivals is also forbidden. The enforcement mechanisms and fines are yet to be finalized and the draft rules are open for public comments until September 15. 

    Solidification of the Cybersecurity Law

    On August 17, the State Council released the Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protection Regulations (CII Regulation), effective from September 1, 2021. The CII Regulation is an implementing rule of the Cybersecurity Law (CSL) which went into effect in June 2017. The CSL governs a broad range of issues from the construction, operation, maintenance of networks to requirements for the collection, storage and use of data inside China to procedures for transferring information out of China.  One of the most significant concepts introduced by the CSL is what is referred to as "critical information infrastructure" (CII). Entities classified as operators of CII are subjected to stricter rules for data security, procurement, cross-border data flows, and other areas. Although the CSL and subsequent regulations addressed which sectors are considered critical, there is no clear definition of CII. The lack of clarity about CII has led to uncertainty amongst domestic and foreign companies. The government has utilized the ambiguity to go after private platforms.  In July,  just two days after DiDi Chuxing began trading on the New York Stock Exchange, an investigation was launched against the company under the Cybersecurity Review Measures that only apply to CII. The action indirectly classified ride-hailing platforms as CII and has fueled speculation on which companies or sectors may be next. The government is in the process of revising the cybersecurity measures to require CII operators holding information of more than 1 million users and want to list on foreign stock exchanges to submit to a cybersecurity review. Given the significance of being designated as a CII operator in China, the CII regulations move us towards a narrower definition of CII. CII refers to "network and IT systems that are critical to important industries and sectors, and whose destruction, loss of functionality, or data leakage may gravely harm national security, economy and the public interest." The regulations do not include details on which network or IT systems qualify as CII operators across different sectors. Relevant government authorities will evaluate and designate CII for their sector on a case-by-case basis. 

    Personal Data Protection Law Adopted 

    On August 20, the Standing Committee adopted the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL), which will take effect on November 1. The new law sets forth a range of principles, rights, obligations, administrative guidelines, and enforcement mechanisms for "handling" of "personal information" (PI).  PI refers to "all kinds of information, recorded by electronic or other means, related to identified or identifiable natural persons.” PI that has been anonymized to "make it impossible to distinguish specific natural persons and impossible to restore" is excluded from the scope of the law. Handling of data refers to the "collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure, deletion etc." and “handlers”, “joint handling” and “entrusted parties” handling data on behalf of the handlers fall within scope of the law. The law applies to processing activities in both the private and public sectors. However, it is not clear whether these privacy regulations will affect the broad rights to government surveillance created by the 2017 National Intelligence Law, which states that “any organization or citizen shall support, assist and cooperate with the state intelligence work in accordance with the law.”  Modelled in many ways upon Europe’s GDPR, the PIPL stipulates principles to be followed when processing PI including sincerity and good faith; purpose limitation; collection and storage limitation; data minimization; openness and transparency;  accuracy and accountability. Processing activities that endanger national security or public interest and the illegal collection, use, processing, transfer, sale, provision or publication of PI is prohibited under the law.  PI can be processed only after obtaining the individuals’ informed consent, i.e. given by individuals "under the precondition of full knowledge" and “in a voluntary and explicit statement of wishes”. The law stipulates parental consent to process PI of children younger than 14. Handlers must obtain specific consent to disclose the details of processing activities or when processing publicly available PI for different purposes other than for which they were published.  Although consent is an important tenet of the PIPL, the law goes beyond the consent-centric framework to include other legal grounds for processing. PI can be processed  when necessary for the execution of a contract, fulfilling statutory duties and obligations, responding to emergencies and for public interest activities like news reporting, public opinion supervision. PI publicly disclosed by an individual can also be processed unless the individual expressly refuses or if such processing is detrimental to individual rights and interests.  The PIPL grants individuals the right to know, decide, refuse, and limit the handling of their PI, to access or copy, to correct or complete inaccurate PI and to delete PI. Individuals have the right to withdraw consent and service providers are not allowed to deny services if an individual does not consent to the processing of PI or withdraws their consent, (although exception for services where PI is “necessary”). Individuals also have a right to obtain explanation, and a right to data portability to a designated handler.  Obligations for processors include setting up mechanisms for individuals to exercise their rights, adopting appropriate technical security measures, and undertaking regular compliance audits. In the event of a data breach, processors are obliged to notify government agencies and the affected individuals, as well as undertake remedial measures.  The PIPL creates additional obligations for processing of “sensitive personal information”, which includes data relating to race, ethnicity, religious beliefs, individual biometric features, medical health, financial accounts, and individual location tracking. Sensitive PI can be processed for a specific purpose and when sufficiently necessary, taking strict protection measures including seeking informed consent and conducting impact assessments. These enhanced protections are based on the recognition that sensitive data once leaked or illegally used may cause discrimination against individuals or grave harm to personal or property security.  The law also includes additional obligations for processors that provide important Internet platform services, have a “large number of users”, and carry out “complex” business activities. Such processors must put in place comprehensive compliance systems, formulate platform protection standards, restrict access of providers of illegal content and publish social responsibility reports.  Algorithms and automated decision-making are explicitly addressed by the PIPL. Handlers using PI to conduct automated decision-making must ensure the transparency and fairness of decision-making. The PIPL addresses discriminatory pricing behaviors and stipulates that handlers shall "not impose unreasonable differential treatment of individuals in trading conditions such as trade price, etc." Processors that use automated decision-making for "information push delivery or commercial sales to individuals" must provide options that are not specific to an individual’s characteristics, or provide the individual with a convenient method to refuse. Individuals have the right to seek explanation of automated decision-making, and the right to opt-out of automated decision-making methods.  PI handled by state organs, critical infrastructure operators, and other handlers reaching a specific volume of data (to be specified by the state) must be stored within the territory of China. Apart from data, Individuals and organizations are not allowed to provide personal data stored within China to foreign law enforcement authorities without the prior approval of the relevant regulatory authorities in China.  The law allows transfers of PI outside the borders of China if the handlers meet certain conditions. Handlers must take measures to ensure the activities of overseas recipients in processing PI protection standards set forth under the PIPL. Prior to overseas transfer, handlers are required to obtain certification from a specialized body, submit to a security assessment by relevant authorities, or any other conditions provided for under other legislation or regulations, or those set by relevant authorities from time to time,  provide notice and obtain specific consent from individuals. Additionally, cross-border transfers are permitted if concluding  a contract with the foreign receiving side in accordance with a standard contract formulated by the relevant agencies.  The PIPL includes strict penalties for violations. Authorities may issue a rectification order or warnings, and confiscate any illegal proceeds of companies found to be in breach of the law. Companies could also have their services suspended or terminated, their business operations and certificates cancelled and face fines of up to 50 million Yuan, or 5% of annual revenue. Processors can be liable for civil and criminal liabilities, and designated consumer organizations may bring suit on behalf of a class of individuals that have been harmed.  The implementation of the rules, rights, and obligations under the PIPL has repercussions for not only entities engaging in domestic and cross-border operations within the country but throughout the world. China’s approach to regulating the personal data and cross-border data flows will shape how other countries approach the same.

    Prohibiting Companies from Listing Offshore 

    On August 27, the WSJ reported China is contemplating rules to make it mandatory for Chinese companies with large amounts of sensitive consumer data to obtain formal approval from a cross-ministry committee (yet to be established) before listing overseas. The proposed rules appear to be a response to regulatory pressures from the U.S..and stems from the Chinese leadership's growing concern about data security.  These rules are also in keeping with recent action against domestic companies trying to list overseas. In many ways, the suspension of Ant Group’s IPO in November 2020, following Alibaba CEO Jack Ma’s speech comparing global banking regulators to “an old man’s club” kicked off the regulatory crackdown that is still ongoing. Since then regulators have ordered Ant Group to restructure as a strictly regulated financial holding company and spin off its consumer credit data operations.  The Financial Times reports the Chinese leadership is contemplating creating a separate app for Ant's loans business which accounted for 39 per cent of the group’s revenues. Regulators had previously ordered Ant to separate its lending units from its main business and bring them into a new entity. State-owned companies have a majority stake in the new business. Now regulators want to break up Ant's mega-app Alipay, so the new businesses can have their own independent app.  The plan will see Ant turn over the consumer data to a new credit scoring joint-venture, which will be partly state-owned. The move to "share" data with government-backed credit agencies is significant as it breaks Tencent and Ant's duopoly over mobile and digital payments data in China. Alipay collects data from more than two-thirds of China's 1.4 billion people, many of them young and without credit cards or sufficient credit records with banks, as well as from 80 million merchants. 

    Management of Algorithms 

    On August 27 the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) released a draft of the "Internet Information Service Algorithmic Recommendation Management Provisions" for public comment, with submissions due September 26. The legislation lays down principles  and obligations for "internet information services" that use "algorithmic recommendation technology" to provide search results, rankings, selections, push notifications within China. The broad definition of information covers all sorts of private platforms and services including food delivery or ride-hailing apps, ecommerce platforms, search engines, or social media companies.  In keeping with China's controlled media environment, algorithms must be used for “good or to disseminate positive energy.” Service providers are required to "establish", "strengthen" and "perfect" information management to ensure content conforms to "mainstream value orientations" especially in key segments such as front pages, main screens and search terms. Algorithmic models that "go against public order and good customs", "harm national security","upset the economic order or social order" are prohibited.  The regulations address consumer harms that could arise from the use of algorithms. Serving up information to minors that could lead to "unsafe conduct", "acts violating social morals","harmful tendencies","online addiction" is explicitly prohibited. Additionally, service providers must periodically review, evaluate, verify, assess, and check their algorithms, to ensure they are not leading users to "leading users to addiction or high-value consumption." Service providers are required to increase transparency of algorithms and intervene when needed to "avoid creating harmful influence on users, or triggering controversies or disputes." The regulations also mandate the protection of PI of users including minors.  The draft includes provisions aimed at specific business practices of technology companies. Service providers are prohibited from using algorithms to carry out “unreasonably differentiated treatment” of consumers based on characteristics like consumer habits, preferences or transaction history. Use of algorithms  to "falsely register users, illegally trade accounts, manipulate user accounts" or "carry out flow falsification or flow hijack", "shield information, over-recommend, manipulate topic lists or search result rankings, or control hot search terms or selections" are also prohibited. The rules also prohibit self-preferential treatment, unfair competition, influencing online public opinion, or evading oversight using algorithms.  Other provisions focus on empowering consumers and granting them more control over their information. Consumers have the right to choose, revise, or delete user tags and opt-out of algorithmic recommendation services. Users have the right to seek an explanation as well as an obligation for service providers to notify users of "the situation of the algorithmic services including the basic principles, purposes, motives and operational mechanisms." Importantly, consumers can file complaints and seek remedy if algorithms have a major influence on their rights and interests.  The regulation establishes a categorised and graded management of providers of algorithmic recommendation services on the basis of factors like the types and sensitivity of content, the scale of users, the degree of interference in users’ activities, their public opinion properties and social mobilization capability.  Service providers using algorithms deemed to have "public opinion properties or social mobilisation capabilities" must comply with additional obligations. Providers must register within 10 working days of providing services, submit an "algorithm self-assessment report", conduct "security assessment according to relevant state regulations" and "perfect algorithmic recommendation service management mechanisms". Information records must be preserved for six months, and shared with law enforcement agencies when requested. The penalties for violations range from a mere warning and order of rectification to fines ranging from 5,000 to 30,000 yuan and suspension of services.

    Migration of Data to State-owned Cloud System

    On August 27, Reuters reported that China is in the process of setting up a state-backed cloud system which will be completed by next year. The Chinese city of Tianjin had asked municipally controlled companies to migrate their data from private operators like Huawei, Alibaba and Tencent to "guoziyun" or "state asset cloud" by September 30, 2022. Companies have also been instructed to not sign new contracts with third-party cloud platforms, or continue cloud resource rental agreements. The Tianjin State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), which issued the orders, said it was following instructions given by China's cabinet. It is not clear whether other provinces are adopting similar measures. 

    Restrictions on Online Gaming 

    On August 30 the National Press and Publication Administration (NPPA) issued the "Notice of Further Preventing Minors from Indulging in Online Games" restricting online gaming for users under the age of 18 to three hours a week. The guidance requires gaming companies to take measures to prevent minors from accessing online game services in any form outside of the stipulated hours (from 20:00 to 21:00 every Friday, Saturday, Sunday, and holidays). Gaming companies must have a real name verification system in place to ensure the new rules are enforced.  The government has justified the ban on the grounds that it is designed to reduce addiction among young people and protect their physical and mental health. The NPPA regulator told Xinhua it would increase the frequency and intensity of inspections for online gaming companies to ensure they were putting in place time limits and anti-addiction systems. Regulators are closely following the implementation of the new rules and have temporarily suspended approvals of new online games in China. 

    Amending the e-Commerce Law 

    On August 31,  the SAMR announced it is revising China's ecommerce law. The amendments enable SAMR to fine, restrict operations and revoke licences of ecommerce companies that fail to curtail infringement of intellectual property (IP) rights by vendors selling through their platform. The amendments are open for public review until October 14. 

    Data Security Law Kicks In 

    The Data Security Law (DSL) came into effect on September 1. The DSL updates the existing regime, and introduces new mechanisms for data security in China. Data security is broadly defined and the law regulates a wide range of data processing activities, including “collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision and disclosure” of data in both electronic and non-electronic forms. The DSL has extraterritorial reach as it applies to both data processing activities within China as well as activities outside of China that could be detrimental to national security, public interest or the rights of Chinese citizens or organizations. The DSL categorizes data into three classes, namely “important”; “national core'' and "general" based on its sensitivity and importance to economic development, national security, public interest and individuals’ and entities’ legitimate rights and interests. It is not clear what constitutes "important" data in China. The DSL empowers regional and industry authorities to catalogue "important data" for their regions and industries and formulate specific measures for its security. Processors of important data must undertake periodic risk assessments, appoint officers and management bodies for data security. Importantly, the DSL mandates data localization as service providers must store important data within China.  National core data” is a new category and is broadly defined as “data related to national security, the lifeline of the national economy, important aspects of people’s livelihoods, and major public interests”. and outlines strict penalties for non-compliance. The DSL implements a "stricter management system” for companies processing such data. Non-compliance could result in fines up to RMB 10 million, cancellation of licence, and even criminal penalties.  The DSL mandates compliance with the multilevel protection scheme (MLPS) set up by the CSL. The MLPS grades companies (on a scale of 1-5) based on their impact on national security, social order, and economic interests if they are damaged or attacked. Companies classified as level 2 are required to take technical and administrative measures.The DSL expands these obligations and outlines measures for data security. Companies are required to take technical and other measures like setting up management systems, or enhancing risk supervision to ensure data security and prevent data breaches. Non-compliance with these obligations could result in individual fines up to RMB 2 million and operations being suspended.  Significantly, the DSL includes provisions to regulate the commercial “transaction” of data and creates duties for data transaction agents. Agents “shall require the data provider to explain the source of data", "review and verify identities of both parties" and "maintain records of the verifications and transactions.” Failure to comply could lead to penalties for data transaction agents. These include “request for rectification, confiscation of the unlawful gains, cancellation of business licenses,” and a fine of up to 10 times the value of the unlawful gains or a fine of up to RMB 1 million if there are no unlawful gains. Additionally, the directly responsible person will be subject to a fine of up to RMB 100,000.  The DSL establishes a system for “data security reviews” to examine any data activities that may be deemed to pose risks to national security. The law also empowers the government to impose export control measures on data related to the protection of national security and interest and China’s performance of international obligations.  The DSL also places restrictions on sharing data with foreign judicial and law enforcement agencies. Organizations and individuals must obtain approval from the authorities before providing data stored within China. Entities found to be sharing data without approval could face fines of up to RMB 5 million, cancellation of business licenses, and the directly responsible person may be subject to a fine of up to RMB 500,000

    Broad Comments: 

    The PIPL together with the DSL and the CSL serve as the fundamental laws regulating cybersecurity and data in China. These three laws and various supporting legislation like the CII regulations, form an increasingly complex regulatory framework for companies doing business in or with China. These regulations have been in the works for several years and stem China's concerns about surveillance by adversaries that were accelerated by the Snowden revelations. China's push to secure its data led to the formation of the CAC and the introduction of the CSL. DSL, PIPL and other supplementary legislation have added immensely to its powers.  Besides strategic competition with foreign adversaries, another reason why these different regulations have been introduced simultaneously could be because Chinese regulatory agencies are competing with one another. Implementation of these new laws including assessment functions and setting up enforcement controls are assigned to different ministries. The political dimension of the changes was captured well by the Indian publication The Diplomat:
    Encouraged by the momentum of strengthening the role of the government in the economy, multiple government agencies began waving their sticks against tech companies to gain greater political clout. For example, it was the central bank and other financial regulators that halted Ant Group’s IPO. For Meituan, the General Administration of Market Supervision was the investigator. In the case of DiDi, the company initially received mixed signals from different regulators regarding its IPO decision, and eventually it was the Cyberspace Administration that picked on DiDi, implying an uncoordinated cross-agency regulation. How these power struggles will reshape the landscape of the Chinese tech sector remains to be seen.

    From Big Tech to Big Government

    The regulations on algorithms, online gaming or the more recent action against online celebrity and fan culture, the Chinese government is venturing into new and uncharted aspects of internet governance. There are many theories about why China is doing this and one of the most popular ideas is the concept of "common prosperity". The concept has been around for several years, and is generally understood as "as moderate wealth for all, rather than just a few". Last month, President Xi Jinping highlighted “common prosperity” as an essential requirement of socialism and an important feature of Chinese modernization.  There are reasons why the vague slogan is being revived to frame recent regulatory interventions. First, leadership cannot ignore growing inequality. As the Brookings Institute notes: 
    In launching a recent wave of actions to redress social inequality and economic disparity, China’s leaders may view themselves as correcting some of the excesses of Deng’s decision to “let some people get rich first.” Such efforts align with Xi’s efforts to recast himself from a princeling to a populist leader. As some of the initial awe of Xi’s anti-corruption efforts begins to fade, his efforts to champion greater equality, including by soaking the rich, presents Xi a new opportunity to align with the people against the powerful. Such efforts also have a corollary benefit of chastening China’s new oligarchs against challenging his authority or that of the Chinese Communist Party in governing China.
    This explains why policymakers across ranks have been advocating for “the prevention of disorderly expansion of capital” or why Chinese companies are rushing to align themselves with the "common prosperity" agenda.  Second, China's technology companies have grown rapidly and engage in intense competition and predatory business practices to gain dominance. Many of these competitive strategies have contributed to growing resentment towards technology platforms in China. The framing of "common prosperity" allows the government to target private platforms while appearing to be responding to public sentiment. In December 2020, the Chinese leadership signalled the strengthening of its anti-monopoly stance and vowed to protect consumers' interests, particularly in the regulation of domestic internet giants. Viewed from the broader vision of "common prosperity" it is easy to see why the recent regulations target some of China's most profitable companies and individuals or why they enjoy public support.  To be fair, some aspects of these laws are nominally good for consumers, as they strengthen and create rights and avenues for users to bargain with platforms. But these regulations do not necessarily stem from a well-intentioned desire for protecting consumers. On the contrary, they are rooted in the CCP’s desire to shift control from the private sector into the hands of the state. Common prosperity, Xi has said, is “not just an economic issue, but a significant political one that matters to the Party’s basis to rule.”  

    Shift to Strategic Industries 

    Another popular idea is that these regulations stem from China's efforts to redirect the country’s efforts toward other strategic technologies for geopolitical reasons. From this view online gaming, ecommerce and ride-sharing technologies, however popular and successful, are not core technologies that will enable China to emerge as a leader in technology. As noted by SupChina: 
    In this top-down view, the government has decided that it wants its economy to be heavy on manufacturing and hard tech — semiconductors, batteries, “industrial internet,” and biotechnologies — and light on the consumer internet. The move is a tacit indictment of the U.S. economy, which has been running largely on the digital fumes of Silicon Valley. “Big Tech continues to find new and profitable ways to sell ads and cloud space,” wrote Derek Thompson in The Atlantic last year, “but it has failed, often spectacularly, to remake the world of flesh and steel.” China is making sure its economy doesn’t make the same mistake.
    But everything we know about economic evolution indicates that this materialist preoccupation of the Chinese is more likely to be a mistake. The migration of advanced economies from hardware to services and towards a greater role for consumption is a long term trend across the board, and has happened in Hong Kong, South Korea and Japan as well as the United States. 

    Changing Concept of National Security

    IGP believes that another important but less discussed aspect of these regulations is the conceptualization of data and platform governance from a national security perspective. The CSL and DSL focus on supervision and protection of "important", "critical" and "national core data" relating to national security. The DSL also signals the rise of extraterritorial application of national security laws. Both the DSL and the provisions on recommendation algorithms also reveal that China is expanding notions of security to include social and economic stability. The reconceptualization of data and platform regulation as a matter of national security is happening not just in China but around the world. While there are no absolute answers for what is driving these regulations in China, one thing is certain: the implementation of these laws is likely to spark even more controversies. Many of the laws only provide a general framework and several of the regulations are proposals that may end up nowhere.   

  • Aug 2021
  • The Narrative: IGF plans; Lessons from fingering China; Refr ...

    IGP at UN Internet Governance Forum

    The UN Internet Governance Forum announced its draft schedule. The event will be held December 6 - 10; it is planned as a face to face meeting in Katowice, Poland, but, due to the evolving Covid situation, many of the pre-events will be virtual and most sessions will be hybrid. The Internet Governance Project organized or co-organized three sessions, all of which were accepted: a workshop on “Multistakeholder initiatives in content governance;” a workshop on “Antitrust regulation of internet platforms;” and a Town Hall on “Beyond the hype: What does digital sovereignty actually mean?”   

    Fingering China: private, public roles in cyber attribution

    On July 19, 2021, the United States government, along with other usual and unusual collaborators, publicly accused the Chinese government and its agents of conducting “irresponsible and destabilizing behavior” in cyberspace. The latest episode of public attribution  is notable for its expansion of the multilateral approach to public attribution of state-backed cyber activities. In addition to the Five Eyes (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and NATO, the member states of the European Union and Japan all issued statements. However, there were important differences in who was blamed. Some statements referred to activities “by Chinese state-sponsored actors,” others to activities “which the Chinese government is behind,” others, less accusingly, to activities “undertaken from the territory of China.” The collective grouping of the attribution seems to have exacerbated China’s feeling that it is being picked on; articles in the Chinese press have questioned the accusations, with some responding angrily and others raising double standard concerns. Some statements focused on the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities, but others also pointed to other incidents attributed to threat actor “APT40,” including the unsealing of the May 2021 US DoJ indictment of four individuals. The indictment includes over 120 allegations, covering activity going back as far as 2009. While we don’t have access to the actual evidence, we do have a clear understanding of the types of data and how it was collected by both private and public actors. The indictment indicates a mix of technical indicator and technique data observable in cooperating organizations’ system logs, like installation of unique malware files and tools or use of particular directories, IP address and domain name queries, and email addresses used in spear phishing campaigns. The indictment weaves together private threat intel reporting, repeatedly stating how some (but importantly not all) of the data was “subsequently publicized by a cybersecurity company”, indicating how private threat intel companies selectively reveal and make assessments about perpetrators, perhaps without knowing the entire picture. We see references to personal information, like email and hosting accounts and domain name registrations, presumably obtained via legal due process. There is also insight to how activities were linked between different victims/incidents (e.g., software similarity, reuse of domains and IP addresses), and to the Chinese intelligence apparatus, possibly through open source and other intelligence.  Research emanating from our 2020 workshop on attribution shows that more than 30 organizations in at least nine countries (including China) have shared data about APT40’s alleged activities since 2016. This includes private threat intel providers, threat info sharing platforms, media outlets, independent researchers, and government agencies. We are now looking at the extent to which the data from these various sources overlaps and contributed to the public attribution. Such analysis may give insight to how much the US government relies on private actors, how much and when they reveal data publicly, and what influence they have in public attribution.

    Reframing Intermediary Liability 

    Both the U.K. and the E.U. are working on updating the "safe harbours" in order to tighten control over online intermediaries. We have previously covered the EU's draft Digital Services Regulation (the 'DSA') that regulates online intermediary services. The DSA retains safe harbours against liability but throws in additional obligations for large intermediaries to meet in order to qualify for immunity. Very large platforms that serve a certain threshold of users will be required to appoint a compliance officer, implement codes of conduct and crisis response protocols, and open up their systems for audits. Additionally such platforms are required to share parameters of decision-making on content removal, account restrictions, publish details of all ads posted on the platform and filtering/ monitoring techniques used and analyse systemic harm from the use of their platforms. Companies that do not comply with these obligations could end up coughing up 6% of their annual global income.  In May, the U.K. government published the Online Safety Bill which establishes a "duty of care" for intermediaries to address illegal and "legal but harmful" online content. Duty of care as an approach to regulating intermediaries first made an appearance in the 2019 Online Harms White Paper. The new bill imposes an obligation on certain service providers to moderate user-generated content in a way that prevents users from being exposed to terrorist and child sexual exploitation and abuse (CSEA) content, hate speech and fraud. The extent and reach of duty of care will be set by the Office of Communications (OFCOM), based on the assessment of prevalence and persistence of illegal and harmful content on a service. The bill does not mention intermediary liability and “safe harbor” for platforms and it is unclear if and how the "duty of care" obligations will alter the conditional immunity regime outlined under the EU’s E-Commerce Directive (eCD) and implemented in the U.K. during its membership in the EU.  While policymakers in both the EU and the U.K. seek to alter the existing liability framework that applies to intermediaries they are going about in different ways. The DSA retains the existing conditional immunity regime and sets forth specific and defined obligations for platforms. The Online Safety bill places additional monitoring obligations on intermediaries that they must meet, but which do not qualify them for immunity from liability. The DSA is currently under review by the European Parliament Internal Market and Consumer Protection committee. The Online Safety bill needs to pass through both houses of the U.K. Parliament. A Joint Committee has been established to scrutinise the draft bill and report its findings by 10 December 2021. The committee is seeking comments on how the Bill compares to online safety legislation in other countries, and whether it will achieve its aims until 16 September 2021

  • Jul 2021
  • The Narrative: EU stands down; China cracks down; Cuba shuts ...

    July 16, 2021

    US, EU converge on global taxation

    In a move with major implications for global internet governance, the European Commission “put on hold” its work on a digital services tax (DST) until October. The announcement came after the G20 nations came to a loose agreement to adhere to a minimum corporate income tax rate of 15%. The G20 effort to eliminate jurisdictional competition over corporate tax rates was spearheaded by the Biden administration which, like the Europeans, is hungry for additional tax revenues but constrained by international forum shopping by multinationals. The U.S., however, sees a DST as unfairly targeting global platforms, almost all of which are American. Fourteen European countries have already proposed or implemented a tax on certain revenue streams of large digital companies such as Facebook, Google, Apple and Amazon. Because of their concentrated impact on American firms, the U.S. deemed DSTs discriminatory and responded with a Section 301 investigation of France that could have triggered retaliatory tariffs. An EU-wide digital tax was proposed as a replacement for this patchwork of national DSTs, but the Biden administration believed that the contentious DST proposal would undermine US-Europe collective action on the minimum corporate income tax. Apparently, the EU officials agreed and suspended its work. The EU-wide DST is only postponed, however; failure to make progress on the global minimum corporate tax could revive it.

    China data paranoia stalls digital expansion

    In a series of actions based on the Communist Party’s increasingly closed, isolationist approach to data and Internet governance, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has expanded the scope of cybersecurity reviews. One victim of this approach is any digital company trying to raise capital from foreign stock markets. In 2017, China passed a Cybersecurity Law and regulations that prohibited foreign cloud providers from interacting directly with Chinese customers. The law also tried to make it impossible for the data generated by platforms or stored with cloud providers to be transferred out of the country. Apparently these harsh measures did not generate a feeling of data security in China. In June of this year, it passed a new Data Security Law with even more extensive controls. On July 10, 2021 the CAC website published an amended set of Cybersecurity Review Measures based on the new Data Security law. The proposed measures broaden the scope of a cybersecurity review beyond “critical infrastructure” to any data processor and any supplier of products and services to data processors. The review is no longer limited to cybersecurity risk, but will also consider data security, supply chain security, national security, and the legal compliance status of the suppliers. Any operator that holds the personal data of more than 1 million users must apply for cybersecurity review if it plans to list in a foreign country. In line with these changes, the government made an example of ride-hailing platform Didi Chuxing, which had rushed ahead with a NYSE listing. The CAC shut off all new users and removed it from all app stores while it underwent the required “cybersecurity review.” The actions devastated the company’s stock price and punished investors who participated in its initial public offering. China also subjected two other companies with recent U.S. listings to the review, and reports emerged that ByteDance, the owner of Tiktok, refrained from its planned IPO due to warnings from Chinese regulators. The Chinese government’s data paranoia is disintegrating capital markets as surely as its Great Firewall has bordered internet content. The U.S. Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, which was signed by former President Trump in December of last year, banned foreign companies from listing on U.S. stock exchanges if their audits haven’t been inspected by American regulators. The failure of Chinese coffee firm Luckin, which cooked its books but could not be inspected, created a justifiable concern about auditing Chinese companies. Chinese data-nationalists, however, fear that inspections of Chinese companies by American regulators/auditors could reveal sensitive information about Chinese operations, owners and users. In the meantime, China’s Ministry of Information Industry and Technology (MIIT) issued a  three-year plan to develop China’s own cybersecurity industry. China’s cybersecurity products and services sector is sized at $38B and estimated to be growing at 15% annually. In comparison, the global market is estimated at $158B and is growing at 11% per year.  Interestingly, the anodyne 3-yr plan explicitly states the need to “give full play to the role of various types of capital support.”

    Cuba’s Internet shutdown

    Internet blackouts and brownouts are common in Cuba, but most technical experts see the current Internet downtime as a deliberate attempt by the government to prevent the protest movement from using social media on mobile devices to communicate and coordinate. Internet connectivity analysts such as Doug Madory of Kentik identified two total blackouts on the afternoon of Sunday, July 11, when the protests occurred. The NetBlocks Internet Observatory website said that Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram and Telegram were partially disrupted on Monday and Tuesday. Reuters reported NetBlocks director Alp Toker as saying "The pattern of restrictions observed in Cuba indicate an ongoing crackdown on messaging platforms used to organize and share news of protests in real-time." The protests were forcibly suppressed and the next day gangs of government supporters patrolled the streets. Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel said in Granma, the official newspaper of Cuba’s Communist Party, that the protests were a “strategy of subversion so outrageously mounted, so perverse, so maliciously promoted on social networks.” According to Díaz-Canel,“This is media terrorism.”

  • Jun 2021
  • The Narrative: TikTok still worries the US, US-China confere ...

    Biden didn’t “revoke” the TikTok ban

    President Biden issued an executive order June 9 on “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data from Foreign Adversaries.” The media widely reported it as “rescinding” or “revoking” two Trump executive orders that banned new downloads of WeChat and TikTok. But that framing is wildly inaccurate. First, the Trump orders never took effect, as they were blocked by the courts. Second, Biden's new order is more like an extension of than an abandonment of Trump’s orders. Far from rejecting the premise of Trump’s orders, it calls for the Commerce Department to undertake "evidence-based" evaluation of the risks to national security, foreign policy, and the economy posed by the increased use in the United States of TikTok, which it describes as “certain connected software applications designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by ... a foreign adversary.” The Biden EO already concludes - without any evidence - that increased use of foreign apps “continues to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.” In other words, the U.S. is still edging away from a global Internet and towards China’s “Great Firewall” approach to foreign information services. It will be interesting to see any actual evidence the Commerce Department can provide for the order’s foregone conclusion. The administration has also not said whether TikTok will need to divest from its Chinese owner ByteDance. A separate U.S. national security review of TikTok launched in late 2019 remains active and ongoing

    US-China conference event

    IGP’s academic conference on “Comparative Analysis of Platform Governance in the U.S. and China” is almost here. Register at Eventbrite by June 18 to gain access to the presentations and discussions to be held June 23-25. Twenty papers will compare American and Chinese approaches to digital platform trade and market access, content control, antitrust, cybersecurity and payment systems. This assumes, of course, that the exchanges of information are not deemed national security threats by either government.

    El Salvador de Bitcoin

    Last month’s trend toward banning bitcoin was met by a remarkable counter-event June 9: the Congress of the nation of El Salvador formally voted to accept Bitcoin as legal tender. Under the law, bitcoin must be accepted by firms when offered as payment for goods and services, and tax contributions can also be paid in the cryptocurrency. The government will guarantee convertibility to dollars through a $150 million trust created at the country's development bank. The innovative move raises a number of economic policy questions, including the poor internet access in parts of the country and its potential impact on inflation given El Salvador’s reliance on the US dollar. But it is also highly significant for global Internet governance, because its legitimation by one state would greatly increase the difficulty of a coalition of other states to ban or unduly restrict Bitcoin use.

    Canada imposes national quotas on user-generated content

    The Trudeau government's push to pass Bill C-10, which seeks to classify media streaming sites as "broadcasters" and subject them to regulation that applies to television and radio, took a disturbing turn last week. Under the current version of the bill all user generated content is treated as a “program” and thus subject to regulations under the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission’s (CRTC) rules. Being classified as a program means that the Canadian government has the power to order YouTube, TikTok and Instagram to carry a certain quota or type of content. While must carry obligations made sense in the age of limited airwaves where only a certain amount of content could be consumed, on-demand services make this approach redundant.  Last week, the Canadian Heritage Committee, which has been studying Bill C-10 for months, moved to shut down its line-by-line study of the bill, and in the process rapidly passed a series of amendments before MPs on the committee had time to discuss them. Thankfully, the Speaker of the House of Commons found that the committee had “exceeded its authority” and the problematic amendments seem to have been stalled for now. However, given the misguided motivations driving the bill it is unlikely to go away anytime soon.

  • The Narrative (June 03, 2021): Bitcoin and ransomware; IGP's ...

    Ransomware fuels talk of Bitcoin ban, Russia and the US clash over YouTube, WhatsApp backtracks on enforcing its new privacy policy, and IGP presents at the PLSC for the first time.

    Bitcoin and Ransomware

    Successful, highly disruptive ransomware attacks are prompting calls to ban Bitcoin or find ways to crack open anonymous use of the cryptocurrency. Ransomware has been a problem for many years, but the recent crippling of the Colonial Pipeline for 6 days and its payment of $4.4 million in Bitcoin to the criminal perpetrators has elevated attention given to the role of cryptocurrency in society. Senior Biden administration officials are now describing ransomware as a national-security threat akin to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and are looking at ways to better trace ransomware payments. Critics attack its anonymity, its facilitation of ransomware and its excessive energy use as reasons to ban it. Supporters claim that banning an open-source blockchain protocol is impossible without banning Internet access, and also call attention to the important role the alternative currency plays in checking governmental abuse of national money. Faced with the technical and collective action problems of a ban, bitcoin enemies revert to a “regulate it to death” approach, focusing on controlling exchanges that convert cryptocurrencies to US dollars or Euros. The future of cryptocurrency, a transnational, stateless and decentralized asset that can be used as money, in a world of national states with central banks and highly regulated monetary systems will continue to be one of the core issues of Internet governance.

    YouTube in the middle of US-Russia conflict 

    A Russian court has ordered Google to reinstate the YouTube account associated with Tsargrad TV, an Orthodox-leaning culture and news channel that the company blocked last year citing “violation of legislation on sanctions and trade rules”. The incident shows that both the U.S. and Russia are striving for global jurisdiction over a global platform and imposing conflicting rules as a result. Tsargrad TV’s owner and founder, Konstantin Malofeyev, was placed under U.S. and EU sanctions in 2014 over accusations that he funded pro-Moscow separatists in Ukraine. The timing of YouTube's ban raised eyebrows both in Russia and abroad. Although Malofeyev was placed on the sanctions list in 2014, Google allowed Tsargrad to accumulate an audience on YouTube and received almost $10,000 a month in advertising revenue from it until 2020. It is unclear whether U.S. sanctions law requires social media companies to prohibit publishing by sanctioned individuals or organisations. In April, the Moscow Arbitration Court found that the ban had unfairly discriminated against Konstantin Malofeev and ordered Google to reinstate Tsargrad’s YouTube channel globally or face a daily 100,000 ruble ($1,358.29) fine, which would double each week until Google complies. Google filed an appeal against the ruling on May 19. 

    WhatsApp backs down on controversial privacy update 

    After months of threatening to cut off users refusing to accept the new terms of service, WhatsApp appears to have backed down. In a reversal of its stance of limiting functionality for those who did not accept the updates to its privacy policy, WhatsApp has clarified that it has "no plans to limit the functionality of the app."  The company has issued a statement, saying that “given recent discussions with authorities and privacy experts, we want to make clear that we currently have no plans to limit the functionality of how WhatsApp works for those who have not yet accepted the update... We will continue to remind users from time to time about the update as well as when people choose to use relevant optional features.” We will never know what has brought about the change of policy, but it is likely the decision of German regulators to temporarily ban the update and the growing conflict with the Indian government over the policy update have contributed to the company's decision. 

    IGP Research on data enclosure

    IGP researcher Brenden Kuerbis presented the paper, “Making Data Private - and Excludable” at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference this week. The paper identifies a phenomenon called “data enclosure,” which is part of the competitive struggle over the economic value of data. The paper draws on examples of early pay over the air television, satellite-based cable and conditional access, DNS over HTTPS, and mobile Internet and advertising identifiers used in the adtech ecosystem. The most interesting questions about the future of privacy arise from the degree to which data enclosures affect competition and succeed in providing better privacy protection. Ultimately, our goal is to understand the impact of market-driven encryption and privacy initiatives on the political economy of data.

  • May 2021
  • The Narrative (May 19, 2021): Cybersecurity EO and encrypted ...

    This week we cover some of Biden's Cybersecurity Order and a few 5G related developments. 

    Biden’s Cybersecurity EO: Encrypted data at rest for me, why not thee?

    On the heels of the Colonial Pipeline, Microsoft Exchange Server, and SolarWinds incidents, the White House has issued a new Executive Order that seeks to protect federal government networks. At over 8000 words, it deals with everything from revising USG contracts to facilitate threat information sharing, to implementation of zero-trust architecture, creation of a cybersecurity safety board, securing software supply chains, and improving federal network management including vulnerability identification, logging, endpoint detection, and incident response for both unclassified and national security systems.  We’ll focus here on just one of those topics - implementation of a zero-trust architecture (ZTA), including MFA and encrypting data at rest. While MFA adoption is growing, one interesting thing is the differing recommendations emerging from various parts of the USG on encrypting data at rest. NIST 800-207 explains how ZTA moves defenses from static, network-based perimeters to focus on users, assets, and resources. ZTA is grounded in two principles:
    • No implicit trust granted to assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location.
    • Authentication and authorization (both subject and device) are discrete functions performed before a session to an enterprise resource is established.
    While data certainly is a resource, encrypting data at rest is not explicitly mentioned in NIST 800-207. However, when looking at DoD guidance and now the Executive Order, encrypting data at rest is an explicit component of proposed organizational architecture. DOD strategy In the past few years, DOD has published several documents charting its expanded use of ZTA, including the DOD Digital Modernization Strategy, DISA Strategic Plan, and recently the DOD Zero Trust Reference Architecture. The DOD approach to ZTA cites NIST work and provides additional rationalization for the approach. Specifically, it assumes a hostile environment, and presumes breach. Because the network is assumed compromised, a “data centric security model” is necessary that denies access to all users by default, allowing access by authenticated, authorized exception. While such a strategy cannot entirely prevent an adversary from executing the standard playbook of stealing credentials, elevating privileges and exfiltrating data, it does make it more difficult because every attempt to access an encrypted data resource is validated.

    DISA

    Source: https://www.dvidshub.net/video/759897/norton-outlines-new-cybersecurity-model-army-signal-conference 

    Executive Order Federal agencies have been urged to move to security based on zero trust principles for more than a decade. (NIST, 2020)  But the new EO mandates “secure cloud infrastructure” for any contracted services: “Within 180 days of the date of this order, agencies shall adopt multi-factor authentication and encryption for data at rest and in transit, to the maximum extent consistent with Federal records laws and other applicable laws.” CISA guidance CISA recently released best practice guidance in response to the Colonial ransomware incident. It highlights MFA for remote access but makes no mention of encrypting data at rest. The lack of mentioning it seems odd especially since more than one ransomware threat actor has allegedly threatened to release data it has exfiltrated. Yes, implementing MFA will help reduce unauthorized access to organizational resources. But CISA has recommended granular access control for agency high value data/assets. Additional authentication and authorization controls to make data ostensibly useless to the adversary is an important thing to consider in addition to other defense techniques. Many private actors are already governed by industry standards (e.g., PCI-DSS) or legislation (e.g., HIPAA) to address encrypting certain kinds of data at rest. Major commercial cloud platforms all offer encrypted data at rest solutions. Obviously victims’ threat models can differ, and encrypting data at rest may not be practical for some subset of victims, but that’s a decision that can be made case by case. It doesn’t mean the practice shouldn’t be recommended by CISA, especially when it's a key new component of the USG’s approach to cybersecurity.

    Huawei, ZTE Left Out of India's 5G Trials; China Threatens Retaliation against Ericsson unless Sweden Revokes Ban

    India's Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has approved applications of Reliance Jio, Bharti Airtel, Vodafone Idea and state-run Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (MTNL) to conduct a sixth-month trial for the use of 5G technology in the country. The telecom providers will partner with Ericsson, Nokia, Samsung, Centre for Development of Telematics (C-DOT) for the trials. Additionally, Reliance Jio will be conducting trials using its own indigenous technology.  Notably absent from the list of approved partners are Huawei and ZTE which currently supply a significant amount of equipment and technology to India's mobile providers. Although the omission of the two major Chinese firms from the list of approved partners is not the same as an official ban, their exclusion from the 5G trials signals India's hardening stance against China. Having designated Huawei and ZTE as “national security threats'' last year, the U.S. has welcomed India's decision. Michael McCaul, US House Foreign Affairs Committee Lead Republican, and the China Task Force Chairman hailed India's decision as "good news for the people of India and the world." The China Task Force report released last year had called for the US government to work with partners and allies, like India, to ensure "Communist Party-controlled" companies do not have access to their 5G networks. More recently while choosing not to comment directly on the development, State Department spokesperson Ned Price emphasized that the U.S remains "deeply concerned about the dangers of installing networks with equipment that can be manipulated, disrupted or potentially controlled by the PRC (People’s Republic of China)."  Meanwhile, CISA, in coordination with the National Security Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence have only offered up potential threat vectors to 5G infrastructure The Chinese Embassy in Delhi has issued a statement expressing “concern and regret" and urging India to "provide an open, fair, just, and non-discriminatory investment and business environment for market entities from all countries, including China." While the Chinese response to India's decision has been muted so far, China's increasingly aggressive stance on bans against Chinese companies suggests an escalation is not out of the question.  In Sweden, home to Ericsson and one of the few European countries to ban Chinese firms in their national 5G roll-out - China is fighting back. The Swedish Post and Telecom Authority's (PTS) decision has been challenged by Huawei and a ruling is expected shortly. Following the ban, Beijing had threatened to retaliate against Swedish companies doing business in China, including Ericsson and its largest shareholder, Investor AB. With that threat and China accounting for 8% of sales versus 1% from Sweden, Ericsson’s chief executive criticised the ban.  Last week, Ericsson received an invitation for 5G equipment testing from China’s four major telecom operators. Simultaneously, the Global Times, a Chinese state media outlet, served up yet another reminder that Ericsson's involvement in the 5G equipment test is linked to the revocation of the ban on the participation of Chinese firms in Sweden's 5G rollout. As noted by the WSJ, the warning in Chinese state media is yet another example of Beijing using the heft of its domestic market to protect its business and foreign-policy interests. It remains to be seen if Sweden will reconsider the ban, however one thing is certain - China is fighting back.

  • Mar 2021
  • The Narrative (March 30, 2021)

    Facing a hostile U.S. Congress, Facebook proposes “updated Internet regulations” that push more responsibility for content regulation decisions to the government. Europe is already trying to do just that, but civil liberties groups are campaigning against it. India considers a tech nationalist approach to cryptocurrency.

    A taste of “updated Internet regulations” 

    U.S. politicians are exploiting anti-Big Tech sentiment to target free speech on social media. Congressional hearings on “Social Media’s Role in Promoting Extremism and Misinformation” showed that there is a bipartisan consensus that social media companies can be blamed for almost everything that is wrong with American politics, and that unspecified forms of government regulation of platforms can fix it. In his opening statement at the March 25 hearings, Democrat Michael Doyle angrily exclaimed that the platforms “amplify extremism” and their business models encourage and profit from misinformation. Republicans are going along with the attack because, in the words of Ohio Republican Bob Latta, they dislike “big tech’s ever-increasing censorship of conservative voices and their commitment to serve the radical progressive agenda” by “cancelling any voices that are not considered woke.” It’s now clear that Facebook’s campaign for “updated Internet regulations” is designed to defuse these political pressures by pushing more responsibility for controversial content regulation decisions to the government. Google’s testimony defended Section 230, stating that without it, “platforms would either over-filter content or not be able to filter content at all.” Twitter’s Jack Dorsey argued that neither government nor private companies should make the decision, but favored a “protocol approach” that would allow users to be in control. But Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg called for “thoughtful change” in Section 230. "Instead of being granted immunity,” he said, “platforms should be required to demonstrate that they have systems in place for identifying unlawful content and removing it.” Significantly, his testimony also asked Congress “to bring more transparency, accountability, and oversight to the processes by which companies make and enforce their rules about content that is harmful but legal.” During  questioning, he endorsed Congressman Peter Welch’s suggestion to create a new government agency modelled on the SEC or FTC to supervise and regulate decisions about content filtering.  It will be interesting to see what concrete measures, if any, emerge out of this. Scapegoating Big Tech is easy; the problem of moderating or controlling digital content at massive scale without fostering political censorship is not. We have already documented how efforts to regulate disinformation and hate speech in Europe and Asia have led to internet censorship by the state. What would be the standard for determining whether “adequate systems” of detection and suppression of illegal content are in place? Wouldn’t political oversight of processes for suppressing legal content be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge?

    A European model?

    Europe has already taken several steps down the path American lawmakers are contemplating. The latest is a proposed Regulation “on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online.” The controversial regulation, proposed in 2018 after “lone wolf” terrorist attacks in Europe (which there is no conclusive evidence that online content caused), has many similarities to Zuckerberg’s notion of “updated Internet regulations.” While it only targets terrorist content, it tries to square the circle of retaining platform immunity while, in fact, making platforms more responsible for detecting and taking down content. It makes the government (“competent authority”) responsible for striking “a fair balance between public security needs and the affected interests and fundamental rights including in particular the freedom of expression and information, freedom to conduct a business, protection of personal data and privacy.” The Regulation tries to retain that aspect of the 2000 E-Commerce Directive that relieves platforms of a general obligation to monitor,” but it also says “the decisions under this Regulation may exceptionally derogate from this principle” due to “the particularly grave risks associated with the dissemination of terrorist content.”  Pressures from liberal civil society and free speech advocates led to several improvements of the Regulation, but European digital rights groups are still campaigning against its passage. Their main concern is that it creates incentives for platforms to use upload filters and other forms of algorithmic content regulation that will restrict access to important and useful information.

    India may block cryptocurrency IP addresses

    In the latest manifestation of tech nationalism, the Indian government is considering blocking internet protocol (IP) addresses of cryptocurrency exchanges or companies dealing in cryptocurrencies. The development is a part of the government’s plan to introduce a bill to ban private cryptocurrencies and introduce India’s own digital currency in line with what China and other countries are doing. India is also amending its Companies Act 2013 to require companies to disclose cryptocurrency holdings in their financial statements. 

  • Nov 2020
  • The Narrative (November 30, 2020)

    The Narrative is a twice-monthly survey of key developments in Internet governance. This time we take up competition law activity against platforms, and the EU data governance initiative.

    Competition policy and platforms

    As Internet-driven platforms achieve ever-greater prominence and market power in the 21st century, antitrust actions are proliferating based on laws and politics forged during consolidations in the 19th century industrial economy. Actions are taking place in the U.S., China, Australia, India, the UK and the European Union.  In the U.S. there is strong bipartisan support for antitrust actions against the platforms, though the rationales of Republicans and Democrats differ. Republicans want to punish them for being biased media sources, while progressive Democrats target them for their bigness. In October, the House Judiciary Committee’s antitrust subcommittee released a comprehensive report on its investigation into competition in digital markets. Although the report highlights control exercised by tech giants over digital infrastructure and the data of sellers or consumers, it does not address the economic and political factors that have contributed to the rise of tech monopolies. Not long after publication of the report, the US Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Google accusing the company of engaging in anti-competitive practices in search and search advertising. The lawsuit is the most aggressive challenge the DOJ has made against a tech giant since it accused Microsoft of anti-competitive practices in 1997. The US Federal Trade Commission has also been examining Amazon's relationship with third-party sellers. China is preparing to launch an antitrust probe into Google, based on complaints from Chinese smartphone maker Huawei that by cancelling its Android licence Google has caused “extreme damage” to Chinese companies. In India, one of Google's most important markets outside of the U.S., the Competition Commission of India (CCI) is investigating allegations of Google hurting competitors by forcing smart TV manufacturers to use the Android operating system, or prohibiting them from developing modified versions of Android. The case is Google's fourth major antitrust challenge in India: it has been fined nearly $21 million for “search bias” and abusing its “dominant position” in the market, and is being investigated for abusing its dominance to promote its payments app and reducing the ability of smartphone makers to choose any other operating system other than Android. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has released an issues paper seeking views and feedback on whether Apple’s App Store and Google Play Store stifle competition. Issues under consideration include the use and sharing of data by apps, the extent of competition between Google and Apple’s app stores, and pricing transparency. UK's Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is contemplating launching a formal investigation into Google's ‘Privacy Sandbox’ initiative following complaints from Marketers for an Open Web (MOW), a coalition of technology and publishing companies, that the proposed changes take login, advertising and other functionalities off the open web and place them under Google's control.  The European Union has also sought to enforce antitrust laws against large technology platforms. EC antitrust actions against Google started 10 years ago but aside from collecting very large fines have had little impact on market structure or market share. In November, EU regulators brought antitrust charges against Amazon alleging it had abused its dual role as a platform operator using non-public data from sellers who use its platform to spot popular products, then copy and sell them, often at a lower price. In a statement Margrethe Vestager, executive vice-president in charge of the EU’s digital policy said, “We must ensure that dual role platforms with market power, such as Amazon, do not distort competition...data on the activity of third-party sellers should not be used to the benefit of Amazon when it acts as a competitor to these sellers.” Apart from pursuing Big Tech, EU is working on proposals to allow regulators to go after fast-growing companies before they are able to achieve the kind of market dominance enjoyed by Google and Facebook.   Echoing the trend of increasingly active antitrust enforcement in the digital sector, China has published antitrust guidelines. The guidelines cover both platform operators and sellers on platforms (platform players), and algorithms, technical tools, data and platform rules are included in assessment of market power and analyzing monopoly conduct. Notably, both digital platforms and data controlled by platform operators or players may be deemed as an essential facility which coupled with market dominance could entail obligations to grant access for competitors and users. The UK government has also announced the creation of a specialized unit - the Digital Markets Unit (DMU) to reign in Google, Facebook and other major platforms. Anchored within the CMA, the unit is expected to play a key role in shaping and enforcing a new code of conduct setting out the limits of acceptable behaviour by companies deemed to have “strategic market status.” The contents of that code have yet to be drawn up and the government has not specified what would qualify a company as having strategic market status.  From this survey one sees a highly varied and not always consistent set of rationales for antitrust action, including classical abuse of market power, political retribution, trade protectionism, reaction to US sanctions on China, and neo-Brandeisian revolts against bigness. The most applicable precedent for platform antitrust is the Microsoft case of the early 2000s. Although there are still differing opinions about the effects and remedy of that case, we would do well to learn from it.

    EU data governance initiative

    On 25 November, the European Commission released its Proposal for a Regulation on European Data Governance, to be known as the Data Governance Act. The Commission and supporters of the proposal see it as an attempt to avoid divergent and uncoordinated legislation from its member states, which could “intensify fragmentation [of data-related services] in the single market.” The four pillars of the proposal pertain to:
    1. A mechanism for re-using certain categories of protected public sector data which is conditional on respect for privacy and intellectual property rights (Chapter II)
    2. Limiting data sharing to “trusted intermediaries” (Chapter III)
    3. Creation of a platform for data voluntarily made available by individuals or companies for the common good; a.k.a. “data altruism” (Chapter IV)
    4. Creation of a European “Data Innovation Board” (Chapter VI)
    Most of the interesting issues and controversies pertain to the trusted intermediaries in Chapter III. Critics of the proposal have called it “protectionist and discriminatory.” In an attempt to head off these claims, the EC “decided against imposing geographical restrictions” on data-sharing services, but still requires them to have a place of establishment in the EU, or at least “designate a representative” in Europe. Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, the director of the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), criticized the requirement that companies that share data must be established in Europe. "Not even China goes that far”, he said in a Politico article. Lee-Makiyama, like some US-based critics of the proposal, believes that the proposal violates WTO rules on trade in information services. The EC’s Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breto, surprisingly, did not deny this but rather said in the same Politico article that “WTO rules that were drafted in the mid-90s might no longer be suitable for today's data-driven world.” Whether the Act is protectionist or not has diverted attention from a more fundamental issue, namely the economic feasibility of the so-called “trusted intermediaries” proposal. Trusted intermediaries are an interesting attempt by the government to dictate a market structure for data sharing that is completely different from the way major platforms currently operate. Margrethe Vestager, the European Commission’s executive vice-president for digital, said that the intermediaries “will have to comply with strict requirements to ensure their neutrality.” Neutrality, in Vestager’s opinion, “is only possible by way of a clear structural separation between the eventual data acquirer and the data intermediary.” Consequently, the draft regulation states “data sharing service providers act only as intermediaries in the transactions, and do not use the data exchanged for any other purpose.” Providers will be obliged to separate data sharing services from other commercial operations and will not be allowed to further monetize the data. Will it be possible to maintain structural separation? One is reminded of the ancient attempt in the U.S. to draw a line between “basic” and “enhanced” information and telecom services. It is unclear how many of the millions of acts of data sharing that occur in an increasingly digital economy will be affected by this requirement. It is unclear whether actors who are subject to it have incentives to participate in this scheme or to find ways to avoid it. Another question arises: Are “trusted intermediaries” an attempt to better regulate data protection and sharing for the purposes of protecting individual rights, or is the new legal framework an industrial policy initiative that tries to hobble the American platforms so as to create European “national champions” in the data economy? Both rationales can co-exist, of course, but they can lead in different directions. 

  • The Narrative (November 16, 2020)

    The Narrative is a twice-monthly survey of key developments in Internet governance. This time we assess the impact of the U.S. Presidential election on IG, and assess the results of the first virtual UN Internet Governance Forum.

    A new U.S. President

    The United States has elected Joe Biden, and this will certainly alter the country’s and the world’s course when it comes to Internet governance - but the devil is in the details. The 2020 Democratic Platform states, "We will recommit the United States to the principles of an open internet… and vigorously oppose efforts to digitally silo off countries and populations from the rest of the world." This is a good principle, and would seem to contradict the Trump Administration’s Clean Networks initiative. But evidence indicates that Biden will not reverse the main thrust of US attacks on trade with China. Though the Trump administration was a lot noisier about it, the attack on Huawei dates back to 2010 at least, and was originated by intelligence agencies under Obama. Trump’s Tiktok ban is in limbo and may be abandoned due to court setbacks in the lame duck period. Most likely the new administration will not follow up. But there are no indications that Biden will call off the damaging chip war. In July 2020, Biden reacted to the Hong Kong National Security Law by threatening new economic sanctions on China if he was elected, and has vowed to prohibit U.S. companies from “abetting repression and supporting the Chinese Communist Party’s surveillance state.” Biden believes we should confront China by forming alliances against it, rather than relying on the unilateral action favored by the Trump administration. A Biden administration will prioritize domestic policy, and the top priorities listed on Biden’s website were covid-19, economic recovery, racial equity, and climate change. Insofar as technology policy is mentioned, the focus is on expanding broadband internet. Biden has claimed that he will “restore” net neutrality but this is really a dead issue in the US and is unlikely to become a priority. A Biden administration will probably have more amicable relations with the big US platforms. As a reaction to Trump’s overt hostility, internet companies were among his campaign’s top 10 donors, and VP Kamala Harris’s political base is in California, where she has long-standing ties to Silicon Valley. But Biden has been critical of Section 230, and has called for it to be “revoked.” The Republican/conservative view that the platforms were hostile to them made platform regulation and Section 230 a stronger priority for them than it is for Democrats. But others have written that the Google antitrust lawsuit will probably continue under Biden, and perhaps be expanded. It is unclear whether a Democrat Party administration will soften the attack on encryption that is coming from various parts of the U.S. government. Biden has criticized end to end encryption, but the ITIF report comparing Trump and Biden claims that neither one of them has a well-developed position on encryption ITIF is clearly wrong about the Trump administration, as its Attorney General has made his position clear. We suspect a Biden administration will not be pushing against encryption as strongly, but could go either way. Whatever happens on the policy front, a Biden administration will improve the tone of US government interactions with the rest of the world, particularly Europe. Biden will also be much better on policy regarding the movement of people, if not packets, across borders. He is likely to allow more H1B visas, and will be much less likely to threaten arbitrary or discriminatory travel bans.

    The first virtual IGF

    The United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF) has successfully pulled off the first virtual forum. This turned out to be an interesting experiment, in that the IGF normally converges thousands of people into a single city for a week of face to face sessions - not to mention intensive receptions and parties outside the formal proceedings. In this pandemic-stricken year, IGF activities were all virtual, and spread out over 3 tracks (roughly from 07:00 - 18:00 UTC), in 12 days. Altogether the “event” spanned almost three weeks, and there will still be a November 25 “open mic and feedback session.” The secretariat claims there were 5,900 registered participants and over 1,000 speakers. In all there were 250+ sessions, most of which were proposed by participants - definitely living up to its billing as the most open and inclusive international forum for Internet policy. Due to the stimulus provided by the pandemic, the world of conferences is undergoing a profound techno-economic transformation, which can be described as the globalization of the attention economy. A larger and larger number of people - on both the supply side and the audience side of events - are learning how to use the online tools effectively. Although time zones and language are still important constraints, every event can attract an audience from anywhere in the world, intensifying competition for eyeballs. This also transforms the economic exchanges associated with travel, lodging and the parties and social events associated with them, as well as the barriers posed by visas and other legal restrictions. At the IGF, it was clear that the virtual format enhanced attendance in some ways by crushing the barriers posed by travel, borders, and lodging. Some Day 0 events, such as the Giganet Symposium for academics, enjoyed much higher levels of attendance than before. Time zone differences still served as a problem for many, however. Virtualization also made it difficult for people with day jobs to focus on IGF as a collective “event,” particularly when it was spread out over such a long period. Furthermore, the event overlapped with several other virtual events related to IG, such as the conference of the Hague Program for Cyber Norms, and the Taiwan IGF, not to mention single-issue focused virtual events in the U.S., Europe and elsewhere. Although the IGF Secretariat’s handling of the logistics generally drew praise, one common complaint was that the audience could not see who else was attending the sessions they were in, or even how many there were. Simple visual cues like these are critical for understanding shared or conflicting interests. The UN this year introduced a new notion, “voluntary commitments,” into the IGF, based on experience with other UN conferences and summits. These are voluntary actions or pledges to forward the goals of Internet governance and digital cooperation from any stakeholder. By putting panel participants on the spot to take concrete actions, this was a good idea, but most of the panels we saw did not press for them. At the Civil Society Coordination Meeting there was a discussion on the values and characteristics that define a “public interest” Internet, and the challenges and opportunities for civil society in defining the “public interest.” A YouTube video of the discussion can be found here. Members of the Global Encryption Coalition came together to provide a background to the formation of the coalition and share a vision for the future. The full video of the discussion is available here.

    Our IGF 2020 workshops

    IGP organized or co-organized three workshops. Brief summaries are below Overcoming the U.S.-China Digital Cold War. Over 120 participants attended this IGP-led workshop, co-organized with Professor Xu Peixi of Communication University of China, Beijing. The panel featured Stephen Anderson of the US State Department, Guo Feng of China’s Ministry of Information Technology, and Charles Mok, an elected member of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. (18 hours after the event, Mok and 14 other pro-democracy Legco members resigned en masse in response to the mainland government’s arbitrary move to disqualify four of their colleagues.) In addition, perspectives on the global implications of the US-China contention were shared by Joanna Kulesza of Poland, Jyoti Panday of India and Iginio Gagliardone of South Africa. Our efforts to promote a constructive give and take over tense US-China-Hongkong relations drew widespread praise from observers, but sometimes led to awkward silences and some question-dodging. Asked to make concrete proposals for improving the situation, the US representative addressed only Europe, saying that their disagreements were mere “irritants” implying that they could be overcome. Asked what China would offer in return if the US called off its chip war, the Chinese govt representative said “buy lots of chips,” provoking laughter. A Youtube video of (most of) the session can be found here. A more complete written report on the substantive interactions will come later. DNS over HTTPS (DoH): Human Rights, Markets, and Governance Encrypted DNS is here, we need to accept that and understand the implications. This was the overwhelming sentiment of the panel at a well attended workshop (90+ attendees) on DNS over HTTPS (DoH), one variant of several protocols that are bringing confidentiality and integrity to how we use domain names. The panel included an ISP from Russia (where there is a proposal to outlaw the technology) that reiterated 1990s telco arguments about the threat of over the top (OTT) applications, IETF/ISOC technologists and civil society privacy advocates, and one of the main global providers (Cloudflare) of open DNS resolution, which continues to see growing demand, especially from users in authoritarian countries. Despite the varying perspectives, there seemed to be agreement about some key points. 1) Local network choice in resolver selection should be preserved (discussions are occurring in the IETF Adaptive DNS Discovery WG). 2) We should separate the problem of technological centralization - which can raise valid concerns about resilience but can also bring dramatic innovations - from the problem of market concentration. The market [for DNS-related services] includes application-level resolvers, network-level recursive resolution, as well as complementary products and services. Measures of concentration must be based on a clear definition of what is being bought and sold and which players have which share. 3) Foster more competition in DNS recursive resolution and policies. It was also clear there is a need for clarification of the relationship between DNS data flows and national sovereignty, and which data access legal regime(s) apply to DNS data especially in light of recent privacy decisions like Schrems II. A Youtube video of the session can be found here. A more complete written report on the substantive interactions will come later. The Interaction of Platform Content Moderation & Geopolitics This panel brought together experts and regional perspectives to discuss how platforms content moderation standards, business practices, and its relationships with nation states effectively arbitrate which narratives can reach the global public. Pratik Sinha, Founder of AltNews, and Marianne Diaz, Derechos Digitales, highlighted how constantly evolving and malleable standards and the lack of investment in local resources by global platforms can contribute to differential treatment of problematic content and behaviour in emerging markets in South Asia and Latin America. Amelie Pia Heldt, Leibniz Institute for Media Research, Hans-Bredow-Institut made the case for more transparency and accountability by platforms when complying with national speech laws. Varun Reddy from Facebook, India talked about how local context shapes development and enforcement of content moderation policies. Tarleton Gillespie, Microsoft Research reflected on the limitations of platforms to respond to different contexts and cultural values. The panel was in agreement that we are experiencing issues with content moderation since platforms are in their adolescent years, and having grown in scale and complexity have adopted an industrial approach to content moderation. Panelists also drew attention to how uneven enforcement of community standards can reinforce or magnify existing power disparities and  eroding trust of users. With over 80 participants, the discussion was well attended and a Youtube video of the session can be found here. A more complete written report on the substantive interactions will come later.  

  • The Narrative 11/1/2020

    The Narrative is a twice-monthly survey of key developments in Internet governance.  This time we take up Facebook's struggles with content moderation, the geopolitics of 5G, and coordinated efforts by governments to limit encryption.

    Platforms and Content Moderation 

    Platforms continue to struggle with the controversies and contradictions of content moderation, even as numerous legal and policy initiatives attacking Section 230 protection are underway, such as a new round of Congressional hearings October 28. Facebook chief executive Mark Zuckerberg has signalled his support for Congress updating Section 230 "to make sure it’s working as intended."  Facebook’s new Oversight Board, hyped as a "Supreme Court," has announced that it is accepting appeals from individuals objecting to the removal of content. Initially the Board's authority is limited to reviewing content removals, and it cannot take up appeals from users whose accounts have been suspended or cases where content that is in violation of Community Guidelines has not been removed. The Board has given itself a 90-day window to start reviewing cases, which means it will not be taking up cases related to the upcoming U.S. election. Although Facebook can refer cases to the Board for an expedited review both on an ongoing basis and under exceptional circumstances, Brent Harris, Facebook's director of governance and global affairs, has clarified that the company would not submit a case for expedited review before the November 3 vote. The conditions and processes for Facebook referrals and expedited hearings remain unclear. For example, the Board should be addressing controversies like the decision of Facebook’s public policy chief for India to exempt posts by members of the ruling BJP party and Hindu nationalists from takedowns for violating the company's policies against hate speech or dangerous organizations and individuals. Although the India policy head in question has since stepped down, uneven enforcement of content policies continues to degrade trust in platforms. While the Oversight Board's bylaws state that content that Facebook has ultimately allowed to remain on the platform will be reviewable “in the future”, the India hate-speech case would not be heard by the Board unless Facebook itself brings it forward. As things stand, the company has no incentives to appeal content moderation decisions of employees and teams, particularly when those decisions protect the company’s business prospects.  These are early days and it remains to be seen what kind of accountability the Board will bring to Facebook's content moderation, which has been lacking in both human oversight and options for appeals. The Wall Street Journal reported more than 150 pieces of content that Facebook later confirmed violated its rules, and found that the company’s review system allowed the material—some depicting or praising grisly violence—to stand more than three-quarters of the time. Facebook’s August 2020 transparency report shows there were zero appeals on Instagram during the second quarter of 2020 and very few on Facebook. Due to the pandemic the company has ended up curtailing the process for users to appeal against removal of content and get the content reinstated following review by a human moderator. A few other stories of note. Facebook is attempting to shut down a New York University Ad Observatory that has recruited more than 6,500 volunteers to collect data about the ads Facebook shows them by using a specially designed browser extension, on the grounds that that it violates that site's rules against bulk data collection. “Scraping tools, no matter how well-intentioned, are not a permissible means of collecting information from us,” wrote Facebook privacy policy official Allison Hendrix. "We understand the intent behind your tool. However, the browser plugin scrapes information in violation of our terms, which are designed to protect people's privacy." If the university doesn’t end the project and delete the data it has collected by Nov. 30, she wrote, it may "be subject to additional enforcement action.”

    The Geopolitics of 5G

    Efforts by the United States to press allies to shut Chinese vendors out of next generation 5G networks on security grounds appear to be paying off. On October 20, Sweden joined the USA, Australia, the U.K., and France in instituting a ban on using Huawei and ZTE equipment in 5G networks. PTS, the Swedish telecom regulator, said that companies supplying 5G services in the country will have until 2025 to remove any equipment from Huawei and ZTE from their infrastructure networks. PTS added that the decision was based on the advice of Sweden’s military and security services, which apparently described China as “one of the biggest threats against Sweden.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs lashed out, saying that Sweden was using “national security as a pretext to slander Chinese companies, openly oppress Chinese telecom companies, and politicize normal economic cooperation.” The Ministry’s Zhao Lijian warned of “negative consequences.” Ericsson has won contracts from all three major operators in China to supply radio equipment for 5G networks. Retaliation seems imminent.  Orange and Proximus have picked Nokia to help build 5G networks in Belgium as they drop Huawei amid U.S. pressure to exclude the Chinese firm from supplying key telecoms equipment. The Italian cabinet has vetoed a deal between telecoms group Fastweb and Huawei for 5G core network equipment supplies and is demanding that Fastweb diversify its suppliers. While stopping short of an outright ban on Huawei, the Handelsblatt reports that the German government has raised the bar for participation in 5G networks so that the China-based vendor will unlikely meet the criteria. A draft bill mandating technical tests of components to be used in 5G infrastructure, alongside a ‘political assessment’ of the trustworthiness of manufacturers is being considered and is expected to be cleared in November. After securing Slovenia's support for the Clean Network campaign against Chinese technology, the State Department has announced that it had clinched agreements with Slovakia, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bulgaria on high-speed wireless network technology. The memorandums make no explicit mention of other countries, but they stress that any new 5G systems should take into account whether the network suppliers are subject “to control by a foreign government,” taking indirect aim at Chinese telecoms giants like Huawei and ZTE.   In Brazil, the US government is lobbying to ensure that the government chooses Huawei’s rivals. CNBC reports that during a trip to Brasilia on Tuesday, officials from the Export-Import Bank of the United States and U.S. government signed a memorandum of understanding to “identify potential opportunities” for financing up to $1 billion. US officials told reporters at the signing that the money was available for Brazil to buy telecommunications equipment from Huawei’s rivals.  With the securitization of 5G not subsiding and unable to compete in certain markets or access critical foreign technologies and talent, Huawei is expanding its presence in Russia as well as developing partnerships with Russian universities and tech firms. Huawei is also working on securing supplies for its core telecom infrastructure business despite US sanctions. The Financial Times reports that the company plans to set up a dedicated chip plant in Shanghai as a potential new source for semiconductors after stocks of imported chips Huawei has been accumulating since last year ran out.

    Exceptional Access to Encrypted Data

    Encryption has always been a politically charged technology, and one that historically has been embroiled in conflicts between individual privacy and national security. A recent “international statement” by the Five Eyes Alliance ((USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) plus “Japan” and “India” calls on technology companies to work with governments to  provide lawful access to the system and build mechanisms that can enable authorities to see content “in a readable and usable format where authorization is lawfully issued.” Startlingly, while other countries have a designated signatory from the government named in the letter, neither India nor Japan mention an authority.  With this move, law enforcement interests within governments are trying to revive the old argument that their inability to "lawfully access encrypted data and communications poses challenges to law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect our communities." Over the past few years we’ve seen several efforts to codify this position in domestic law.  In the UK, the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act put provisions in place to ensure that the government could receive information in an "intelligible form" although it left open exactly how that might occur. Australia’s Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 provided authorities the ability to request, require assistance or have a capability be built by a private actor to access encrypted data. Legislators in the United States took up a similar effort with the Lawful Access to Encrypted Data Act proposed in June 2020.  But it’s not just the Western liberal democracies and friends that are eager to have exceptional access to encrypted data. Researchers at FGV.br flagged several countries (e.g., Brazil, France, Russia, China) where there is existing or proposed law obligating service providers or device manufacturers to provide exceptional access to encrypted data.  With the governments of Japan and India now joining the party we should expect to see legislative proposals there too. Many civil society advocates have taken up the good fight domestically against this effort to create exceptional access by undoing encryption. The Global Encryption Coalition was launched in May 2020 to promote and defend encryption in key countries and multilateral gatherings where it is under threat. The Internet Governance Project has signed on as a member. 

  • Sep 2020
  • What is the future of Internet architecture?

    An important discussion of the future of Internet architecture with Dr. Richard Li, of Futurewei Technologies and key proponent of Huawei's "New IP" proposal, and Andrew Sullivan, the President and CEO of the Internet Society. IGP's Dr. Milton Mueller moderates. Click on the image to view the 90 minute recording  

  • Nov 2019
  • Town Hall Meeting on .ORG at IGF 2019

    The UN Internet Governance Forum demonstrated its utility as a forum for bringing together relevant parties for negotiations and discussions yesterday. A snap "town hall" meeting convened about 50 civil society members and representatives of the Internet Society (ISOC) and ICANN to express concerns about the sale of .ORG. Notably absent were representatives of PIR and Ethos Capital. The meeting was called after discussions among the leaders of Access Now, the Noncommercial Users Constituency, and IGP. ISOC trustees Walid Al-Saqaf and Mike Godwin made a strong case for the sale from ISOC's perspective. Al-Saqaf said that he had a fiduciary responsibliity to consider the interests of ISOC primarily and that the sale definitely was good for ISOC. It establishes an endowment and gets ISOC out of the business of DNS registry operation so it can concentrate on its core mission. Godwin noted that DNS may not be the long term direction of the internet and that as promoters/advocates of the internet ISOC did not want to have a conflict of interest that tied its revenue stream to a 1980s/90s business (domain name registration) that might prove to be a declining or suboptimal. Though reluctant to step forward and talk initially ("We are just here to listen"), ICANN board members Becky Burr and Chris Disspain quickly came to their senses and explained the process they go through when ownership of a registry changes.  They acknowledged that section 7.5 of the ORG Registry Agreement gives them a role in the transfer of control and that the process associated with that is already happening. They can ask questions of ISOC trustees and PIR about the sale and exchange information. There is no fixed 30-day limit on these exchanges, rather a rolling 30 day limit on each round of questions and responses. Board members acknowledged ICANN's ability to attach conditions to the recognition of Ethos Capital as the new operator of .ORG. Board member Leon Sanchez was also in attendance. The ICANN board members sat through the entire meeting and paid attention, so it should be clear to them that they can enhance ICANN's legitimacy and reputation by taking the right steps in this controversy. They also indicated that concerned members of the community are welcome to send their opinions to the CEO and Board. We would caution anyone who does this to keep in mind the precise nature of ICANN's role in this process, otherwise the advice will not be useful. Trustees received notice of the proposal in the August-September time frame and also claimed that they had more than one offer. A former ISOC trustee asked whether they had considered other financial models such as a leasing arrangement. They say they had. Following the agenda put forward in our previous blog on this topic, Milton Mueller articulated a proposed agenda for modifying the RA:

    • Longer term contracts
    • Content neutrality
    • Ending the URS
    The ISOC representatives did not seem to be hostile or negative about this agenda. Access Now representatives seemed to be more interested in finding ways to stop the sale.

  • Jul 2019
  • Are Indictments in Absentia an Effective Deterrent for Cyber ...

    This article, based on initial research conducted by recently graduated Georgia Tech Cybersecurity Policy track Masters student Erin Whittaker, looks more closely at indictments in absentia as a way of deterring future attacks and creating accountability in cyberspace.  Over the past half-decade the United States government has used indictments in absentia as a form of deterrent for malicious cyber acts perpetrated by foreign actors who are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Arguably, indictments in absentia are one of the best methods for authoritatively attributing a cyber-attack to an actor because of the associated due process involved in collecting evidence and burden of proof standard (i.e., probable cause). However, critics argue that indictments in absentia are not an effective deterrent since it is very rare that the defendants charged appear in U.S. court.   The analysis uses a dataset derived from the United States Department of Justice’s (DoJ) press releases and indictments. Whittaker initially identified 34 indictments in absentia pertaining to cyber hacking, attacks, and espionage. A similar dataset was developed by Garret Hinck of the Carnegie Foundation’s Cyber Policy Initiative and published in a Lawfare blog. The data presented here reconciles and summarizes the datasets.

    Figure 1

    Figure 1 shows a total of 39 indictments since 2014. It differentiates between indictments, with defendants categorized as cyber criminals or state-backed actors. Twenty-five (64%) indictments accused the former, while fourteen (36%) involved the latter. It’s important to note that indictments do not always implicate a state. One example is the DoJ’s 2014 indictment against Su Bin, a Chinese national and businessman residing in Canada at the time. While his indictment included allegations of violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as well as export control regulations and linked him to unidentified co-conspirators, it never mentioned the Chinese government. However, it was widely reported that Bin was conducting espionage on behalf of the Chinese government. How should one categorize these indictments? In this analysis, Whittaker relied on the language in the indictments. Regardless, indictments of state-backed actors appear to be increasing while indictments of cyber criminals remains steady over the period studied. Figure 2 details the types and number of defendants accused. We see a total of 120 individuals accused, with a slight majority (66, 55%) being state-backed versus 54 (45%) being criminals. Indictments implicating a state average twice the number of defendants (4.71 versus 2.16) versus cyber crime indictments. Of note is the rapid growth in number of state-backed actors indicted, while the number of criminal actors has remained relatively smaller. This perhaps reflects the complexity of the underlying state-backed cyber-attacks (e.g., information operations) being investigated or the resources available to states.

    Figure 2

    An indictment is a major, although only one, step in deterring future attacks. Arguably there is weaker deterrence if there are no consequences for the alleged perpetrators.  Figure 3a and 3b compare indictments versus enforcement activities, including extraditions, arrests and convictions. As one would expect, indictments involving cyber criminals are more likely to result in enforcement activities. Far fewer enforcement activities occur (2) when states are implicated versus cyber criminals (13). This makes sense given the variety of bilateral and international mechanisms available to bring criminals to justice, while implicated states (and their agents) are far more likely to simply ignore allegations of illegal conduct. However, in both cases, the number of enforcement activities appears to be declining relative to indictments filed.  

    Figure 3a: Cyber criminal actor indictments

    Figure 3b: State-backed actor indictments

    What can we take away from the data? Based on this data, using indictments to identify individual perpetrator(s) and their state affiliations appears to growing. But it also appears that that alone is not capable of resulting in enforcement or accomplishing deterrence.    

  • Apr 2019
  • European Commission Weighs in on the Side of Privacy in WHOI ...

    The European Commission (EC) has finally weighed in on the recommendations of ICANN's Expedited Policy Development Process (EPDP). The EPDP  is reforming WHOIS to make it consistent with GDPR and privacy rights. The EC comments, we are happy to report, are well aligned with the positions of privacy advocates. This should not be surprising, because the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which is what forced ICANN to reform WHOIS in the first place, is a European law. However, within ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) the EC has not always seemed to fully support GDPR. These comments put those concerns to rest. In this blog, we will detail the important points the EC has raised in its comments.

    Disclosure of personal information is not a purpose!

    One of the purposes for Whois outlined in the EPDP report was Purpose #2, which was enabling responses to lawful data disclosure requests. Having "disclosure" as a purpose was a compromise we had to make to bring intellectual property, government and security researcher interests to a consensus. But as IGP, the Noncommercial Stakeholders Group, and the contracted parties said multiple times, collecting data in order to disclose it to third parties is not a legitimate purpose under GDPR. The EC comments confirmed this view. The EC told ICANN that disclosure of personal information to third parties is not a purpose but a processing activity. It also invited ICANN to differentiate between  processing activities and purposes, noting that:
    ...the European Commission considers that the purposes for processing WHOIS personal data by ICANN and/or the contracted parties should not include enabling access by third parties. This is also at the core of the concerns expressed for some time by the Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) and the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), which have clarified that the purposes of ICANN and contracted parties must not be conflated with the interests of third parties in accessing registration data.
    It is very important that the European Commission finally decided to break its silence on this issue.

    Establishing legitimate interest to access personal information

    The European Commission agrees that Article 6(1)(f) can be invoked to establish the legitimate interest of third parties. However, the conditions that the EC enumerates are all too familiar for the GDPR lawyers and privacy advocates involved with this issue. The EC  states that in order to grant access to personal information, the Controller needs to carry out a balancing act to establish that the interest of the third party outweighs the fundamental right of the data subject. This means that the registrars primarily are responsible for carrying out such a balancing test and perhaps on a case by case basis. As to the Intellectual Property Rights holders, the existence of the right has to be established, the necessity or proportionality of access to data has to be ascertained. This leads us to conclude that policy recommendations about the process of granting access to personal information of domain name registrants should be based on individual cases and should not be a blanket right of access. It also reminds us that the excessive requests submitted by brand protection firms such as APPDETEX, might face legitimate delays because registrars have to carry out the balancing act. Another very interesting point in EC's comment is about law enforcement access to personal information. This point was also raised multiple times by GDPR lawyers, IGP and NCSG. Law enforcement agencies have to come up with their own means of access to personal information. Their mandate and the nature of their requests are different from other interest groups such as intellectual property rights holders. The European Commission finally declared that legitimate interest cannot be used as grounds for law enforcement access to personal information. Moreover, as the European Commission states,  law enforcement should be granted access in accordance with their own legal basis and Article 6(1)(f) cannot be used to establish their legitimate interest. The EC suggests that the legal basis for law enforcement access to personal information can be in their national laws. This is a surprising but welcome turn of events, as the law enforcement agencies that are based in Europe have been trying to gain access through the means that are predicted for intellectual property rights holders. These parts of the EC's comments are welcome and long overdue.

    But, what about law enforcement access? 

    However, the concluding section of the EC comments seems to have been written by a different author. It encourages facilitating EU law enforcement access to personal information and argues that protecting personal data by redacting certain data elements has affected EU law enforcement agencies. This is surprising since, in their comment on legitimate interest, they clearly stated that law enforcement has to establish its own legal basis for access, which can be based on their national laws. Should Europol and other EU agencies be waiting for EPDP team to come up with a solution? That is yet to be seen, but conflating the IP interests with law enforcement access does not seem to be GDPR compliant.    

  • Feb 2019
  • IGP White Paper: Understanding Russia's "National Internet"

    Not a day goes by without hearing that Russia wants to nationalize the Internet, fragment the Internet or block its citizens' access to the global Internet. Just yesterday, media sources announced that Russia will be testing its Internet shut down capabilities, which is a rather inaccurate account of Russia’s move towards nationalizing the Internet. In this timely white paper, Ilona Stadnik provides what these Internet analysts really need: a realistic and in depth analysis of what is happening to the Internet in Russia. This paper is particularly important for advocates of global, interconnected Internet.  The Internet community gets involved and even contributes to the hype by predicting what would happen next. But the process of nationalization of the Internet is not a hype. It is a slowly evolving, not so well thought-out process that faces constant trial and error. The danger of such a process should be acknowledged, however. It is going to take time for Russia to nationalize its Internet, align it to its border and even perhaps fragment it. But it will not happen tomorrow by switching the Internet off.  In this paper Stadnik tells us how it might have been happening and where it might be going. Download the paper here.

  • Jan 2019
  • Another Facebook privacy scandal you have never heard of!

    Facebook did not have a good 2018. Treating its customers' personal information as a commodity, it was revealed by New York Times that  “For years, Facebook gave some of the world’s largest technology companies more intrusive access to users’ personal data than it has disclosed, effectively exempting those business partners from its usual privacy rules, according to internal records and interviews.” But Facebook’s approach to privacy goes beyond mere disregard, and it's not only limited to its customers. Facebook has an anti-privacy public policy approach. To shed light on that, we will explain Facebook’s approach to the privacy of domain name registrants and the protection of their data in a directory called WHOIS, which has never been covered before. During the ICANN WHOIS policy meetings, the chair sets an agenda which can be amended or added to by the request of the policy group members. The Facebook representative has never missed a chance to add issues to the meeting's agenda that would weaken the data protection of domain name registrants and help with maintaining a public WHOIS. For example, the Facebook representative has pushed to require additional contacts (admin/tech) to consent to publish their data rather than be redacted; She has insisted on trying to force registrars to differentiate natural and legal domain name registrants and hence not protecting the legal person’s data; she has attempted to put the burden of the accuracy of data on domain name registrars;  and she has pushed to make ICANN fragment its policies by differentiating domain name registrants geographically so that we do not provide protection for those not subject to European jurisdiction.

    Facebook and accuracy argument

    Facebook continuously brought up the issue of accuracy of domain name registrants personal information and multiple times been advocating for accuracy but not in favor of data subject but in favor of rights of the “others” (meaning third parties such as Facebook itself). Facebook never acknowledges that accuracy in GDPR is about protecting the data subject and the right to correct mistakes in personal information and shielding the data subject from abuse of inaccurate data by the controller. Even when the Facebook representative quotes UK Information Commission Organization, her interpretation of guidelines is self-serving, This wrong interpretation appears in almost all of intellectual property lawyers public comments submitted with this regard. The argument is based on Article 5 of GDPR which states that personal data shall be "accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay." Accuracy is a data subject right. It is in GDPR to give a  chance to the data subject to correct an inaccurate personal data element about herself and to prevent the controller from using the inaccurate data against her. It is not about the right of a third party to accurate personal information. It has nothing to do with the required accuracy in ICANN policies which is all about protecting third party “interest” by obliging the registrants and registrar to keep the data accurate.

    Fight to limit data protection globally

    Facebook does not want domain name registrants to enjoy data protection globally. On 20 December 2018 during an EPDP meeting (a policy meeting at ICANN) the Facebook representative supported an approach that would treat domain name registrants data differently based on jurisdiction. She stated: “...I know it’s called a rules engine [an engine that decides what law applies] but I believe that it’s more of a – essentially a flow chart concept of, you know, factoring in different elements that relates to the jurisdiction and then making a determination on what rules would apply. And as I look at it, I think it’s something that – and I think we asked this question or someone asked this question on the – maybe the last call – that really should be done by ICANN, you know, in consultation with legal counsel.” So in effect, Facebook is asking to try as much as possible not to protect domain name registrants’ data if it is found that they are not subject to GDPR and treat data protection of domain name registrants differently based on their jurisdiction. With the implied intent that since GDPR has a high bar for data protection, they would not have to provide such high bar for other domain name registrants around the world. Milton Mueller responded to this suggestion as below: “I’m really kind of shocked because this is supposed to be an ICANN meeting, and the reason we have ICANN was to have a global policy and governance for the domain name system. And I hear people talking about instituting essentially making ICANN differentiate between different national jurisdictions. And may I remind everybody that there are 50 state-level jurisdictions in the United States alone and each of them can be – does have for example different data protection – or data breach regulations and I can only imagine what happens when you start extending this into developing country provinces and regions. The only solution to this issue is to have a global policy that sets the bar high enough that it’s not in any risk of contravening the laws of any jurisdiction and it’s actually not that hard to do. The kind of data that is in the Whois is fairly basic and we have some very common threads as to how not to run afoul of basic concepts of privacy. So ICANN's job is to create a global mechanism for governance of the domain name system and this false promise that we can somehow implement artificial intelligence that automatically applies the proper jurisdiction to any of 300 million domain name registrations is just pointless.”

    Facebook anti-data protection advocacy in the name of security

    Facebook also tries to justify its suggestions that could weaken data protection in the name of security. For example, FB was arguing that ICANN might need to have access to personal information of domain name registrants to bring about security in DNS. It suggested to ask ICANN: “did OCTO (office of chief technology officer) use WHOIS in its law enforcement training and outreach activities, or engagement with the cybersecurity community, or to facilitate or respond to large scale botnet attacks, such as Conficker or Avalanche”. OCTO clarified that they do not need access to personal information for their security work and if they need personal information, it can be pseudonymized (or hashed). It was a failed attempt by Facebook to advocate for granting access to personal information of people when it's not needed!

    Advocating for data mining

    Facebook has been advocating for data mining to be allowed in WHOIS policy. This means that Facebook will be able to find all the domain names that are related to one potentially trademark infringing domain name registrant. This function was known as reverse WHOIS and was used by security researchers to establish a malicious pattern of registration and mitigate botnets. But this function has also been used and abused by some intellectual property owners to challenge domain name registrants and not allow them to have access to due process as much as possible. Reverse WHOIS can also identify the domain name registrant or expose their personal data where it is not protected by GDPR or privacy and proxy service.

    A final reminder

    Facebook’s policy approaches matter to the global Internet governance and our rights. In the case of domain name registrants data protection, Facebook has even inspired and led other actors to argue for less data protection. Facebook has an agenda which has not backed off from: it is vigorously advocating and lobbying for minimal individual rights on the Internet. Facebook's approach is bad for the Internet, its anti-rights and anti-privacy advocacy positions should be revealed and its actions in policy forums should be scrutinized.

  • Dec 2018
  • Looking back, thinking forward: IGP on 2018 and beyond

    Wow, has 2018 flown by! Hopefully, you're in a restful and reflective holiday mood. We want to look back at the top developments in Internet governance we covered, and offer some thoughts on issues that are heating up and what will be happening in the coming year. In the past year:

    • Domain name holders' private registration data was finally redacted and protected by ICANN. We will continue our advocacy to keep it like that
    • IGP's educational efforts were expanded to support the curriculum design of the Middle East School on Internet Governance
    • Bright students and scholars joined IGP to undertake research on Internet governance. Drop us a line if you want to undertake research on Internet governance at IGP
    • We kicked off our Digital Free Trade project last year and made it the focus of several events and our annual workshop. We quickly realized we were in an uphill battle as the "Techlash" against global platforms took place and cyber-nationalist laws and policies took hold in many countries. A special issue on cyber nationalism and digital trade will be published next month by Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance
    • We strengthened and developed our work on cyber attack attribution. Watch this site for further developments
    • We still believe discussing cyber norms endlessly with soft commitments from the states will not preserve Internet security
    • We warned against multilateralization of Internet governance processes at the United Nations
    • IGP explored IPv6 and economic incentives for its deployment in 2018. Stay tuned for the final report, to be published very soon
    In 2019 we will:
    • Discuss and develop our research on cyber attack attribution
    • Continue working on digital free trade
    • Work closely with the civil society for a coordinated approach in Internet governance
    • Monitor States actions that can affect the multistakeholder Internet governance
    • Work with more students and IGP fellows
    • And continue our usual advocacy at the domain name space and ICANN
    We wish for a transnational Internet governance in 2019 and we will work toward that goal, we will continue to resist Internet nationalism, and we will work hard to keep the Internet global, open and free from the vices of controlling states.

  • Oct 2018
  • Governance discussions at the Ostrom Workshop

    The Ostrom Workshop at the University of Indiana carries on the work of the late Elinor and Vincent Ostrom on governance and institutions. I was honored to be invited by the Ostrom Workshop to give the 3rd annual Ostrom Memorial lecture Wednesday, October 3. The lecture challenged the idea of sovereignty in cyberspace. Based on an analysis of the techno-economic features of the domain, it questions the desirability and practicality of sovereignty in cyberspace, and explores the applicability of global commons models to cyberspace. The full lecture, including audience questions, is archived and available for viewing here. The Ostrom Memorial lecture was for me merely the highlight of a week of activities. On Monday we held a colloquium on IGP's paper on institutionalizing cyber-attribution. That discussion, which raised useful questions about legal and incentive issues of an attribution institution, is also archived and available for viewing here. On Thursday and Friday the Ostrom workshop held a small conference on Smart Cities. This was an opportunity to meet a diverse and interesting group of people, including the chief privacy officer from the City of Seattle, a board member of a regional water authority in Virginia, tech journalist Doc Searls and his wife and partner in the Internet Identity Workshop and Sovrin Foundation Joyce Searls. Academics from Indiana U, Georgia Tech, Harvard (Berkman-Klein Center) and Virginia Tech rounded out the discussion. The Ostrom Workshop has become a beehive of governance-related research, workshops, colloquia and lectures. Directed by Lee Alston, it touches on a variety of Internet governance related topics, including Cybersecurity and Internet Governance (with the ubiquitous Scott Shackelford as program director), and Data Management and Information Governance (with Angela Raymond as program director), which includes a blockchain governance initiative.

  • Sep 2018
  • Whois Reform Grinds forward

    The expedited policy development group that is trying to reform ICANN’s Whois system post-GDPR met face to face in ICANN's Los Angeles headquarters September 24 – 26. The same old conflicts of interest underlying Whois policy for the last 18 years resurfaced repeatedly, but this time important progress was made. This report is intended to document and clarify the process. We are deliberately giving the reader a deep dive into the details to promote better understanding of the issues and to keep the process accountable.

    The divide

    Two fundamentally different ideas about data collection and disclosure coexist in the working group. To the contracted parties who supply domains – and to the individual rights advocates in the noncommercial stakeholders group – Whois data is just a byproduct of a service provided to domain name registrants. To be compliant with GDPR (and other data protection laws), data collection about registrants should be limited to that which is necessary to fulfill the functions of ICANN, the registry providing the domain, and the registrar servicing it. Data subjects need to be informed what those purposes are, and all uses of data restricted to them. Purposes should be guided by and consistent with ICANN’s limited mission, which is the coordination of the global domain name system. Registration data should be disclosed to third parties only if they have a legitimate interest, and only under conditions that protect the rights of registrants. Let’s call the group that believes this the privacy caucus. (OK, registries and registrars are not really privacy advocates, but they don’t want to be fined for privacy law violations and have a duty to their customers to protect their privacy, which is almost as good). The other group consists of intellectual property, government and law enforcement interests, and commercial cybersecurity services. To them, GDPR compliance is a secondary matter; they see the primary purpose of Whois as data mining, surveillance and identification of bad actors on the Internet by third parties (i.e., them). The temporary specification, which redacted much of that Whois data, means that their main concern now is gaining access to the non-public data. They have, after all, become habituated to unlimited, indiscriminate access to that data for 20 years. Let’s call this group the surveillance caucus.

    Purpose and Access

    The biggest problem the ePDP faces is to disentangle access issues from purposes for collecting data. Under its charter, the ePDP is not supposed to talk about access to non-public data until it settles the issue of making Whois compliant with GDPR. But that’s hard to do when one caucus is only interested in access. After spinning its wheels for a month, the ePDP finally recognized a clear distinction between purposes for data collection and third party legitimate interests in gaining access to that data. Since purposes control what data is collected and how it is used by controllers and processors, this was a big step forward. Previous ICANN discussions of this topic repeatedly confused “use cases” (i.e., third party interests in Whois data) with ICANN’s “purposes” for data collection. Clear guidance from the GDPR and from the European Data Protection Board helped the privacy caucus to establish this distinction. Indeed, key members of the ePDP, such as the US GAC representative, understood and accepted this distinction, opening up the door to progress. Next, two ePDP members, Thomas Rickert and Farzaneh Badiei, developed a matrix that facilitated the systematic identification of purposes, the data required for them, and the application of GDPR requirements to the data processed.  The matrix allowed the group to identify data controllers and processors of Whois data, define their purposes, and check their legality under GDPR as well as their consistency with ICANN’s bylaws. The group headed to Los Angeles with a new and systematic methodology.

    The Matrix: Red pill, blue pill, painkiller?

    ICANN’s staff and co-chairs of the ePDP (Kurt Pritz and Rafik Dammak) adopted a modified matrix as the basis for discussions in Los Angeles. Professional mediators from CBI worked very hard to keep the group focused on accomplishing specific objectives. Although it was tedious at times, the group worked its way through the 5 basic purposes listed here without too much trouble. (The purposes were identified alphabetically; if letters are skipped it means a purpose was discarded or merged with others.)

    A. Establishing the rights of a Registered Name Holder in a Registered Name and ensuring that the Registered Name Holder may exercise its rights in respect of the Registered Name

    C. Enable communication or notification of the registered name holder and/or their delegated parties of technical and administrative issues with a registered name

    E. Provide mechanisms for safeguarding registered name holders’ registration data in the event of a business of technical failure, or other unavailability of a registrar or registry operator.

    F. Handle contractual compliance monitoring requests, audits, and complaints submitted by Registry Operators, Registrars, Registered Name Holders, and other Internet users.

    M. Coordinate, operationalize and facilitate ICANN's TLD and domain names dispute resolution policies, namely URS, UDRP, RDDRP, PDDRP and PICDRP

    None of these purposes introduced radical changes in what data elements would actually be collected. The only significant change agreed was that Technical and Administrative Contact data (collected under purpose C) would be optional.

    The Conflict 

    Progress almost broke down over what came to be known as Purpose B. B was a consolidated version of 5 or 6 different proposals advanced by various surveillance caucus members. It basically said that one of the key purposes of the Whois system was to enable third party access to registrant data. This idea took several forms, such as:
    • Supporting a framework to address issues involving domain name registrations, including but not limited to: consumer protection, investigation of cybercrime, DNS abuse, and intellectual property protection (the language in section 4.4.8 of the temp spec);
    • Providing access to accurate, reliable, and uniform Registration Data based on legitimate interests not outweighed by the fundamental rights of relevant data subjects
    • Supporting a framework that enables identification of third-parties with legitimate interests grounded in legal bases, and providing these third-parties with access to Registration Data relevant to address specific issues involving domain name registrations related to: consumer protection, investigation of cybercrime, DNS abuse, and intellectual property protection.
    Clearly, the main motivation behind each of these “purposes” was to allow third parties to gain access to non-public Whois data. In discussing these proposals, the group was repeatedly plunged back into a premature discussion of access. The privacy caucus argued, correctly in our view, that it is illogical to claim that one’s purpose in collecting and processing data is to disclose it to third parties. Disclosure is an objective of third parties, not ICANN, and defining access for third parties as a purpose does not provide any guidance as to which data needs to be collected. Would it justify collecting whatever the third parties want? But the surveillance caucus feared that unless providing access to third parties was defined as one of the “purposes” of Whois, they would not be guaranteed access by decisions made later on in the process. They claimed, plausibly, that they had no intention of justifying the collection of additional data elements - but what about two years down the road?

    The Compromise

    With debate over this problem threatening to blow up the meeting, a compromise was proposed which formulated purpose B like this:

    B. Provide lawful access for legitimate third party interests to registration data that is already collected and identified herein.

    This formulation recognized the provision of access to registrant data as an ICANN purpose but limited it to the disclosure of data already collected for other purposes. It was a compromise in which both caucuses got something, but gave up something. The surveillance caucus got access defined as a purpose, which they seemed to want very badly. The privacy caucus agreed to recognize this as a purpose of ICANN, which they didn’t want to do, but the wording was intended to foreclose any additional data collection based on that purpose. It also finessed the issue of which third parties' interests are legitimate, deferring access criteria to a later date, as the ePDP charter calls for. There are problems with this formulation, but it seems to have prevented worse formulations from being debated, and it paved the way for a consensus among the ePDP members. Defining disclosure as a purpose of ICANN was vehemently opposed by some contracted parties. A final agreement was reached when B was redefined as a registry/registrar purpose rather than an ICANN purpose. The policy for granting access would be consensus policy decided by ICANN stakeholder groups. This is still under discussion but the text reads:
    • Registrar/Registry Purpose B - Facilitate lawful access for legitimate 3rd party interests to data that is already collected and identified herein

    Happy ending?

    The rest of the purposes were proposed as:
    • ICANN Purpose A - Establish the rights of a Registered Name Holder in a Registered Name and ensuring that the Registered Name Holder may exercise its rights in respect of the Registered Name
    • ICANN Purpose C - Enable communication or notification to the Registered Name Holder and/or their delegated parties of technical and/or administrative issues with a Registered Name
    • ICANN Purpose E (Registrar and Registry Escrow) - Provide mechanisms for safeguarding Registered Name Holders' Registration Data in the event of a business or technical failure, or other unavailability of a Registrar or Registry Operator
    • ICANN Purpose F - Handle contractual compliance monitoring requests, audits, and complaints submitted by Registry Operators, Registrars, Registered Name Holders, and other Internet users.
    • ICANN Purpose M - Coordinate the development and implementation of policies for resolution of disputes regarding the registration of domain names (as opposed to the use of such domain names). 
    • ICANN Purpose N - Enabling validation of Registered Name Holder satisfaction (fulfillment) of registration policy eligibility criteria.
    These are not yet finalized and there are additional issues to be addressed. Basically, this wording is just a placeholder until the different stakeholders can confer with their groups.  The ePDP has now been working for two months. It has only three more weeks to prepare an initial report that can be reviewed in time for consideration at ICANN’s Barcelona meeting October 20 – 27. If you’ve read this all the way to the end, congratulations! You are a true Whois junkie.

  • New IGP affiliates

    Ilona Stadnik and Braxton Moore have recently joined the Internet Governance Project.

    Ilona is a Fulbright visiting researcher at Georgia Institute of  Technology, Internet Governance Project. During her stay, she will be focussing on her Ph.D. thesis about Russia-US cybersecurity relations and will also contribute to IGP's cybersecurity research, including cybersecurity governance and nationalization of the Internet, the private sector role in cybersecurity governance and States' international approach to cyber norm-making. Read more about Ilona here.

    Braxton Moore, an undergraduate engineering major, joined IGP upon receiving the Presidential Undergraduate Research Award to work on Blockchain Governance. He will be working on Blockchain as the underlying technology for Cryptocurrency and how national regulation and private governance can affect the adoption of cryptocurrencies.

     Read more about Braxton here.

  • Aug 2018
  • New IGP White Paper: Is It Time to Institutionalize Cyber At ...

    Public attribution of cyber incidents to nation-state actors is increasing. It is a challenging and important accountability function that is often performed by a combination of threat intelligence firms or other private actors and less frequently by states. But is it time to institutionalize cyber attribution? The cybersecurity community has sporadically reflected on the idea. Several calls have been made for domestic or international attribution organization(s) to provide credible processes that go beyond technical measures. The feasibility of these ideas is only beginning to be examined in depth, with no systematic plan to evaluate and discard or to find ways to implement them. In this new white paper by the IGP, we explore the attribution challenge, review proposed models for new institutions, and sketch an agenda for future research. IGP's expertise in the development of transnational institutions in the domain name space has direct policy relevance to this case. A new Transnational Attribution Institution (TAI) may be needed to align actor incentives and serve as a neutral global platform for performing authoritative public cyber-attributions that could hold offensive actors responsible and deter future cyber attacks. Download the white paper here.          

  • Jun 2018
  • The ICANN discussion draft on UAM: Another railroad?

    As we anticipated, ICANN the organization, under the pressure of powerful interest groups, decided to come up with its own model for access to personal information of domain name registrants dataIt is a draft for "discussion." But there is a timeline as well:

    Phase 1: Community discussion and consultations on the Unified Access Model

    Phase 2: Consultation with the European Data Protection Board on the Unified Access Model and the approach to develop Code of Conducts for various Eligible User Groups

    Phase 3: Further refinement and finalization of the Unified Access Model based on inputs from the community and the European Data Protection Board

    It seems  ICANN wants to have a model in place by December 2018. Despite the fact that most registrars are not receiving many requests for access, ICANN insists that a unified access model should be in place by then. The matter of "who" should get access has been delegated to GAC but ICANN has also stated that third parties with "legitimate interest" should have access in compliance with Article 6 (1)(f)  of GDPR. It also mentions that both registries and registrars should provide access to data. This requires Thick registries and the transition of the legacy .com and .net TLDs to thick registries, which are not acceptable requirements. They add that if only registrars should be in charge of giving access, then it should be discussed in a PDP. They believe there should be an authenticating body and GAC should decide on the authenticating bodies. Or some have proposed that organizations such as WIPO which provide dispute resolution should authenticate the legitimate IP interest.

    ICANN 62 is going to be filled with GDPR discussions. We need to stop ICANN's unilaterally developed accreditation model and get them to accept what the community develops. How should we approach this?

    Understand what access  is about

    It's access to personal information of domain name registrants, not "nonpublic WHOIS data." It seems like some people are saying "nonpublic WHOIS data" to water down the seriousness of the issue. These interest groups want to have access to personal information of domain name registrants: their address, their phone number, their email!! This is what "nonpublic WHOIS data" means!

    ICANN's model is about accreditation, not access 

    ICANN's recommended model is not an access model, it's an accreditation model. It revolves mostly around "who" should be given (unlimited) access and what authenticating bodies should grant them this privilege. They state that they will first ask GAC and then if there is no response they will ask the community. As we said in our previous blog, accreditation is a secondary issue, not a primary issue when it comes to access, and we may not want to accredit broad classes of people at all. We should focus on the process and restraints of giving access to data, and the accountability of those who give it, not accreditation at this stage.

    The "authenticating bodies"

    ICANN wants GAC to appoint authenticating bodies that authorize users who can have access to personal information of domain registrants. If GAC cannot come up with authenticating bodies then the community can make suggestions. Some community members made a suggestion that shows why having authenticating bodies is such a bad idea. They proposed The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) as an organization for authenticating IP lawyers. Our short answer to the approach of having authenticating bodies is: no. Our long answer is: you cannot put a biased organization in charge and oblige registrars to give access to their customers' data!

    Who should be in charge of giving access to personal information

    ICANN believes registries and registrars will be in charge but then says that the discussions about whether only registrars are in charge of giving access belong to relevant PDPs. We believe that the whole discussion about who should be in charge belongs to a PDP and we wonder why ICANN org thinks that it can answer the question and then says a clarification belongs to a PDP. Seems like all along ICANN knew too well it is invading the picket fence and getting engaged with something that is a policy issue. Our answer to this question is: only registrars will be in charge of giving access.

    Scope of data

    ICANN org believes there might be two answers to the question about the scope of data the requestor can access: one is access to full WHOIS record for each query and one is access to a limited record in accordance to the legitimate purpose or interest of the request.  Obviously, it is better for the privacy of domain name registrants that data be available for specific domain names and the information received has to be in accordance to the legitimate purpose. ICANN does not have two options! It only has one: Access should be given to a limited record in accordance to the legitimate purpose of the request. That is the only answer compliant with the GDPR. Further, this is a policy question. Other than the answer should be compliant with GDPR, the policy has to be set by the community and not ICANN org.

    Registries and registrars will be required to give access

    ICANN wants to oblige registries and registrars to give access to authenticated users. But as it says they are obliged only if it is in accordance to local law and is a legitimate interest. Funny enough ICANN has not really corrected its legitimate purpose and interest definition despite the WP29 guidelines.

    The code of conduct elements

    The code of conduct applies to the conditions under which legitimate users can have access to personal information of domain name registrants. The elements ICANN enumerates are not wrong but they are incomplete and it wants to develop these codes of conduct in consultation with GAC and European Data Protection Board. Did it fail to mention the community by mistake? Does it understand that access to personal information of WHOIS registrants is a policy issue that should be developed within the community?

    Who would enforce the code of conduct?

    Remember the concept of authenticating bodies? ICANN believes that authenticating bodies should enforce the code of conduct. What is wrong with this approach? Independence and neutrality of authenticating bodies will not be ensured. Would WIPO enforce the code of conducts on its devoted IP lawyers because they went too far to enforce their intellectual property rights? We doubt that. We need neutral ADR providers. All in all, ICANN's proposal is too theoretical, does not even solve the problem and is a clear ICANN org intervention into a policy issue that the community should be developing, We invite ICANN org to calm down and watch us come up with a policy for access.                

  • Cyber Nationalism and Digital Trade: IGP Workshop Report

    On May 24-25, 2018, the Internet Governance Project (IGP) at Georgia Tech’s School of Public Policy held its 4th Annual Workshop in Atlanta. This year’s workshop theme was “Digital Free Trade or Cyber Nationalism? Setting the Course for a 21st Century Digital Trade Policy.” The workshop explored the scientific and public policy questions raised around digital trade. This blog covers the workshop proceedings and its outcome.

    Understanding the nature of digital trade

    The workshop opened with papers exploring the nature of digital trade and cross-border information flows, including attempts to measure their size and value. A presentation by economist Jessica Nicholson, U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), surveyed current quantitative data on digital trade and described in detail how the BEA is attempting to develop new and better measures. Her presentation, based on this research report, highlighted some of the uncertainties and gaps involved in measuring digital data flows as trade. Some, but not all, digital exchanges are captured in general trade in services statistics, and of those that are captured, we know that some are “potentially ICT-enabled” (PICTE) but we don’t know whether they actually occurred electronically or through traditional means. The U.S. has a significant trade surplus in PICTE services, which account for almost 55% of its total international services exports, and slightly under half of its service imports. A big component of this is charged for the use of intellectual property. A paper by IGP’s Milton Mueller attempted to address the information flows that the BEA study did not attempt to measure. His empirical analysis relied on Telegeography data regarding the geographic distribution of the top 100 web sites in each of 100 countries. This data was used as an indicator of “information exchange balances” across countries. The research showed that Web traffic is highly transnational. On a worldwide basis, domestic website requests account for only one third of the traffic, with the remaining two-thirds being cross-border requests. Of the traffic that is cross-border, 76% of the requests are headed to U.S. websites, and another 18% are headed to European websites, so together the North American and Western European regions are the target of no less than 94% of the cross-border web requests. Slightly over half of these requests (52%) come from East Asia and South Asia (basically, China and India). East Asia, which has a huge goods trade surplus with the developed economies, particularly with the US, has the largest negative information exchange balance. Mueller’s paper noted that the trade paradigm, with its emphasis on monetization, surpluses, and deficits, was less applicable to this situation than the Article 19 guarantee of a right to “seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.

    Data localization and digital trade

    This panel examined the issue of data localization and related efforts to align information flows with national borders. Are data localization laws inherently protectionist or are they justified by governments’ needs to bypass time-consuming barriers to trans-jurisdictional access to information?

    Panelists agreed that while data security and national interest is frequently invoked to localize data, data security has little to do with jurisdictions. Rather, when states localize data to enable domestic law enforcement access and surveillance, this can inhibit the public’s data security by restricting consumer choice. Dr. Annegret Bendiek’s paper suggests that currently there are no viable approaches to provide data security and data protection to facilitate cross border data flow. This creates uncertainty in business practice about how to handle data and who should be allowed to have access to the data. She concluded that having data servers in the European Union and outsourcing to a third party to grant access to the data, might be an option but does not solve the problem of cross-border data flow globally. Agreements that allow law enforcement to have access to foreign data, such as the Cloud Act, might be a step towards solving the problem. Nigel Corey of ITIF argued that mandatory data localization to preserve data security is a misleading argument. The security of data does not depend on where the data is geographically located, but on company practices. Many of the mandatory data localization efforts take place in the name of protecting the national interest, while it is unclear how cross border data flow threatens national security or puts public interest at risk. “One solution to fight against data localization is for nations to seek recourse from existing international institutions like the WTO when the intent of the policy is clearly protectionist. Another solution, would be for states to work globally on finding a common framework to enable governments to legitimately gain access to data, in a timely manner. Jon Neiditz, an Atlanta lawyer, brought forward a different view. He discussed the results of a the second year of a survey of more than 600 respondents responsible for the protection of  “crown jewel” data assets within their organizations which he just completed with the Ponemon Institute on global exfiltration of trade secrets, corporate confidential information and intellectual property from organizational systems by states, state-affiliated entities and state-sponsored and other hackers.  Data protectionism in this environment, he argued, is really unilateral protectionism, and a winning, best-of-both-worlds strategy against the free multilateral flow of data. As long as global access to data puts these digital assets in such danger, facilitating cross-border data flow through trade agreements will not create a level playing field.  Rather, we need to emphasize a digital Geneva Convention on data security and commercial espionage as a foundation for agreements on cross-border data flow. Charles Duan of R Street Institute discussed how intellectual property protection can lead to data localization. He drew on his experience with the Clearcorrect vs. International Trade Commission case, in which a patent holder sought to block digital transmission of information. Duan explained how intellectual property rights can cover very broad but unrelated interests. Despite this potential, intellectual property is not often a topic associated with the free flow of data. We need to pay attention to how intellectual property rights protections, especially in trade agreements, can overreach and block the legitimate exchange of information.

    Digital trade in geopolitical context

    This panel reviewed ongoing negotiations and strategic positioning on various trade agreements that might affect digital trade, including the future of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)-minus, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Is there any hope for digital free trade in the current geopolitical environment? Gus Rossi of Public Knowledge looked at the political backlash in various countries against globalization and emphasized the need to convince people nationally of the benefits of digital trade. Trade is reducing inter-country inequality, but increasing it inside the country. Noting how the EU paired free trade and consumer protection, he proposed pairing privacy protection with digital free trade in new agreements.   It was mentioned that Europe still has a political consensus for trade agreements. It was implied that trade agreements were taking the heat for broader changes in the economy: people cannot vote against technological change, but they can vote against trade agreements. Carolina Aguerre described the current regulatory status of digital trade in Latin America and Caribbean and how the region is going towards adopting a more protectionist agenda. She explained that in bilateral trade agreements there is an opportunity for a more tangible approach to the digital economy in LAC countries. Will Hudson of Google observed that the Internet by its very design has tremendous value for trade, creating new opportunities for more people and making trade more inclusive.  Encouraging panelists to explore what lessons digital trade negotiations could take from Internet governance, and vice versa, he noted that the Internet is best governed in the same way it was built: it needs to be transparent and participatory. There were some divergent views on the panel about the role of civil society and its resistance towards digital free trade agreements. Some believed that the rights that civil society stands for should not be directly included in trade agreements. The value of transparency in trade negotiations was also debated. While bilaterals were seen as a positive approach, some concerns were raised that it might lead to various and potentially conflicting policies. In discussions the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was a hot topic. One participant viewed it as a different model, instead of state-by-state negotiated trade agreements we have an extraterritorial "race to the most restrictive." Another participant said this wasn't new: GDPR was compared to US attempts to leverage market access to export stronger intellectual property rules, and to China's attempt to tie market access to IPR transfers. One participant said that GDPR exemplifies what happens when you don't have global governance.

    Cybersecurity and digital trade

    Day two of the workshop kicked off with this highly anticipated session. One of the key drivers of cyber-nationalism is cybersecurity, and the growing tendency to link trade in information technology equipment and services to national security and national industrial policy. This panel included Tara Hairston of Kaspersky Lab, Claude Barfield of AEI, Ga Tech PhD student Karl Grindal, and Tsinghua University PhD student Jinhe Liu. Kaspersky legally challenged administrative and statutory bans on the use of its products by the US Government. They and other multinational companies they speak with are trying to figure out exactly what evidence merits a national security restriction. IT companies that have global operations are trying to figure out exactly what evidence merits a national security restriction and how such restrictions account for global supply chains. If there is a concern, is there a way to mitigate it, and how can governments be more transparent about it? The signals sent to market by governments implementing national security restrictions are broad and impactful. The response by Kaspersky Labs has been greater transparency and data relocation. The idea of transparency centers is not new, e.g., Huawei, Microsoft, Cisco already have them. However, the code reviews they facilitate raise other issues. The choice of Switzerland for a new Kaspersky data center was based on the country’s data protection laws. Overall, the cybersecurity industry sector needs to move to be more transparent and have processes in place to contend with economic nationalism. Multinationals will continue to seek advantage in countries comparative advantages, e.g., Kaspersky’s operations in Russia and around the world provides a competitive edge in R&D, talent acquisition, and the ability to monitor malicious cyber hot spots. The deployment of sophisticated cyberespionage malware is no longer the province of just nation-states; non-state actors engaging in such activity is exacerbating the problem of cyber nationalism and will continue to do so. Jinhe Liu presented a framework for understanding Chinese cross-border data flow. The Chinese strategic perspective described by the concept “Internet Sovereignty” has been focused on a perceived dependence on western countries, specifically the United States, with respect to information communications technologies (ICT). The subsequent policy response was the Cybersecurity Law adopted in November 2016. This law implements a policy of local storage and outbound assessment with respect to both “personal information” and “important data.” This law has subsequently been formalized through regulations, and subsequent regulations (Personal information and important data outbound security evaluation measures (Draft)2017.4.11 and Guidelines for data outbound security assessment (Draft)2017.5.27(1st edition)2017.8.25(2nd edition)). These policies have created a distinct form of “Internet governance with Chinese characteristics.” The protectionist attributes of these Chinese policies, have been challenged (albeit at a reduced level) through US protectionist policies in turn, like those initiated by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Claude Barfield of AEI, pointed out the concern that the “national security” standard which currently governs CFIUS decisions are at risk of being expanded to include national “economic interests.” CFIUS reform legislation being debated in Congress has explored adding this language. Congress is fixated on doing something about China. Problem is CFIUS covers all inward investment and China will be a relatively small investor in US compared to other countries. Moreover, Congress is contemplating expansion of CFIUS purview from inward investment to also include outward investment by US companies, aimed at China and covering a wide range of activity like investments, joint ventures, etc., not just M&As. CFIUS will be inundated and unable to do deep, meaningful reviews. DoD and Treasury have the capability to define what are "critical technologies" and therefore what is reviewed. Allies and other countries can be exempted. Karl Grindal’s presentation, built on Claude Barfield’s with a quantitative analysis of CFIUS decisions and a framework for understanding the various Trade Regimes that might use concerns around cybersecurity to inhibit trade. These trade regimes included: arms control regimes, foreign investment restrictions, tariffs, and localization policies. These four regimes were categorized based on a framework to assess, how focused they were in application, which actors would bear the highest cost, what the likelihood of retaliation could be, and how would these policies contribute to global internet fragmentation. This framework was previously described by an IGP blog post here. Karl’s historical review of CFIUS showed that while presidents have been reticent to use their CFIUS authorities, the number of investigations performed annually is trending in an upward direction. Further, since 2014, CFIUS has begun to collect data on the number of notices withdrawn and transactions abandoned in light of CFIUS concerns. While still small, this number demonstrates that the effect of these policies is larger than just what Ant Financial and Moneygram or Broadcom and Qualcomm would suggest. These unknown transactions which are preemptively blocked, are indicative of the effect for any restriction in trade. Even narrowly applied, policies which cover specific transactions can have a broader effect. Brought to its extreme, the expansive tariffs proposed by President Trump are indicative of the dangers of sweeping decisions. In these events, retaliatory policies are likely, and the costs frequently fall on those with the most to lose.

    Rights and Trade – IPR and Privacy

    Trade in digital services are often linked to rights protection (or rights conflicts), most notably around privacy and intellectual property. This panel brought together academic and civil society experts active on issues related to digital trade to discuss the extent to which trade and individual rights are complementary or conflicting. A paper by Jeremy Malcolm and Jyoti Panday, representing EFF, focused on the backlash to trade and described the potential for privacy based consumer protection policies to create a new global social contract. Highlighting both right and left resistance towards increased globalization, Jeremy identified the impact of a populist opposition to global digital trade. Jeremy then surveyed the diverse ways that data localization has been implemented by countries around the world, be it for metadata in Germany or cloud storage in China. To these policies, Jeremy tried to understand the intention behind the localization provisions. These policies are justified using a wide variety of arguments including that they promote domestic innovation, challenge US hegemony, or improve policing or national security. While these policies are frequently viewed through an economistic lens, Jeremy asserts that the impact on democracy and human rights is equally important. Discussant Shannon Coe of the U.S. Commerce Department’s International Trade Administration led with her own presentation on the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Cross Border Privacy Rules (CBPR). Speaking independently of her role with the U.S. Commerce Department, she emphasized the history and expansion of CBPR and described how they enable greater trade integration. As a voluntary system, adoption has been slower than anticipated; only 6 of the 21 APEC countries are part of this system. However it has been picking up, with 3 more countries on track to join by 2019, and represents a unique model privacy model from that implemented by the EU with GDPR. Ishan Mehta, Georgia Tech graduate student alumni, presented a more critical take on the APEC cross border privacy rules. Noting that uptake had been slow and that the system was complicated, he described GDPR as the elephant in the room, Ishan wondered what role APEC’s voluntary accountability system would have when more aggressive privacy requirements could potentially be expanded as a global norm. With many companies already becoming compliant with new GDPR requirements, the ability to extend these same protections to non-European Union citizens is comparatively affordable, and in some cases the cheapest option. As APEC has struggled to gather adoption, Ishan argued that the benefits of this voluntary privacy regime have not been realized by either countries or companies.

    Where to go from here

    The last panel showcased various proposals for reform. Professor Susan Aaronson (George Washington University) opened with a presentation outlining what she called “A New Approach to Regulating Data in Trade Agreements .” She questioned the use of “e-commerce” language in trade agreements, noting that e-commerce and data flows are not the same. She also stressed that no existing trade agreements take account of the many types of strategies that governments can adopt to block cross-border flows, from censorship to cyber-security rules (under the exceptions). Her proposed strategy is to base regulation on the type of data. Her proposed data types were personal data; confidential business data; public data; metadata; machine to machine data. But all of these categories, she admitted, could involve personal data. It was asked, if personal data is in all categories, and triggers distinct regulatory obligations, what is the point of having the categories? Charles Duan of R street recommended focusing not on the data itself but on the intended recipient and how it is going to be used. What follows is a summary of specific proposals for policy change made during the conference:

    Using WTO dispute resolution process (DRP)

    Several people proposed using the WTO DRP especially in regard to China’s unbalanced approach to digital trade. Specifically, there could be WTO challenges to a) China’s data localization law, and b) China’s Great Firewall (GFW). The GFW could be challenged because it does not conform to WTO rules that national exceptions must be done in the least protectionist way. Reaction to this proposal was mixed, with participants noting some good aspects and some feasibility issues. One participant noted that there are disagreements about the value of the GFW within China and some domestic parties might actually welcome a challenge to it. Another noted that China has a reasonable record in the WTO, and might actually comply with an unfavorable ruling. Drawbacks of this approach were also noted. Big WTO cases, such as Boeing-Airbus, go on for a lifetime. Moreover, WTO rulings are not legally enforceable and states have to come up with their own remedies in case of noncompliance with WTO award. One participant claimed that the “prostitution” of the national security argument by the Trump administration ruins the opportunities the US has to push back against China when they invoke it.

    Link cross-border data flows to HR

    Participants’ views on linking human rights to cross-border data flow diverged. One participant explained that ex ante, the negotiation phase of trade agreements is the only phase whereby the civil society advocates can potentially have an impact on trade agreements. They can express their concerns and have more rights respecting provisions. However, ex post, when the disputes rise, trade dispute resolution mechanisms might not be suitable to resolve human rights disputes. Other participants stated that WTO dispute resolution forum is not the suitable forum for human rights disputes nor is private arbitration mechanisms.

    Make better bargains for the public

    It was also suggested that tangible benefits for consumers are needed at the national level if we want societal support for free trade agreements. This could be accomplished by linking trade agreements to consumer protection and other benefits. However, this approach was not perceived as pragmatic by some participants, who feared it could lead to an overextension of trade regimes and might lead to prolonged and frustrating trade negotiations, that might never yield a free trade agreement.

    Retaliate against China

    Using national protectionist measures to retaliate against China was not seen as the right solution to deter Chinese protectionist measures on digital trade. Tariffs, market access barriers, and FDI limitations generate major costs for consumers and decrease economic efficiency. Many proposed retaliations simply reinforce China’s nationalistic tendencies. Using global, legitimate international forums such as the WTO that is neutral and not political to bring disputes against protectionist measures of countries is a better alternative to nationalistic measures.

    Voluntary adoption of harmonized privacy rules

    States argue that data localization efforts protect their citizens from jurisdictions that have not passed appropriate data protection laws. An alternative to data localization would be to harmonize the privacy rules that countries and corporations adopt. Global corporations that get involved with digital trade should be incentivized to voluntarily adopt these rules. The human rights advocates can also advocate for the adoption of such rules.

    "Geneva Convention on the Status of Data"

    There was a suggestion by Nigel Corey to have a Geneva Convention on the Status of Data which would facilitate law enforcement access to data globally and might lessen states efforts to localize data in order to have an easier access. There should also be multilateral agreements on the questions of jurisdiction and transparency of the data. Having a multilateral agreement for government access to data globally was also seen as a solution by other contributors.

    Move to bilateral approaches

    Bilateral trade agreements were seen as a useful tool that can bring incremental improvements to digital trade, persuade other nations to join free trade agreement regimes and have a positive effect on non parties as well. Some concerns were raised, however, regarding whether this pluralism in trade regimes might fragment progress on digital trade.

    Final remarks

    The IGP workshop on digital trade proved to be very successful in creating a discussion among various stakeholder groups on the impact of trade policy on Internet governance and the intersection of trade agreements and digital rights. IGP will publish a special issue on digital trade based on the contributions of the workshop in the Journal Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance. The proceedings of this workshop and the papers can help develop a digital trade policy agenda that preserves and advances Internet freedom while being grounded in evidence and sound economic analysis. IGP will work on using and expanding the outcome of this workshop in processes and discussions about digital trade.

  • May 2018
  • Cyberattribution Session at RightsCon

    What can we do to stop the militarization of cybersecpace by States? One answer might be convening a transnational cyber attribution organization. States need to be held accountable if they carry out cyber attacks. However, up until now, this has not been feasible. The infeasibility does not mean that cyberattribution does not take place at all. Cyberattribution is not impossible anymore. There are cyberattribution efforts in place carried out by various nations and security firms. However, such processes might not be seen as legitimate internationally since the attribution is carried out by the institutions of the attacked nation states. To overcome this hurdle, scholars, as well as the private sector (mainly Microsoft recently), have been discussing the possibility of convening such an organization. As one of its main research topics, IGP is carrying out research and organizes sessions about cyberattribution. One of our recent papers, presented at the International Studies Association showed empirically that nonstate actors might not have enough incentives to carry out cyberattribution. We are continuing our research on cyberattribution and focussing on more scholarly work but we also engage in organizing sessions at various Internet governance events to help with advancing this discussion further. At RightsCon, we have organized a session that will discuss the idea of cyberattribution organization. Join us on Thursday 17 May at 12 pm. For more information about the session, go to http://sched.co/EHn5

  • Apr 2018
  • Can we Fight InfoOps Without Breaking the Internet?

    Last week, a 3-day conference was held at Harvard University’s Belfer center focused on fortifying election security and digital democracy. IGP contributors Karim Farhat and Karl Grindal competed in an Information Operations hackathon, winning first place in the policy category. The panel of judges was comprised of former Secretary of Defense and Belfer Center Director Ash Carter and former Pentagon “cyber czar” and current Defending Digital Democracy Project (D3P) Director and Belfer Center Co-Director Eric Rosenbach.  [caption id="attachment_6067" align="alignright" width="317"] Entrants to the Defending Digital Democracy Project's Hack-a-thon present their ideas to former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter prior to winners being announced.[/caption] The motivation for this project was to find a solution that maintains the US’s commitment to an open Internet while protecting elections from foreign interference. The 2016 Russian information operation campaign had three distinct tactics: sockpuppets, strategic leaks, and political advertising. While these strategies represent the present day challenge, our hackathon proposal sought to prepare for a future where bot-based communications amplify existing capabilities. What follows is an overview of these recommendations. While Facebook has preemptively committed to adopting many of these recommendations, what is legally required of them and other online platforms is another question entirely. This proposal addresses shortcomings in the Honest Ads Act and the Draft FEC Strategic Plan, FY 2018-2022. Justification Why these proposals? It’s important to first diagnose the problem. By acknowledging that information operations use distinct tactics and that responses should be tailored to these specific actions we are hopefully addressing the most significant dimensions of the campaign. These proposals are designed so that if replicated by any other state, democratic or authoritarian, the response would be consistent. Were the United States to adopt this proposal, it would be setting a global norm for campaign transparency as these policies could easily be adopted by other countries. Countries with overburdensome election regulations may lack the market to shape novel disclosure requirements. These provisions would inhibit information operations while protecting innovative platforms and free expression rights.    Election advertising Campaigns are expensive. In the past much of this money went to television broadcasting. Yet, estimates suggest almost $1 billion campaign dollars went towards online ads in 2016, and this number will certainly grow. Although broadcasters are already regulated when it comes to election advertising, social media platforms are not. Campaign spending consequently provides a unique opportunity. We propose that federal regulations on political advertising only apply to communication platforms that accept Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulated advertisements from political campaigns and Political Action Committees (PACs). Existing broadcast regulations provide ready made definitions and precedent. Startups and companies that prioritize anonymity over verified identity can choose to be exempt, but will lose out on political advertising. There are different rules for broadcasters, cable and satellite but the political file that is kept on hand for purchased ads is the same. Our proposed provision would only apply to direct political electioneering i.e. excluding opinion and issue-based campaigns. Political ads are those that directly mention a candidate, legislation or particular party. For instance, an ad stating “I love polar bears" is fine but “vote Clinton because she likes polar bears” applies as direct political electioneering. These broadcaster regulations should be extended for online electioneering, which includes: a transparency mandate (who is buying ads), domestic origin requirements and non-discriminatory pricing policy is relevant because of Facebook’s ad auction environment. Wired Magazine reported that the algorithm for Facebook’s ad auction sets lower prices for divisive and inflammatory content because of the higher click through rate. In contrast, broadcaster must offer the same price to all political ads. The above disclosure regulations would include sockpuppets and bots as explained in the subsequent sections. Sockpuppets We define sock puppets as a network of fraudulent online identities that are intended to spread the same message. These fake identities tend to create ‘echo chamber’ effects. It’s our belief that anonymity is not inherently wrong and has legitimate uses: it’s frequently used for parody accounts and by dissidents in oppressive regimes. From the perspective of election campaign law, however, sockpuppets can be construed as a fraudulent form of in-kind contributions that violates election law and should therefore be monitored by the FEC. An army of sockpuppets masquerading as genuine political discourse may be more effective in swaying elections than a third-party ad buy. An organization that promotes a candidate by secretly paying sockpuppets to lambast the opposing candidate would, in effect, be in violation of federal law. Under Citizens United v. FEC the Supreme Court declared their support for disclosure stating it “is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations of speech”. Consequently, this provision would segment the market between platforms selling anonymity vs. credibility to their users. This provision may expand the already established norm of verified-identity which has obvious consequences to anonymous speech. Today’s leading social media platforms, such as Facebook, already require real identity, which would make this kind of regulation less burdensome. Clearly, the monitoring of sockpuppets might make some platforms less welcoming to dissidents. However, an opt-in mechanism is better for anonymous speech than say a blanket provision applying to all public communication. With a few short lines in their contractual language, platforms that value anonymity such as Reddit and Imgur would clarify that campaigns and PACs are NOT eligible to post advertisements. Since platforms have an incentive-based choice on opting-in, users will also have the choice to use the service that best suits their preferences. Bot identifier     Sockpuppets will be nothing compared to bots in the future. One sockpuppet can only manage so many social media accounts but the process of posting disinformation, including fake videos (courtesy of Google’s open source engine TensorFlow), will be increasingly automated and large scale in the future. We are proposing that a bot identifier be developed to provide transparency. Human users should be able to make the distinction between when they’re communicating with something that is human and something that isn’t. This identifier scheme could be created in collaboration with industry and only applied to FEC regulated platforms. A bot identifier tag could find a broader audience as a norm, especially since bots are increasingly able to pass the Turing test. Strategic leaks The principal challenge faced by the DNC throughout the 2016 election was not one of the Russian sock puppets, but rather establishment media reporting on documents shared through Wikileaks and DCLeaks. By using anonymizing third parties, the Russian espionage campaign strategically released selective but factual information about DNC activities to exploit America’s constitutional prohibition on prior restraint of media. Established since the 1925 Supreme Court case Near v. Minnesota, this protection of press freedoms supports the Fourth Estate. As such, the news media is right to investigate alleged abuses, but is also setting the agenda for national discourse. With respect to strategic leaks, a culture change is needed within the American media. At the core of the problem is the economic incentive that journalists have to publish breaking news first. So how do we reconcile disclosure norms against a very compelling force in the opposite direction? There is no proper government role here, the response should lie in self-regulation. Ethical restraint by the media is needed when it comes to nation-state leaks. Organizations like the International Federation of Journalists, the National Writers Guild, and the Accrediting Council on Education in Journalism and Mass Communications ought to develop trade specific codes of ethics to guide journalists in the use of leaks from foreign powers or other potential purveyors of disinformation. As national trust in the mainstream media has dropped in recent years, context about the substance and origins of leaks is important to maintain objectivity and retain public trust. Concluding Remarks Having identified a plan for strategic leaks, political ads, sockpuppets, and bots, we believe these provisions might inhibit information operations while protecting innovative platforms and first amendment rights. We would like to thank Ishan Mehta who made invaluable additions to this proposal.

  • Mar 2018
  • Regulating cyber through trade regimes

    Background The international trade in hardware, software, and content complicates many cybersecurity challenges. Domestic regulations and enforcement may fall short of their intended aims when foreign criminals and governments are out of their jurisdiction, and cheap insecure technologies proliferate worldwide. In response, some security experts have looked to restricting trade as a mechanism to promote cybersecurity, or to implement some form of arms control. And yet, as with any restriction on trade, these proposals have major, potentially detrimental economic consequences. What follows is a typology of trade regimes, and the expected economic challenges associated with their use. Many of these ideas were formulated at the 2018 Harris School's Inter-Policy School Summit which this year focused on the topic of Trade and Cybersecurity. I would like to thank my team members from the Workshop: Erik Ernesto Bacilio Avila, Edgar Braham, Luis Gonzales Carrasco, and Lina Skoglund. Mechanisms for Restricting Trade Trade restrictions have been used for a wide variety of purposes: promoting nascent industries, protecting politically influential sectors, and regulating the spread of dangerous goods. What makes cybersecurity such a difficult topic for trade restrictions is the degree to which it serves dual-use purposes (military and civilian). For example, intrusion software can be used by an enterprise for security, and by a government for surveillance. And yet, the mechanisms to limit trade are not new, but grounded in existing organizations and processes. While not intended to be comprehensive, the following framework attempts to explore the various mechanisms that are or could be used to restrict trade either of cybersecurity products or general IT products for cybersecurity reasons. - Export Controls The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods provides a 42-country wide multilateral export control regime. This successor to the Cold War era technology export control program started in 1996, Wassenaar tried to upgrade its standards with a 2013 amendment that added an export restriction to internet based surveillance systems. The Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR) is not a treaty, but "an informal political understanding" that controls exports of missile technologies through established Guidelines. These Guidelines reference specific equipment, software and technologies that could proliferate missiles with greater range and payload capacity. This informal restraint of trade, has not had a significant effect on cybersecurity products. - Tariffs Article XXI security exception is a World Trade Organization mechanism which allows an exception to the Non-Discrimination principle in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) allowing a country to raise trade barriers against a partner or import flow based on a National Security threats. Similar security exceptions are made to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) where Article XIV bis allows for the “protection of essential security services.” On March 1st, President Trump stated that he would use the GATT exception to promote the US Steal and Aluminum industry. By default, the WTO Information Technology Agreement sets the tariffs on IT products to zero for over fifty participating countries including the US, EU, Russia, and China. For now, the ITA appears to have limited the use of tariffs to promote a domestic cybersecurity industry. - Investment Restrictions As a US-specific inter-agency body, The Treasury-led Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) reviews the national security implications of acquisitions of US businesses by foreign actors. Upon review, CFIUS can then recommend that the President block these acquisitions. Cybersecurity, with its dual use potential, increasingly has been cited as a factor in CFIUS decisions. This blog has previously noted how concern about Chinese access to US markets, has led CFIUS to make anti-competitive blocks. The US program is not unique, other nations including Canada and Germany have similar review processes. China’s Cloud Computing Regulations present another kind of investment restriction with significant impacts on cybersecurity. With regulations requiring local partners and requirements to reveal proprietary code, the country maintains strict control over cloud services. While this control may have certain cybersecurity intentions, its ends are more likely to enable domestic surveillance while hindering foreign surveillance. - Localization Requirements While the cloud computing requirements in China emphasize ownership limitations, localization requirements have been adopted more widely, either deployed in a specific sector like telecommunications metadata in Germany, or all personal data in Russia. More informal targeted localization requirements have also been propagated in the United States. The federal government efforts to prohibit Kaspersky Antivirus and Huawei have been banned from bidding for US government contracts after accusations of enabling foreign espionage. These government actions have led to American companies responding in kind resulting in a de facto ban. A Typology In an attempt to clarify analysis of trade-related cybersecurity restrictions, I have developed a table which relates the different trade control mechanisms to the following dimensions: 1) their effect on cybersecurity; 2) the distribution of costs; 3) how targeted or generic the restrictions are; and 4) the opportunities for retaliation or fragmentation they create. - Cybersecurity Effect The purported cybersecurity effect of the policies described above is limited. Rather than directly providing information assurance to domestic consumers or enterprises, these policies instead seek to limit proliferation, protect domestic industry, or limit foreign espionage. And yet many of these policies may have a net negative effect on the domestic populace. If the expense of cybersecurity products rises, or domestic espionage is made easier, the net effect would be to undermine security. - Targeted or Generic The effect of these policies can be considered to be either generalized through a widely applicable standard, or targeted (as with Investment Restrictions) at a specific enterprise. The scope of these policies has clear consequences on the likely impact for security, potential costs, and long-term effects on norms. -  Costs Who bears the brunt of the cost of trade restrictions? The subsequent chart is intended to address how producers, consumers, and governments might distribute the costs. Producers in this context represent the global IT industry (including the cybersecurity sector). Consumers are those individuals and enterprises that use these goods. Governments will face administrative costs in the enforcement of these provisions. - Retaliation and Fragmentation National decisions about trade restrictions do not occur in a vacuum. Nations will respond to each other in their interest. Particularly with arbitrary tariffs, the likelihood of retaliation with counter tariffs is high. In contrast, other policies might not result in retaliation, but might lead to norms which will further fragment the Internet. As countries seek to align the Internet with nation specific rules, they are likely to inhibit the cross-border flow of goods and services and change the character of the Internet from one country to another. Table: Classification of Trade Regimes This framework helps to clarify some of the tradeoffs and consequences of regulating cybersecurity through existing trade regimes. There are important distinctions of purpose, how targeted the program is, who will bear the costs, and how other countries might respond. While no program is without some cost, these factors should bring pause to anyone hoping to leverage the international trade regime as a mechanism to bring peace. Lessons For example CFIUS, while unlikely to affect domestic producers, has a high risk of trade backlash and creating restrictive norms, while export control regimes are unlikely to see trade retaliation but do punish the domestic industry of cybersecurity services if they limit legitimate research and sale. The costs will be faced by someone in the market. At present, the potential benefits of these proposed trade regimes seem to fall mostly to governments under a national security paradigm. However, even if these programs were targeted to limit the flow of vulnerable software, the typology above would remain true. By limiting the consumer choice to use foreign goods, governments are making critical value judgements on behalf of their citizens.

  • Feb 2018
  • The 2006 Definition of Whois Purpose: Case study of the “bad ...

    My last blog emphasized the importance of defining a purpose for Whois consistent with ICANN’s mission. It is impossible for ICANN to comply with GDPR unless this is done. Why doesn’t ICANN already have a defined purpose for Whois? Therein lies an interesting story - a story with a hero, a villain, a betrayal and an unhappy ending. A tragedy according to the Greek definition. Way back in 2003 – 15 years ago – ICANN formed a Whois Privacy Steering Group. That was its first response to growing concern about the tensions between its newly-implemented Whois policies and privacy law concerns. The Steering Group eventually came to the same conclusion that ICANN seems to be reaching now: before it could decide what data to make public or nonpublic, it had to define the purpose of Whois. So on 2 June 2005 it created a GNSO Task Force on The Purpose of Whois and the Whois Contacts. The task force was mandated to:

    (1) Define the purpose of the WHOIS service in the context of ICANN's mission and relevant core values, international and national laws protecting privacy of natural persons, international and national laws that relate specifically to the WHOIS service, and the changing nature of Registered Name Holders.

    (2) Define the purpose of the Registered Name Holder, technical, and administrative contacts, in the context of the purpose of WHOIS, and the purpose for which the data was collected.

    By January 2006, the task force had produced a Preliminary Report. Reflecting the divisions in the community, the report offered two competing definitions of the purpose of Whois, and asked for public comment. The two definitions were:

    Formulation 1

    "The purpose of the gTLD Whois service is to provide information sufficient to contact a responsible party for a particular gTLD domain name who can resolve, or reliably pass on data to a party who can resolve, issues related to the configuration of the records associated with the domain name within a DNS nameserver."

    Formulation 2

    "The purpose of the gTLD Whois service is to provide information sufficient to contact a responsible party or parties for a particular gTLD domain name who can resolve, or reliably pass on data to a party who can resolve, technical, legal or other issues related to the registration or use of a domain name." As one of the participants in the work noted, “everyone in the task force agrees the purpose of Whois is to provide a system for a given domain name to be looked up and produce a set of contact information. The crux of the differences relates to the types of problems the constituencies believe ought to be resolved using the Whois system. (e.g. technical, legal, etc.)” Formulation 1 emphasized the technical problems that could be resolved, as being more suited to ICANN’s mission. Advocates of Formulation 1 claimed that it was the only definition consistent with the narrow technical mission of ICANN, with ICANN's Core Values regarding security and stability, and with national data protection laws worldwide. Formulation 2 on the other hand opened the door to literally any use of Whois. By saying that Whois data could be used to resolve “technical, legal or other issues” related to the either the registration or use of a domain name it essentially opened the door to any purpose under the sun, with the exception of spamming. ICANN put the task force report up for public comment. Comments closed February 9, 2006. Between February and March there were attempts to resolve the difference by bringing the matter to a vote on the GNSO Council. In April 2006, the Task Force’s work was successfully concluded: after months of discussion and debate and public comment, the GNSO Council passed Formulation 1 with the required two-thirds majority to deem it a “consensus” under GNSO operating rules. What happened next? Something that happened several times during the bad old days before ICANN's reform. The trademark and business interests refused to accept the consensus policy and urged the U.S. government to use its power over ICANN and its influence in GAC to veto this definition and bury it. The U.S., which had made its preference for Formulation 2 known, was more than willing to do this. As the vote was held, Suzanne Sene, the US Commerce Department official who represents the US on the GAC, complained that "GAC didn't know how close to a vote we were" and said she didn't think GNSO should vote so “soon.” She made this absurd claim despite the 3 years that had passed since the formation of the Whois-Privacy Steering Group and the 9 months that had passed since the formation of the Whois purpose task force. Next, enormous pressure was placed on the chair of the GNSO Council, Bruce Tonkin, to reverse the vote. Even the Australian GAC representative – whose own national privacy laws clearly made the existing Whois illegal – pressured Tonkin (an Australian national) to abandon it. Eventually, Tonkin caved. He unilaterally short-circuited the work of the GNSO Task Force and kept the issue of Whois purpose unchanged and the issues about its consistency with privacy law unresolved. There was never another vote. The matter was just dropped. Because the consensus was ignored, the work of the Task Force was truncated and the status quo (which was the option favored by the trademark interests and the USG) has remained in place to this day. Back then, when the stakes were high enough and ICANN’s policy development process didn’t do what the U.S. government wanted it to do, the U.S. just didn’t allow it to happen. It started doing this fairly overtly in the 2005-6 time frame, when it decided to veto ICANN’s approval of the .XXX top level domain based on domestic political pressure. Like the XXX incident, the Whois purpose veto should remind everyone that US control over the pre-transition ICANN was much more than “ceremonial;” it was deeply political and directly affected policy. ICANN as an organization simply could not afford to run counter to U.S. interests. But more important than the historical precedent, it is important to keep this incident in mind as we enter into the new effort to define a purpose of Whois. We have already debated many of the issues and problems related to Whois purpose. We can easily predict which constituencies will be on which side of the issue as we settle on a purpose. We need to remember that there are powerful interests at stake, and some of them have no qualms about playing dirty to keep the status quo in place. There are key differences now, however. One is that the legal situation is changing in ways that make it difficult, if not impossible, to keep evading the issue. Secondly, European governments have stopped viewing Whois as a convenient escape valve from their own privacy laws and seem to be insisting on compliance. Finally, ICANN itself has changed, it is no longer under the thumb of the US government. It is now more accountable and its staff shows more respect for its own process and limited mission. Let’s hope there is a better outcome this time.

  • Jan 2018
  • IGP at IGF 2017

    The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) is convened under the auspices of the United Nations and holds annual meetings. It is an important event because it brings together various Internet governance stakeholder groups to talk about their activities, hold debates, plan for future projects and have intra-stakeholder group dialogue. Although the IGF meetings do not yield  any binding outcomes and are civil society dominated, they provide the rare opportunity of gathering various stakeholder groups in one place and giving the United Nations the pleasure of hosting a diverse, non-hierarchical community. This blog post showcases some of the activities of IGP at IGF 2017. At IGF, IGP pursued its focus on civil society engagement, digital trade, online content regulation and Internet of Things. The civil society day As is customary, various civil society groups and digital rights activists get together two days before IGF to prepare themselves for IGF but also to discuss and debate Internet governance issues. At the joint civil society meeting, we were featured in a debate on economic nationalization and digital trade. Civil society activists who favor trade agreements that liberalize digital services exchanged views with those who think digital trade agreements are inimical to privacy rights. IGP is of the opinion that trade agreements can be a vehicle to advance Internet rights, especially to combat data localization laws, and can even be leveraged to improve privacy protection. Some argue that e-commerce chapters in intergovernmental trade agreements encroach upon Internet governance issues that are now resolved through multistakeholder processes. This concern is not very well backed up, however. The issues addressed in trade agreements have never been resolved by multistakeholder processes. Privacy protection has become a national issue and many governments have passed data localization measures already. It is time to find effective avenues to address these issues. IGP also presented its paper on domain name registrars and their terms of service, as a part of a broader session about private regulation on the Internet. Our paper was written after a white supremacist website's domain was cancelled by GoDaddy based on a terms of service prohibition on "immoral" use of a domain. Our paper surveyed the morality provisions in terms of service of registrars.  We are still working on the idea of registrars’ neutrality when it comes to content regulation issues in domain names. The topic of domain names and content regulation was also taken up by a workshop organized by the ICANN Noncommercial Users Constituency. IGP was represented on this panel. IoT Security, will regulation save the day? During IGF, IGP organized a workshop on IoT security, titled “IoT security: Will regulation save the day?” The workshop was a debate between those who are for greater regulation of IoT security and those who are against it, and think current practices can resolve IoT security issues. The panelists discussed the definition of  regulation when it comes to IoT, considered product liability in IoT and debated who we are going to regulate and what are we protecting, consumers or networks? We will do a report on the outcome of the workshop soon. In the meantime, watch the session video and read a paper IGP co-authored with the R Street Institute.   Digital Trade The last day of IGF, we participated in a main session about digital economy and trade at IGF. Along with Dr. Badiei from IGP, the main session included government representatives, international organizations such as UNCTAD and Internet corporations such as Facebook. IGP contributed to the main session in the first segment, arguing that WTO has not been proactive in facilitating digital trade and that trade agreements might have positive effects for combating data localization. Video is available here: And we had a booth!  [caption id="attachment_5813" align="alignleft" width="288"] Ian was not there to pick up his book so his famous friend Sophie Kwasny from the Council of Europe picked it up.[/caption] IGP had a  booth at IGF 2017 and we raised awareness about our digital free trade project which you can read more about here. We also told IGF participants about our research and activities at IGP. To stir things up and make the booth more exciting, we had a contest. The IGF attendees who answered the  Internet governance questions correctly could win a signed copy of the book 'Will the Internet fragment?' by Milton Mueller. Only three contestants answered all the questions correctly (a significant portion of quiz-takers thought that Milton Mueller was a co-founder of the IETF). Unsurprisingly, one of the winners was Ian Brown, an Internet governance expert. In 2018, we will continue our activities and research on digital trade, online content regulation, IoT security, cybersecurity and other emerging Internet governance issues. Stay tuned and let us know what you think about our work!

  • December
  • November
  • October
  • September
  • August
  • July
  • June
  • May
  • April
  • March
  • February
  • January
  • Dec 2016
  • The Year in Review: Transition in Internet Governance

    2016 was an eventful year in Internet governance. This year-end overview reveals a year of transition, both for the field and for IGP as an organization.

    ICANN and the historic IANA transition

    In 2016, IGP’s role as intellectual and practical leaders within the ICANN regime culminated in the IANA transition – the end of US government control of IANA and the accompanying accountability reforms in its corporate governance. A March 2014 paper by IGP, released ten days before the NTIA announced that it would initiate the transition, was the first to propose structural separation of IANA from ICANN. Later that year, Dr. Milton Mueller was elected to serve as a member of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group, while he, Farzaneh Badii and Brenden Kuerbis became active participants in the CWG-IANA and the CCWG on Accountability. In March 2016, Mueller attended the ICANN 55 meeting in Morocco where the reform proposals took their near-final form and were approved by the Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. IGP played a prominent role in the public debate over the final U.S. government approval of the ICANN transition proposals. This included many news interviews, the submission of congressional testimony and a talk at the R Street Institute in Washington, DC, on September 30. On October 26, IGP hosted an event honoring Assistant Secretary of Commerce Lawrence Strickling for his role in the transition and a discussion of its long term implications in Atlanta on the Georgia Tech campus. Mueller also attended the November 2016 ICANN 57 meeting in Hyderabad, India. Meanwhile, back at the ICANN ranch, Milton Mueller and Farzaneh Badii were elected to the 2016 Noncommercial User Constituency’s (NCUC’s) Executive Committee, where with NCUC Chair Rafik Dammak they presided over continued growth in the activity and membership of civil society in ICANN. Badii led a long-overdue overhaul of the NCUC’s bylaws. At the end of her EC term, Dr. Badii was elected to serve as the NCUC’s new Chair for 2017, while Brenden Kuerbis was selected to serve as a member of the second Nominating Committee Review Working Party.

    Academic Research

    IGP principals continued making academic research contributions to the field of Internet governance. In mid-March, the International Studies Association meeting in Atlanta was attended by Dr. Mueller, Dr. Hans Klein and Dr. Badii. Klein and Mueller organized a panel on global public policy in information and communications technology; Mueller and Badii presented their paper on state sovereignty and ccTLD delegations. Later that year, their paper – “Governing Internet Territory: ICANN, Sovereignty Claims, Property Rights and Country Code Top Level Domains” – was accepted for publication in 2017 in the Columbia University Science and Technology Law Journal. Continuing their ongoing research on cybersecurity issues in Internet routing and addressing, from May 22 – 28 Mueller and Kuerbis attended RIPE 72 in Copenhagen, where Kuerbis was awarded a RACI fellowship to present a paper Internet Routing Registries, Data Governance and Security. This paper has been submitted to the Journal of Cyber Policy.

    Education

    As recognition of Internet governance as an important area of policy grows, teaching has become a more prominent part of our mission. IGP principal Dr. Mueller continued his tradition of participating as a lecturer in the European Summer School on Internet Governance (EUSSIG) in Meissen, Germany July 18-22. He joined in celebrating EUSSIG’s 10th anniversary immediately afterwards. Drs. Mueller and Klein helped to program and teach the very first edition of a new summer school, Georgia Tech’s Cybersecurity Leadership program, a week-long executive education session held July 25 – 29 in Atlanta. From October 30 – November 1, Mueller lectured in three sessions of the first edition of the India School of Internet Governance (InSIG) in Hyderabad before attending ICANN 57. At ICANN 57, he collaborated with Kilnam Chon to organize an outreach session for academics involved in Internet governance.

    IG: fragmentation, trade and cybersecurity

    Problems in Internet governance are moving in new directions. After the ICANN transition, IGP is reorienting its activities to focus more on the way Internet governance intersects with cybersecurity and trade. This includes concerns about the so-called “fragmentation” of the Internet caused by the assertion of multiple national controls over potentially global Internet services. The new direction for IGP was manifested in 2016 in a variety of ways. On May 19-20 IGP hosted an invitation-only workshop on Political Space and Cyberspace, where 15 scholars from around the world exchanged papers and held intense discussions about the tensions and intersections between jurisdictional boundaries and cyberspace, focusing on their implications for governance institutions and for cybersecurity policy. In June 2016, Dr. Mueller was invited to present his analysis of “Is there sovereignty in cyberspace?” at a US Army War College workshop on sovereignty in cyberspace in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Shortly thereafter (June 15), Dr. Mueller was a featured speaker at an ISOC-DC and Microsoft event on Internet fragmentation: the technical aspects in Washington, DC. Cornell University, which is embarking on a new initiative in cybersecurity, invited Dr. Mueller to speak there September 14. On October 22, Dr. Mueller was an invited speaker on Internet governance at the 2016 International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon US) meeting in Washington, DC, where he was on a panel with Laura DeNardis of American University and Internet protocol founder Robert Kahn. In December 2016, IGP organized two workshops at the UN Internet Governance Forum in Mexico, one on the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, and the other on the risks and reality of DNS fragmentation.  

  • Jul 2016
  • What's really at stake in the Microsoft v. USA decision

    The recent appeals court decision in the Microsoft – Ireland case was a milestone in Internet governance. If it is not challenged, or if it is appealed and holds up in the U.S. Supreme Court, it will mark an important turning point in the attempt to subject the Internet to sovereign states. Recently there has been a lot of froth about the “fragmentation/balkanization” of the Internet. But this debate is not really about splintering the Internet into disconnected pieces; it is about what I call alignment. Alignment is the attempt to subjugate the cyber domain to existing political-legal jurisdictions. It is about superimposing the authority of territorial states over the global virtual space created by the Internet. This happens through various technical and legal measures designed to confine services and information flows to national territories; e.g., by filtering or blocking access to content from outside the country (e.g., the Chinese Great Firewall); through data localization laws; and through geo-blocking. Most of these things are bad – they undermine or destroy the value of the Internet. But those who think they are re-establishing “national sovereignty” by means of alignment face a major problem. Alignment creates a profound jurisdictional conundrum. When governments seek to assert sovereignty over globalized information they have two basic choices. Either 1) isolate themselves completely by requiring every Internet service to keep all of their facilities and data in their jurisdiction and completely regulating all cross-border movements of data; or 2) extend their jurisdiction beyond their territory and try to regulate services globally. The first option, taken to its extreme, ends the Internet – it destroys the network effects and efficiency of the global Internet and creates a set of national walled gardens. The second option destroys the whole model of national sovereignty, and opens up Internet services to a welter of conflicting jurisdictional requirements. Currently, we see both sides of this conundrum being played out. In Microsoft v. USA, alignment was the underlying issue. Under the Stored Communications Act of 1986, the U.S. government claimed that it can direct a company to disclose records within its “possession, custody or control,” anywhere in the world if that system is operated by a US-based company – even when disclosure would violate the laws of the country where the data was located. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 relaxed and broadened the standards under which the US government could request information. This is an example a government reacting to the jurisdictional paradox by making their laws globally applicable. A great deal of the momentum for “data sovereignty” came from other countries reacting to these U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In its current dispute with Microsoft over a customer whose records were stored in Ireland, the U.S. Justice Department argued that the Stored Communications Act does not “limit the ability of law enforcement agents to obtain account information from domestic service providers who happen to store that information overseas.” Microsoft, on the other hand, argued that data stored in Ireland is not subject to US jurisdiction and that it may be contravening Irish law if it hands over the requested data. The same problem is posed by a proposed change in Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Rule 41’s current incarnation, federal magistrate judges can only authorize searches and seizures within their own jurisdiction, with a few exceptions. The amendments promoted by the U.S. Justice Department would allow a magistrate judge to issue a warrant to hack into and seize data stored on a computer anywhere in the world if the computer’s actual location “has been concealed through technical means.” Civil liberties groups complained that the rule change would be a license to “get a warrant locally, hack globally.” A judge complained that the Justice Department's interpretation of Rule 41 would effectively “permit FBI agents to roam the world in search of a container of contraband, so long as the container is not opened until the agents haul it off to the issuing district.” Thus we see how the U.S. government has chosen to respond to the uniquely globalized character of Internet services by asserting global authority, a major deviation from traditional notions of sovereignty.

    The court decision confines governments to their territorial jurisdiction – which is appropriate – but does not in any way confine the Internet to a territorial jurisdiction.
    There is a tendency to view this problem narrowly as an example of the overwhelming power of the US government. But the problem is not confined to the U.S.; it is a structural feature of the clash between cyberspace and political space. Microsoft v. USA should also be a wakeup call for European “right to be forgotten” advocates. In their attempt to enforce the "right to be forgotten” (RTBF), French and European Union data protection agencies have asked Google to de-link all search engine results, in all countries, if they violate RTBF mandates in one or two countries. This would mean that some European governments are demanding global applicability for their local law. They are demanding it even where RTBF-mandated delinking is considered a violation of fundamental constitutional rights such as freedom of expression recognized by other states. Clearly, the attempt to align Internet services with jurisdiction does not lead to a predictable, well-ordered world, a world in which traditional notions of Westphalian sovereignty are restored. It leads to a jurisdictional war of all against all. Superficially, Microsoft’s argument that the U.S. government had no authority to compel disclosure of data located in another jurisdiction seems to rationalize data localization. In reality, Microsoft v U.S.A. was a great victory for the global Internet. The court decision confines governments to their territorial jurisdiction – which is appropriate – but does not in any way confine the Internet to a territorial jurisdiction. Thus, data can move wherever it needs to move or wherever it is most efficient to be held. This means that Governments have to accept the procedural and substantive limitations of their own law. It would be great if European courts showed the same respect for the legitimacy and territorial scope of their laws. If governments want to be sovereign, then they have to be limited in their authority to their own territory, because sovereignty and territoriality are inextricably linked. If governments want to be extraterritorial, then they have to completely abandon notions of sovereignty and allow new institutions for global governance to develop, in which the multistakeholder community can govern themselves in a transnational environment.

  • December
  • November
  • October
  • September
  • August
  • July
  • June
  • May
  • April
  • March
  • February
  • January
  • Nov 2015
  • IGF 2015: Running in place

    The Internet Governance Forum, held this year in the Brazilian beach resort town of João Pessoa, completed its 10th annual meeting Friday November 13. The IGF Secretariat claims that nearly 5,000 people attended. Moreover, it looks as if its existence will be continued for another 10 years when the UN meets in New York later this year. Vint Cerf declared it “the best IGF ever” in the closing open microphone session. But how good is “best?” [embed]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYByxPODLf4[/embed]

    Video from Elon University's Imagining the Internet Center provides an overview of the environment and some comments from IGF 2015
    If one is talking about the meeting rooms and session halls, the efficiency of administration and helpfulness of support staff, Cerf’s claim is right. It was an excellent event. If one is talking about the nature of the dialogue the IGF fostered and its contribution to global Internet governance, it is another story. Substantively, this IGF was not significantly better – nor was it significantly worse – than the others. Therein lies the problem. It’s hard to find people who believe that the IGF is making a critical contribution to Internet governance, but it’s also hard to find anyone who is committed to getting rid of it. IGF dances along the edge of relevance and irrelevance; no one quite believes that its potential as a transnational forum is being realized, but most people (including us) still believe the potential is there.

    Numbers up, but...

    It seems as if there is demand for the IGF. The number of pre-events has exploded; what started with the academic annual symposium of GigaNet in 2006 is now, in effect, another full day of 5 or 6 parallel events. There were a record number of workshop submissions, and as usual some of them were good and some were not. If so many people are using the IGF, it must be useful for some purposes. IGF workshops are still a relatively open, diverse area for airing ideas, but the proposal and selection of workshops is starting to be concentrated in a few organizations such as the Association for Progressive Communications, the Internet Society and ICC BASIS. If the tightly-knit network of people involved in these organizations get together with an intergovernmental organization on a proposal they can instantly claim to be covering all major stakeholder groups (civil society, technical community, business and government) – and it doesn’t hurt to have 4-5 members of their organizations on the MAG. APC did two pre-events and was involved in a dozen workshop proposals, almost all of which were accepted, an astounding dominance of the program. (And the MAG's decision to privilege "new" applicants doesn't seem to have affected this at all.) But while IGF’s potential to raise the profile of a well-organized NGO is unparalleled, what about its effect on Internet governance? Oh yeah, that. Here is a symptom of the problem IGF faces. What is the biggest global Internet governance issue going on right now? Surely, it is the IANA transition and the related movement to make ICANN more accountable. Yet the 2015 IGF did not have a single workshop on ICANN’s accountability reforms. Not one. And while it had two workshops on the IANA transition (see discussion below) inexplicably, the transition was not the topic of a main session. At least two workshops on accountability were proposed, but they were vetoed by the IGF program committee, known as the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG). Who knows what motivated these vetos? Sheer ignorance is a possibility: the MAG has ballooned into a 50-person committee and too many of its members are not that active, having been put there for purely ceremonial or representational purposes. There may be two or three MAG members who really don’t want there to be open, uncontrolled discussions and debates about ICANN issues in the IGF. There is also a tendency to think of IGF sessions as a form of entertainment which leads the MAG to avoid “old,” continuing issues even if they are important.

    IANA transition workshops

    [embed]https://youtu.be/1O8k1sB9DFU[/embed]
    Thanks to DomainMondo for extracting IGF video
    The two workshops about the IANA transition that did make it into the program make for an interesting contrast. One was organized by people embedded in ICANN’s cross community working group on Internet governance and heavily promoted by ICANN staff. The other was organized by us (the Internet Governance Project). The ICANN-based workshop, which was supposed to focus on the IANA transition as a case study of multistakeholder process, was ranked in the top 15 by the MAG, and given a larger room in a plum time slot Thursday morning. The IGP-organized workshop, which focused on the substantive issues raised by the IANA transition proposal, was ranked very low by the MAG, and its evaluation included comments like “what does this [the IANA transition] have to do with Internet governance?” It was pushed to the last day of the event and put in a smaller room. Yet when it came down to results, the two workshops were like night and day. The ICANN-organized workshop had too many speakers, the discussion was not well-structured and its audience dissipated. Worse, it failed even to mention, much less debate, the major process controversies surrounding the accountability process. The fact that the ICANN board rejected the output of the CCWG on Enhanced Accountability and caused a scheduling crisis in which we are still mired was never even brought up in a workshop that was supposed to assess multistakeholder process. The IGP workshop on the other hand, was standing room only, held the interest of its attendees the whole time, and succeeded in airing the controversies as well as consensus points around the ICG proposal. It left significant time for a vigorous set of audience questions which led to some interesting exchanges about the relationships between the different operational communities, jurisdiction, root zone maintainer, and others. Alain Bidron, head of naming and numbering at Orange, said it was the best workshop at IGF. The point of making this comparison is that the MAG has an abysmal record of recognizing which proposals will end up being good workshops and which will not. The MAG not only has the wrong composition, its evaluations lean too heavily on who is closely connected to people in the MAG and on bureaucratic formulae, such as artificial diversity criteria stakeholder balance and – frankly – whether certain people on the MAG like or don’t like the proposer.

    Reforming main sessions – will it even happen?

    Suppose the ICANN accountability or the IANA transition had managed to make it into a main session. Still, we would not be optimistic about its content. ISOC, ICANN, and the mainstream business interests would almost certainly ensure that such a session would be full of happy talk about the triumph of multistakeholderism rather than providing a critical assessment with all points of view. The promise of the IGF is that it could provide a kind of independent (nonbinding) oversight of Internet governance arrangements, but it is difficult for it to do so when the MAG is so tied to the status quo institutions. Indeed, the continuing problem of what to do with main sessions was one of the most depressing things about the João Pessoa IGF. More than any other institution, IGF brings together most, if not all, of the Internet governance community and gives them a chance to work together on the hottest, most important and most interesting topics. But main sessions consistently fail to do anything with that enormous social capital. They are usually lightly attended and have become increasingly less significant parts of the program to attendees. This is very odd, when one thinks about it. Thousands of people who are most committed to Internet governance come to a single place because they are part of a community interested in the same thing, and yet when we get them into the same room we don’t know what to do with them. Main sessions have become nothing more than gigantic, inflated workshops, with 20+ speakers, taking 3 hours instead of 90 minutes. It is a major waste of human resources and time. I was put on the main session on cybersecurity. The people who were slated as speakers were all very good. The people who moderated the panel were very good. Some of the comments were useful and informative. Nevertheless, the session as a whole was aimless, an undirected collection of generic topics and observations about everything from best practices to the need for international treaties to multistakeholder collaboration to encryption to Gamergate. The solution to this problem is clear: make the main sessions into a NETmundial-type interaction where people work on coming up with common solutions to a well-specified problem, or work on common texts with recommendations around a well-specified issue. Many commentators are echoing this theme, calling for "output" and "recommendations" from the IGF (see for example the video at the top of this article). Suppose that a main session had been devoted to assessing whether the proposed accountability reforms of the ICANN CCWG were adequate and if not, which additional reforms would be capable of fixing the problems. The IGF main session would try to reach consensus conclusions which could be passed on to the CCWG (and the NTIA) in the form of a recommendation. Not everyone at IGF would be interested in participating in such an interaction, of course, but a lot more would be willing to attend and participate than currently wander into (and out of) existing main sessions – because their participation would matter. Or suppose that instead of having a general and purely educational discussion of whatever cybersecurity issues happen to come up, that the IGF had fostered a debate on a clearly defined, globally relevant governance proposition, such as whether an international treaty is the best way to address cybersecurity problems. The possibility of the IGF making a recommendation either way would focus people’s minds, and improve the quality of argumentation and dialogue, not to mention attract more participation and attendance. We will know that the IGF is beginning to fulfill its potential as an Internet governance forum when people come out of its sessions with the same sense of accomplishment that they had when they left the NETMundial meeting of April 2014. Some final video thoughts: [embed]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bVua6cm3KEE[/embed]

  • Aug 2015
  • IGP Moves!

    You may have noticed the hiatus in our coverage in July and early August. The reason? IGP has moved. After more than a decade at Syracuse University, the Internet Governance Project is now part of the School SchoolofPublicPolicy-solid-539+874-IACoLAtagof Public Policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. The move comes as a consequence of the Georgia Tech’s recruitment of Dr. Milton Mueller, who departs from the Syracuse School of Information Studies to join the School of Public Policy at Georgia Tech in Atlanta. Postdoctoral researcher Dr. Brenden Kuerbis, one of IGP’s key contributors, will also be working for Georgia Tech as of mid-August. IGP will continue to be independently funded and operated center that bridges scholarship and participation in Internet institutions. Yet at Georgia Tech's School of Public Policy, IGP will be in a much richer environment for public policy-related research and analysis. We will be able to work more closely with one of IGP’s original partners, Dr. Hans Klein, and we will have stronger connections to Tech’s world-renowned computer science researchers, policy researchers in other schools such as Peter Swire, and international relations scholars. Plans are underway for a seminar series and workshops in the fall of 2015 and the spring of 2016. Stay tuned.

  • Dec 2012
  • If the hat fits, wear it

    In a good-natured response to a blog post accusing him of digital Bonapartism, ICANN CEO Fadi Chehadi sent me a Christmas present, pictured above. We are forced to admit that with the proper attire, Bonapartism can be fun! But we still don't recommend it as a mode of Internet governance.

  • Apr 2012
  • CFP: Seventh GigaNet Annual Symposium

    The Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) is seeking submissions of research to be presented at its Seventh Annual Symposium to be held on 5 November 2012, one day before the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Baku, Azerbaijan. Since 2006, GigaNet has organized an Annual Symposium to showcase research about Internet Governance. The GigaNet scholarly community is interdisciplinary, and includes computer science, law, political science, economics, communications, information studies and others. As in previous years, the symposium will provide room to discuss current and future questions as well as the challenges encountered and results achieved in Global Internet Governance. GigaNet is interested in receiving abstracts related to the following topics:

    • Internet policies on freedom of expression (censorship, kill-switches, filtering, policies that promote free expression, corporate social responsibility)
    • Internet freedom and governance in regions in transition (Arab region, etc.)
    • From PIPA to ACTA: National and international agreements on online copyright enforcement
    • Cyber-security, the state and international relations
    • Dataveillance and privacy - the economic perspective
    • Global Internet infrastructure policy (net neutrality, peering and interconnection, ASN assignment, routing infrastructure security, etc.)
    • Innovative methods for Internet Governance research
    • The role of the UN and intergovernmental institutions in global Internet Governance
    • Research on the implementation or effects of ICANN’s new gTLD program
    • IP addressing: economic and technical challenges of scarcity and governance
    • Internet governance and development
    Other topics not on the list are welcome as long as they fall within the field of Internet governance studies. Interested scholars should submit abstracts of research paper no later than 20 May 2012, at the Easy Chair platform: http://www.easychair.org/conferences/?conf=giganet2012. The Program Committee members will evaluate the abstracts submitted and decisions will be sent to applicants by email before 15 June 2012. Accepted papers for oral presentations should be followed by a full research paper to be sent by 30 September 2012. Please read the complete Call for Papers ([download id="36"]) for submission details.  

  • Jan 2012
  • We are all Internet exceptionalists now

    The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and its defeat call attention to a delicious irony in public discourse on Internet governance. Even those who don’t want the Internet to be an exception from traditional forms of regulation and law are forced to admit that something new and exceptional must be done to bring it under control, such as massive departures from traditional concepts of territorially bounded sovereignty through the use of in rem jurisdiction. Reinforcing the irony, these attempts by the anti-exceptionalists to subordinate the Internet to established institutions immediately locks them into conflict with a highly mobilized, highly transnational community of Internet users and service providers who vow to resist those controls. The resistance comes precisely because the mobilized community believes that the controls cannot be applied to the Internet without threatening to fundamentally alter its status as an open, innovative and – dare we say it – exceptional space. In other words, we are all Internet exceptionalists now. You know that the anti-exceptionalists have raised the white flag of surrender when they are forced to whine that the thousands of web publishers who went dark are "abusing their power" - thus admitting that a critical mass of Western society's eyes are turned toward the Internet and that the people who occupy and publish and interact in that globalized space constitute enough of a cohesive community to collectively turn against those who threaten them. It doesn’t matter whether one is on the pro-control or anti-control side of the spectrum; governing the internet forces a choice upon one: either go for new and unprecedented forms of technical intervention and transnational political cooperation, or go for some kind of ratification and institutionalization of the Internet’s special status as a zone for the free flow of information and a diminished role for territorial government and traditional informational property rights. Mind you, one needn't be a cyber-utopian to be an Internet exceptionalist. In other words, you don't have to believe that the Internet will by its very nature make politics fair and democratic and that the good guys will always win. SOPA or some equivalent could rise again, in some other form. Some key actors could be bought off with some concessions in the new legislation. The mobilized community's resolve could weaken over time, as it grows accustomed to things. We need to be heedful of Benkler's warning that as the networked environment resists control, there will be strong pressures to suck ever more of it into the law enforcement vortex. But surely, after 15 years of these battles (starting, roughly, with the CDA mobilization of 1996) we can dismiss these jaded admonitions that Internet regulation is just business as usual. If the Internet stops being an exception, we will have no one but ourselves to blame.

  • Sep 2011
  • Anything interesting about Internet governance in Wikileaks?

    Not much. We searched for copyright and Internet, ICANN and cybersecurity. Almost all of the cables are unclassified but there is the odd secret or confidential memo. Mostly the documents are useful to confirm and add detail to what the US government has been doing in those sphere.

    On copyright and Internet, there is a February 2010 cable in which the Economic Office laments the fact that motion picture studios lost a landmark case on intermediary responsibility in Australia. An earlier 2008 cable about the initiation of the suit notes that while it was filed by a local organization, the Australian Federation Against Copyright Theft (AFACT), it was done "on behalf of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and its international affiliate, the Motion Picture Association (MPA), but [AFACT] does not want that fact to be broadcasted." When the lawsuit failed, the cable notes that "The hope for AFACT  and the big studios was that a favourable decision would have established an international precedent that could have forced ISPs to tightly police the activities of their customers." Although we all knew that "international precedent," and "tight policing by ISPs" were the intent of these and similar actions, its rare to see the USG admit it so openly.

    On the other hand a Feb 2010 cable discussing Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's media and Internet regulation law in notes that "Provisions contained in the bill would make Internet service providers (ISPs), and hosting sites such as Blogspot and YouTube, liable for content in the same way a television station is. The writer seems concerned about the outcome, saying "if this bill were to become law as it is currently written, little would change immediately in the way Internet sites operate in Italy, and the average 11th grader uploading video to his blog would never be targeted for legal action. It would, however, provide a basis for legal actions against media operators that proved to be commercial or political competition for government figures." The memo concludes that "Advocates of Internet freedom have repeatedly warned us that Italy's traditional elites -- on both sides of the political spectrum -- are very uncomfortable with the Internet's ability to bypass the traditional media that they control. Because this new bill seems to address these kinds of concerns, and because it also serves Berlusconi's business interests, it is conceivable that this seemingly improbable legislation might actually come into force in Italy."

    Reagrding ICANN, the leaked cables are from the foreign policy branches rather than the Commerce Department, so most of the juicy ICANN-related stuff is not in there. Searching for "ICANN" produces 39 documents, all but two of them unclassified. Some of the most interesting date back to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the debate it sparked over US control of the root.

    In a cable from July 6, 2005, shortly after the Bush administration released its DNS principles saying that it would never, ever let go of the root, the Tunisian Minister of Communication Technologies Montassar Ouaili confides to U.S. Ambassador Gross that it "has no problem with" US oversight and veto power over ICANN. The now-deposed Tunisian government was more concerned about whether US-Europe feuding would "damage common interests" and "needlessly create competing Internet standards."

    After WSIS, in 2006, when the European concept of "enhanced cooperation" still had some viability, there are mildly interesting memos regarding meetings between the US and European governments. The USG made the rounds trying to get Europeans  to comment on the 2006 renewal of the ICANN MoU (without much success). In discussions with the Government of Austria, Christian Singer explained why they supported the European WSIS proposal to create a stronger role for governments and a more multilateral approach to political oversight of ICANN. One reason for concern, he said, came when the network provider KPN Qwest went bankrupt in 2002: "there was an imminent danger of the shutdown of the Domain Name System (DNS) server." "The Austrian registration authority (nic.at) had major discussions with ICANN on data protection issues before being able to receive the go-ahead for the required changing of the root-zone file." Around the same time, the Dutch govt said that while it agrees with increased private sector management, the MOU should "evolve from the responsibility of one government to the responsibility of all governments on an equal footing." The Norwegian Government stated that "the GAC is currently not structured nor mandated to take the role of an accountable body in matters concerning public policy issues" (an unusually sensible comment from a government). But "in the longer term, and as a response to the Internet being vital to every country and a global public good, [Norway] would like to see an evolution towards internationalization of this relationship between ICANN and government."

    Europe's position on the US role seemed to become more frayed as time went on. When Information Society Commmissioner Vivane Reding issued her famous press release in 2009 calling for separating ICANN from the US Commerce Department, and for the G-12 to exercise oversight authority, the Swedish, German and French representatives said "they perceive the Commission positions to be 'extreme', and have been at pains to distance their governments from the Commissioner," according to the cable of August 21, 2009. 

  • Aug 2011
  • ARIN and Vixie get nervous about competition

    Paul Vixie, a renowned Internet pioneer who runs the Internet Systems Consortium, has written an article in ACM Queue attacking "those who would unilaterally supplant or redraw the existing Internet resource governance or allocation systems." The publication of this article is a sign of a growing policy debate around the reform of IP address registries in the age of IPv4 exhaustion.

    Vixie defends the Regional Internet Registries monopoly on IP address registration services and its current, needs-based policies toward address transfers. I am sure that Paul sincerely believes in the arguments he makes, but it's also true that Vixie is the chairman of the Board of The American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN), the regional address registry for North America. When Vixie argues that ARIN's exclusive control over Whois and address transfer services is beneficial and "in the physics" he is also defending the authority and revenue model of his own organization against a perceived threat.

    And that takes us to another relevant fact. The argument Vixie makes is cast in generalities, but he is really attacking a specific firm, a holding company known as Denuo. Denuo has formed both a secondary marketplace called Addrex for the legitimate trading of IPv4 number blocks, and an IP Address Registrar company known as Depository. Let's set aside Depository for the moment (I will come back to it) and concentrate on Addrex, which has become the first end-to-end platform for legacy address holders to sell their IPv4 number blocks.

    Famously, Addrex scored a major success as the intermediary for the Nortel-Microsoft trade. But Nortel-Microsoft was unusually visible because it had to go through bankruptcy court. Is anything else happening? I spoke to Addrex’s President Charles Lee since then to find out. "We are very busy signing up a growing number of global corporate and governmental customers to sell their unused assets,” he said. I asked him what the buyer side of the marketplace was beginning to look like and he said “Our value proposition to large Asian network operators has resonated quite effectively and we expect to enter into many agreements with them over the coming months.”  Surely Vixie and the ARIN Board have gotten wind of this. So when Vixie begins a public attack on this company and its business model, he is signaling to the rest of us that ARIN is worried.

    It should be. Vixie's article is premised on a stretched, invalid comparison of Denuo to the proponents of competing DNS roots. But alt.root proponents were almost always lightweight rebel-operators who could never, as Vixie correctly points out, make a stable, serious value proposition to end users. Even New.net, the alt.root blessed with millions in venture capital, never came close to success, because there was just not much value in offering someone registration under a top level domain that only one tenth or less of the Internet could see. (To salvage its unviable business model Net.net was pushed into a number of questionable tactics.)

    Denuo/Addrex is most emphatically not like that. They have a simple, valuable business proposition to make to buyers and sellers of legacy address blocks: entities with surplus addresses can profit from them, entities who need more can get them. Businesses who use their services do not cut themselves off from part of the Internet - on the contrary, they help to maintain and secure their connectivity. And they do it without subjecting themselves to the uncertainty and bureaucracy of an ARIN "needs assessment." Moreover, although Denuo will no doubt benefit handsomely by being the first mover in this market, its success in no way depends on being the only person who ever pursues this business model. There is no reason why there could not be as many address brokers as there are real estate brokers.

    But Vixie says this will all end in tears. Shorn of hype and rhetoric, Vixie's argument amounts to this: if people are allowed to trade addresses outside of ARIN's control, then we cannot have an accurate registration database that tells us who holds which address block.

    That argument is obviously wrong. It would be a simple matter for ARIN (and other RIRs) to set up procedures to recognize and record transactions conducted by external parties - if they were willing to surrender pointless "needs assessments." We have thousands of stock brokers and dozens of exchanges independently trading shares, but somehow the world manages to keep track of who does and does not own a specific quantity of critically important stock certificates. So ARIN does not need to control, mediate and set policy for all IP address transfers in order to maintain an accurate database of who holds which address block. It simply needs to serve as a title agency where people come to record their transactions. It is in the self-interest of both sides of an IP address transaction to ensure that their transfer of rights was recorded and is published in a common, authoritative global Whois database. Think of your local county or village property recorder. They do not insist on being a real estate brokerage in their territory - much less the only brokerage. There are many parties who can independently engage in property transactions and then bring them to the property registry for verification and recording.

    Vixie is not appealing to the "physics" of registration and database economics - indeed, Vixie's belief that industrial organization is explained by "physics" rather than economics is a bit odd. What's really happening here is that Vixie and others at ARIN realize that the only way to shield themselves against losing control over and revenue from the IPv4 address market is to leverage their monopoly over the IP address registration database. What they would like to do is discourage competing and independent address trading and registration firms by refusing to make changes in their Whois database to reflect independent transactions. In antitrust/economics terms, they are tying registration records, which do need to be integrated and uniform, to another potentially competitive service, address brokerage and post-allocation registration services, so that it can continue to enjoy a monopoly in both. The penalty for trading addresses outside of its transfer regime is to be banished from or ignored by ARIN's Whois database.

    This is a risky strategy, and the community that ARIN claims to represent should question it. There are powerful economic incentives for legacy holders and companies that need more addresses to trade. Those trades are going to happen. There are also strong economic incentives for those holding legacy resources to avoid contracting with ARIN and other RIRs. Those companies could choose to sign up with Depository and other companies like it. If ARIN refuses to record them because it doesn't approve of the company or is not in control of the transaction, ARIN will be the one responsible for fragmenting and corrupting the IP address registration database.

    Vixie's argument about Whois fragmentation is doubly wrong when one realizes that the Whois database ARIN runs is actually a mess when it comes to pre-1997 address blocks (slightly over 40% of the available space). There are hundreds of firms that no longer exist listed there, and thousands of registration records that have not changed in fifteen years. I reached out to Charles Lee of Addrex about Vixie’s article to get his comments on it. He first issued a disclaimer that “generally, we…do not engage in public debates about Internet governance. We prefer to focus on our clients and serving their needs.” But he felt that Vixie’s posting contained “misleading inaccuracies” that required some comment.

    “The present Whois system which Mr. Vixie defends with such verve absolutely cannot be relied upon. That is not a personal position or opinion. It is a fact. As an illustrative example let’s use the now famous Nortel/Microsoft deal which was brokered by Addrex Inc. In that transaction not one of the 38 number blocks transferred from Nortel Networks Inc. to Microsoft Inc. were appropriately listed in any Whois database in the name of Nortel Networks Inc. It took hundreds of man-hours and over two thousand pages of documentation to reconcile the fiction of the Whois system entries to the reality of Nortel Networks. Unfortunately that now famous case is not the exception to the rule but rather the reality of the situation. For Mr. Vixie to even suggest that Network operators could, or should, rely on an identification system rife with such gross errors is unconscionable.”

    It's likely that private, commercially motivated firms will do a far better job of cleaning up the Whois records than ARIN will on its own. Denuo's Depository, for example, is already advertising its ability to research and verify "chain of custody" of address holdings. Depository has advocated a "registry-registrar split," analogous to the one in Domain Name Service, to allow competing firms to provide post-allocation registry services while maintaining the RIRs as a single, accurate registration database. Vixie's argument that competition from Denuo assumes that no "copycat" competition will ever emerge is 100% wrong. The structural reforms Denuo has advocated are actually designed to pave the way for more competition in that field hence their filing with ICANN to create an accreditation policy for all IP address registrars.

    To conclude, Internet elders such as Vixie have done a wonderful job writing software and defending the Internet's standards and architecture against various threats. For this, we can be respectful and grateful. But expertise in technology does not necessarily translate into expertise in economics and public policy. Vixie's polemic in ACM queue shows us that expertise in one domain often becomes blind arrogance in another. Only someone determined to preserve ARIN's monopoly would ever make the claims he makes.

  • May 2011
  • Call For Papers: GigaNet Sixth Annual Symposium

    The Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet), in co-operation with the Research ICT Africa (RIA), is seeking submissions of research about Internet Governance to be presented at the Sixth GigaNet Annual Symposium, held on 26 September 2011, one day before the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Nairobi, Kenya.

    Since 2006, GigaNet has organized an Annual Symposium to showcase research about Internet Governance, focusing on an interdisciplinary approach. Prior successful symposia took place in Greece (2006), Brazil (2007), India (2008), Egypt (2009) and Lithuania (2010).

    In 2011, the Internet Governance Forum has entered its second phase, after having reached the end of its first 5-year mandate. This year’s event will provide room to discuss the challenges encountered and results achieved during the first five years of IGF. As in previous years the GigaNet Symposium will further discuss current and future questions of Global Internet Governance.

    GigaNet is interested in receiving abstracts related to Internet Governance themes, especially those containing innovative approaches and/or emerging research areas. We encourage submissions on the following topics:

    • The first 5 years of the IGF: Taking stock and the way forward
    • Developing countries perspectives on internet governance
    • New approaches to theorizing internet governance
    • Between global and local: the question of territory in internet governance
    • Freedom of Expression / Right to Information
    • New approaches to Human Rights on the Internet
    • Internet governance and political uprising
    • International relations and cyber-security
    • Online privacy and dataveillance
    • Cloud Governance
    Other proposals may also be considered, please read the entire call for papers for more details on submission requirements, the evaluation process, financial assistance available, and the program committee. Interested scholars should submit abstracts of their research paper no later than 15 July 2011, through the Easy Chair platform.  Authors of accepted papers will be notified 1 August, and complete papers must be submitted by 15 September 2011.

  • Apr 2011
  • Global Internet Governance: Research and Public Policy Chall ...

    The Internet’s status as a communication medium that is decentralized, scalable and global continues to pose challenging new problems in governance and regulation. GigaNet, an international scholarly community created in 2006, holds a two-day conference to explore issues such as IP address scarcity, ICANN accountability, the role of social media in toppling dictatorships, censorship, privacy online, and the tensions between national security and Internet freedom.  Assistant Secretary for Commerce Larry Strickling (NTIA) will provide the keynote speech during lunch on Thursday, May 5. Day one engages policy makers, academics and civil society at large in dialogue on policy issues in global Internet governance.  The goal is to facilitate informed dialogue on policy issues and related matters between scholars and Internet governance stakeholders. Day two features presentations of scholarly research based on peer reviewed papers. The goal is to support scholarship and advance theoretical and applied research on Internet governance. Date: May 5-6, 2011 Location: American University School of International Service, Abramson Family Founders Room, Terrace Level (Washington, DC) View the program and register for the event

  • Jan 2011
  • Call for Papers: Global Internet Governance: Research and Pu ...

    Global Internet Governance: Research and Public Policy Challenges for the Next Decade

    Deadline for abstract submissions is February 25, 2011!

    May 5 and 6, 2011
    American University, School of International Service, Washington, DC
    Fifth Regional Workshop of the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet)
    [pdf]

    Internet Governance is an emerging international field of scholarship, public interest advocacy, diplomacy, governmental and corporate policy-making, and philanthropic investment. The problem of how or whether we should control or regulate a communication medium that is decentralized and global is critically important to anyone who relies on the Internet to communicate, mobilize political action, run online businesses, purchase products and services or access critical information services.

    GigaNet is a scholarly community initiated in spring 2006 in conjunction with the UN Internet Governance Forum. Its four principal objectives are to: (1) support the establishment of a global network of scholars specializing in Internet governance issues; (2) promote the development of Internet governance as a recognized, interdisciplinary field of study, (3) advance theoretical and applied research on Internet governance, broadly defined: and; (4) facilitate informed dialogue on policy issues and related matters between scholars and Internet governance stakeholders (governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society).

    Building on the success of its first four regional workshops in Paris, France (2008), Brussels, Belgium (2009), Seoul, So. Korea (2009) and Montreal, Canada (2010), the purpose of the Washington, DC regional GigaNet workshop is twofold:

    May 5. The first day is dedicated to outreach sessions exploring issues in global Internet governance among policy makers, academics and civil society at large. The goal of the sessions on this day is to facilitate informed dialogue on policy issues and related matters between scholars and Internet governance stakeholders (governments, international organizations, the private sector, civil society, and funders). Issues being considered include but are not limited to governance of critical Internet resources, surveillance and privacy, Wikileaks, copyright protection laws such as the "Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act" (COICA), network transparency and net neutrality. Presenters in these sessions will be invited by the program committee. To propose speakers or ideas, contact any member of the Program Committee listed below.

    May 6. The second day features presentations of scholarly research based on a rigorous peer reviewed selection process. The goal of the second day is to support scholarship and advance theoretical and applied research on Internet governance. Scholars are invited to submit 2-page abstracts describing recently completed research or work in progress on any aspect of Internet Governance. In order to provide a survey of current academic activities in the field, share ideas and forge possible collaborations, presentations will focus on problematics, research designs, preliminary empirical results and conclusions in the aim of stimulating reflection and discussion amongst the audience. Any theme or topic relevant to global Internet governance is welcome.

    Deadline for abstract submissions is February 14, 2011. Submissions can be made through the Easy Chair web site.

    Decisions will be made by March 15, 2011.

    Manuscripts expected by April 18, 2011.

    Program Committee members include:

    • Derrick Cogburn, American University and Syracuse University, Chair
    • Milton Mueller, Syracuse University, Vice-chair
    • Leo van Audenhove, Free University of Brussels
    • Laura DeNardis, Yale University
    • Nanette Levinson, American University
    • J.P. Singh, Georgetown University

  • Dec 2010
  • China, TLD censorship top topics in 2010

    Judging from IGP blog's readership, which grew by about 25% compared to last year, the most interesting and important topics we covered were China's impact on Internet governance and the nexus between internet censorship and new Top-Level Domains. Wikileaks was third, with ICANN accountability rounding out the top of the pack. Individual posts on COICA, the Bredolab botnet prosecution, vertical integration and the move away from multistakeholderism at IGF also found their way into IGP's most popular blog posts (see below for a list of the top 15).

    Our 8 December post framing the Wikileaks controversy as an Internet governance issue was the single most-read blog post in 2010 by far. Apparently, our emphasis on the continuing tension between nation-states and networked information via the Internet struck a chord.

    But the "cyberwar" over Wikileaks only happened in the last month of the year. China and the Internet, on the other hand, was an unfolding series of events we covered throughout the year, and generated more traffic. Readers flocked to our discussion of China's attempt to implement "real name registration" requirements for online bulletins, especially after Blizzard Entertainment, producer of World of Warcraft, tried to follow their precedent (and backed off). But the Google-China and US-China conflicts also contributed great interest to this topic.

    The TLD/censorship story was also an ongoing story only marginally less popular than China. It dealt with the the fate of the .xxx domain - still controversial and still targeted by some governments - as well as the attempt of the GAC to impose more general "morality and public order" restraints on new TLD applicants. We think we've made substantial progress in convincing more people that institutionalizing censorship via ICANN is an important - and potentially dangerous - precedent for global governance of the Internet.

    Our blog post on the historic Independent Review Panel decision overturning the ICANN Board's rejection of the .xxx domain was the third most popular blog post. Our more detailed report on ICANN's accountability deficit, "ICANN, Inc.," though released in October 2009, was the most popular publication download in 2010. Attesting to the staying power of our publication reports, our 2007 paper "Net Neutrality as Global Principle for Internet Governance" not only is still being downloaded -- it attracted more downloads in 2010 than it did in 2009.

    Interestingly, papers and blog posts on IP addressing and the RIRs, while attracting a strong following, are markedly less popular than the other topics, probably due to their technical nature. Popular or no, IGP will continue to track those issues carefully due to their critical importance to the future of the Internet.

    Thanks and a happy new year to all our readers and supporters.

    #1. Why Wikileaks polarizes America's Internet politics Milton Mueller dissects the (over)reaction to Wikileaks by the US foreign policy establishment and argues that it shows that the world's most powerful nation-state is learning that Internet freedom can bite it as well as rival states.

    #2. China: Real-name registration required in online bulletins Sophie Wu explains how China tries to make the Net more managable by linking online posting to state-issued forms of identification.

    #3. Accountability wins! Independent Review Panel upholds ICM Registry - .XXX is alive. A summary of the IRP decision that ICANN's Board broke its own process and made a discriminatory decision when it voted down the .xxx domain in March 2005.

    #4. Google's Leaving China-What do Chinese People Think? Sophie Wu provides a Chinese perspective on the public relations battle in China over Google's threat to leave China.

    #5. ICANN and GAC discuss censorship Writing from the Brussels ICANN meeting, Milton Mueller reported on how the U.S. government led an attempt by ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee to revise ICANN's "morality and public order" objections process.

    #6. US-China Conflict: The Problem of Inadequate Institutions Hans Klein argues that the Google/US-China conflict reveals that we have not settled core issues of global Internet governance, which leads to instability.

    #7. A new era in domain name economics? Milton Mueller summarized the positions and support levels of the contentious working group that tried to revised policy on vertical integration between domain name registries and registrars.

    #8. Kleinwachter: Don't move backwards on Internet governance A re-posting of Wolfgang Kleinwachter's warning that the internal wranglings within the UN over how to manage the IGF represent an attempt to move away from multi-stakeholderism.

    #9. COICA amended, still threatens Internet security Brenden Kuerbis tracks the US attempt to block domain names in the name of copyright protection.

    #10. US and Canadian Governments support Chinese-style censorship of DNS in ICANN A blog prompted by the Canadian GAC Chair's August letter warning ICANN's Board that it should create procedures to censor any "controversial top level domains".

    #11. There’s more to the Google-Italy case than meets the eye Part of the broader debate about intermediary responsibility, this post tried to fathom what was going on behind the scenes in Italy's conviction of a Google executive.

    #12. Dutch Police Inflates Bredolab Botnet Success by Factor of Ten, and Then Some Michel van Eeten dissects the relationship between national law enforcement and botnets, noting that while one botnet manager was successfully prosecuted, the botnetting continues.

    #13. ICANN does the right thing on .xxx - but will the GAC? Covers the Board resolution accepting the findings of the Independent Review Panel but noting that it leaves the ball on GAC's court.

    #14. .EU registry asks: Who owns the Internet? A link to a .EU registry-produced video made at the Brussels ICANN meeting. Popularity must be explained by the star quality of MM head shots.

    #15. Could Google-China smackdown lead to WTO complaint? Brenden Kuerbis on how the WTO may become one of the arenas where Internet governance concerns over access to information are played out.

  • Jul 2010
  • IGF USA meets July 21

    The U.S. Internet Governance Forum is convening in Washington DC July 21 (Wednesday) to discuss the challenges of Internet governance. It will cover key areas such as privacy, openness, security, critical internet resources and child online safety. Launched in 2009, the IGF USA’s purpose is to engage US-based civil society, government, technologists, research scientists, industry and academia, to cultivate partnerships, build coalitions and facilitate dialogues that demonstrate best practices and facilitate participation of all stakeholders at a national and global level.

    The one-day event will focus on the changing Internet and the way forward for the international Internet Governance Forum, an initiative facilitated by the United Nations. Key speakers will include Markus Kummer of the UN Secretariat for IGF, Larry Strickling, administrator of the National Telecommunications and Information Agency, Andrew McLaughlin, White House Deputy Chief Technology Officer for Internet Policy, Ambassador Phil Verveer, U.S. State Department and key leaders from the technical, business and civil society sectors. Workshops and special sessions cover topics such as cyber security, critical internet resources, cloud computing, global governance of the Internet; the role of users in defining a future for Internet governance, e-crime and malicious conduct in the domain name system, and a best practice forum on child safety challenges in the always-on world that youth and children experience today. For more information, see: http://www.igf-usa.us

  • Hot news: UN discovers broadband

    Yawn.

    Just as WSIS represented a discovery by the UN that we were in an information society about 30 years after it happened and 10 years after its basic institutional parameters had been set, now the UN has discovered that broadband is important, a decade after everyone else. So it assembles a blue-ribbon commission with no capital and no authority, based on the assumption that collecting the pictures of as many status-quo luminaries from industry and government as possible onto a web site will actually accomplish something. Your tax dollars at work...

  • Jun 2010
  • .EU registry asks: Who owns the Internet?

  • Call for Papers: 5th Annual Symposium of Global Internet Gov ...

    The Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) is seeking submissions of research about Internet Governance to be presented at the Fifth GigaNet Annual Symposium, on 13 September 2010, held one day before the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF), in Vilnius, Lithuania. GigaNet is a scholarly community that promotes the development of Internet Governance as a recognized, interdisciplinary field of study and facilitates informed dialogue on policy issues and related matters between scholars and governments, international organizations, the private sector and civil society. Since 2006, GigaNet has organized an Annual Symposium to showcase the research about Internet Governance, focusing on an interdisciplinary approach.

    GigaNet is interested in receiving abstracts related to Internet Governance themes, especially those containing innovative approaches and/or emerging research areas related to the following topics:

    1. Assessing the results, effectiveness and renewal process of the Internet Governance Forum;
    2. The ICANN Affirmation of Commitment and its implications for the accountability of ICANN;
    3. Policies for governing critical internet resources, such as IDNs, gTLDs, IPv4 and IPv6 addresses;
    4. Intermediary responsibility in the Internet environment;
    5. How copyright and trademark protection relate to Internet Governance, including new treaties such as ACTA;
    6. Cyber-security and cyber-crime;
    7. Implications of Internet Governance mechanisms and processes for development and developing countries;
    8. Balance between openness, privacy and security from the Internet Governance perspective;
    9. Innovative methods for Internet governance research;
    10. Globally-applicable principles on public policy issues for Internet Governance in the context of the Tunis Agenda and Geneva Declaration of Principles;
    11. Multistakeholderism in Internet Governance: stakeholders, strategies of participation and collaboration including national and regional level

    Please review the entire Call for Papers for more information on requirements and evaluation process.

    Interested scholars should submit abstracts of research papers no later than July 15th, 2010, through the EasyChair platform. Attending the GigaNet Annual Symposium is free of charge, although a registration process will be required close to the event. Please visit the GigaNet website or subscribe [RSS] [email] [twitter] for continued updates.

  • Mar 2010
  • Advertising and the future of the Internet

    Two presentations at the recent IETF meeting in California underscore the way the Internet’s architecture is being shaped increasingly by advertising-driven content distribution networks. 

    A research report by Craig Labovitz of Arbor Networks finds that this has major effects on the basic structure of Internet traffic flows: “the majority of inter-domain traffic by volume now flows directly between large content providers, data center/CDNs and consumer networks.” Those conclusions are echoed by Bill St. Arnaud’s recent paper on what he calls “application content infrastructures” (ACIs). 

    In the same same Thursday session, Balachander Krishnamurthy of AT&T Labs examined how information related to individual users is aggregated by these increasingly concentrated networks as they browse seemingly unrelated Web sites. Thousands of Web sites across numerous categories, countries, and languages are connected through advertising intermediaries which collect and aggregate information about online behavior via the use of cookies.

    These two phenomena are related, of course. Internet-based services exhibit a growing reliance on advertising as a revenue source, and as this happens a growing proportion of total expenditure on advertising is drawn to the online world. The growing reliance on ad revenue places a premium on the possession of detailed information about Web users and what they do online. Of course, the majority of users are uncomfortable with, if not downright hostile to, the online surveillance required to aggregate and deliver behaviorally targeted ads. (See the survey by Turow et al, in 2009) These observations point to an intensifying tension between economic pressures and user privacy.

    Slides from these presentations were available on the web a while ago but seem not to be now. Labovitz made a similar presentation to NANOG 47 a few months ago which is available online.

  • A busy two weeks for Internet governance

    There is so much going on this week and next week in Internet governance and IGP is so involved that we barely have time to blog about it. Here is a quick summary and some links to more information. First, in Internet addressing policy there is an intense buzz of controversy around a March 15-16 workshop of the International Telecommunication Union on two proposals to change the way we allocate IPv6 addresses. The Regional Internet Registries' are riled up about this, seeing it, correctly, as a challenge to their exclusive control of address policy, but there are also signs of an improving dialogue between ITU and RIRs. You can see this reflected in an interesting transcript of the APNIC meeting last week and in the ARIN public policy list.

    Second, the quarterly ICANN meeting is taking place in Nairobi. One of the key decisions that will take place at that meeting involves how ICANN will respond to the Independent Review Panel ruling that its treatment of the .xxx top level domain application was unfair and discriminatory. The obvious response to this ruling would be to turn the clock back to August 9, 2005, and sign the contract awarding ICM Registry its TLD, as ICM has requested. But there is still strong opposition to an .xxx domain, so ICANN is presented with a tough choice: either adhere to its policies and principles, create .xxx, and make some stakeholders unhappy, or ignore its independent review panel and reveal to all the world that its accountability mechanisms are toothless and can be ignored. A real test of ICANN's mettle. Also on the agenda for Nairobi: creating a working group on vertical integration of registries and registrars, and a decision whether the Board will agree to create an "expression of interest" for new TLDs.

    Earlier this week, the Council of Europe's Ad hoc Advisory Group on Cross-Border Internet held its first meeting in Paris March 1 and 2. This working group is taking up some interesting issues regarding the "mutual responsibilities of states in ensuring that critical Internet resources are managed in the public interest," and "proposals relating to the prevention and management of ...malicious acts [e.g., DDoS attacks], falling within member states’ jurisdictions or territories, which could block or significantly impede Internet access to or within fellow members of the international community."  

    Finally, on the Google front, Google has ratified Brenden Kuerbis's prediction that its conflict with China will become a trade dispute -- see our Twitter links. And an Italian blogger has provided a more detailed explanation of how Google's conviction in Italy could have been based on the fact that the E-Commerce directive's safe harbour does not apply to privacy and data protection issues. We will have more to say about this.  


  • CFP: Third International Workshop on Global Internet Governa ...

    The Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) invites you to participate in its third scholarly workshop to be held in Montreal (QC), Canada, on 30-31 May 2010. This workshop is organized in cooperation with the Canadian Communication Association and Media@McGill, during the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences (CFHSS) 2010 Congress week in Montreal.

    Building on the success of its first two editions, respectively in Paris, France in June 2008 and in Brussels, Belgium in May 2009, the purpose of this third GigaNet workshop is twofold:

    The first day will be dedicated to outreach sessions aimed at increasing the interest in the global Internet Governance field among both various academic disciplines and the civil society at large, including but not limited to NGOs and civil society groups active in related fields.

    The second day invites scholars to present and discuss their work-in-progress in Internet Governance-related research, with the aim to identify emerging research themes and design a research agenda. The workshop aims at providing a survey of current academic activities in the field, in order to share ideas and forge possible collaborations. Submissions are expected to focus on presenting problematics, research designs, preliminary empirical results and conclusions in the aim of stimulating reflection and discussion amongst the audience. Submissions may address, but are not limited to, the following topics: involved actors and their interactions; Internet governance institutions and regimes; legal, socio-economical, behavioral and technical regulation means; Internet governance policy issues.

    Submissions in view of thematic presentations should be sent by 20 March 2010 to Meryem Marzouki (Meryem.Marzouki [at] lip6.fr). They should be written in English and include the name, affiliation, e-mail address and short bio of author(s), along with no more than 500 words of research work description. The program committee will notify applicants by 20 April 2010. To encourage knowledge dissemination, relevant submissions will be published on the workshop website. Authors of selected submissions will be invited to present their work in the workshop thematic sessions.

    View the entire call for papers here.

  • Feb 2010
  • CFP: 38th Research Conference on Communication, Information, ...

    TPRC is now soliciting abstracts of papers, panel proposals, and student papers for presentation at the 2010 conference. Proposals should be based on current theoretical or empirical research relevant to communication and information policy, and may be from any disciplinary perspective. TPRC seeks submissions of disciplinary, comparative, multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary excellence. Subject areas of particular interest include, but are not limited to the following:

    • Network Competition, Policy and Management
    • Broadband Deployment, Adoption and Measurement
    • Spectrum Policy
    • Societal Issues: Universality and Affordable Access
    • The Transformation and Future of Media
    • The Transformation and Future of Intellectual Property and
    • Digital Rights
    • Privacy, Security, Identity and Trust
    • Internet Governance and Institutional Strategies for Information Policy
    • Advanced Mobile Services:  Broadband, Video and New Applications
    • The Internet Ecosystem
    Other Emerging Topics are highly encouraged, view the entire CFP. Submissions are due by March 31, 2010. Abstracts and panel proposals must be submitted electronically at http://www.tprc.org.

  • Jan 2010
  • CFP: 21st European Regional ITS Conference

    The International Telecommunications Society has published a call for paper and panel sessions for it's Regional European ITS Conference, to be held in Copenhagen from September 13-15, 2010.

    The local organizer is Center for Communication, Media and Information Technologies (CMI), which is a research and teaching unit at Aalborg University in Copenhagen.

    Topics at the conference will be – but not limited to:

    • NGN and NGA – economics and regulation
    • Investment and innovation
    • New players and platforms in telecommunications
    • User roles and social networking
    • Regulatory separation
    • Universal access/service
    • Internet governance
    • Media convergence
    • Media economics and regulation
    • PPP in telecoms
    • Regulatory institutions
    The deadline for abstracts and panel session suggestions is April 1, 2010. View the complete call for papers.

  • The Top 10 of 2009

    Many thanks to our readers, both old and new, from civil society, industry and governments all over the world. Interest in IGP's work continues to grow dramatically, visits were up over 70% in 2009. Reflecting the growth of the Internet and those impacted by its governance, two-thirds of IGP's visitors come from outside the United States (although Washington DC is definitely following us). The greatest growth is among the BRICs, with visits from China up over 8000%. Here's to another year of in-depth coverage and analysis of global Internet governance developments!

    Top 10 IGP Blog Posts

    1. Revenge of the .xxx domain? (23 January)
    2. Top Internet Governance Issues to Watch in 2009 (9 January)
    3. A more detailed look at the proposed Cybersecurity Act of 2009 (3 April)
    4. Taking a Hard Look at the "Affirmation" (30 September)
    5. ICANN gets "securitized" (2 April)
    6. Under pressure from trademark interests, ICANN undoes the GNSO reforms (13 July)
    7. The IGF and the Internet Society-ITU rivalry (20 November)
    8. Will Rod Beckstrom replace Twomey? (10 June)
    9. Consumer Fraud (22 September)
    10. WIPO the cybersquatter (5 March)

    Top 10 IGP Paper Downloads

    1. Comments of the Internet Governance Project on the ICANN transition
    2. Net Neutrality as Global Principle for Internet Governance
    3. Internet Governance: the State of Play
    4. Regional Address Registries, Governance and Internet Freedom
    5. Comments of the Internet Governance Project on Enhancing the Security and Stability of the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System
    6. Scarcity in IP addresses: IPv4 Address Transfer Markets and the Regional Internet Address Registries
    7. Appraising the Success of the Internet Governance Forum
    8. ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and participation in the governance of critical Internet resources
    9. Political Oversight of ICANN: A Briefing for the WSIS Summit
    10. Securing The Root: A Proposal For Distributing Signing Authority

    Top Countries by Visitors

    1. United States
    2. United Kingdom
    3. Canada
    4. France
    5. Netherlands
    6. India
    7. Australia
    8. Germany
    9. Switzerland
    10. Belgium
    11. China
    12. Egypt
    13. Spain
    14. Brazil
    15. Romania
    16. Japan
    17. Russia
    18. Turkey
    19. Italy
    20. South Korea

  • Dec 2009
  • IGP provides leadership, expertise and analysis at 2009 IGF

    IGP Scientific Committee members were prominent in all phases of this year’s Internet Governance Forum meeting in Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt.  The IGP brought expertise in political science, economics, sociology and other disciples to bear on discussions ranging from cyber security and critical Internet resources to institutional governance.

    Giganet continues to grow

    Traditionally held the day before the IGF, the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) annual symposium brought together more than 90 people, including remote participation facilitated by IGP’s Derrick Cogburn.

    Hans Klein chaired the opening session, entitled "What is Internet governance?" This topic sparked a spirited discussion between IGP’s Michel van Eeten and William Drake of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.  Van Eeten presented his paper, Where is the Governance in Internet Governance? and argued that researchers should be focused on places other than the IGF and ICANN (especially, Internet service providers) if they want to learn how actual governance of the Internet works. Drake suggested that the field would benefit from integrating approaches used in more established disciplines like political science, e.g., rational choice decision-making models.

    Derrick Cogburn, chair of Giganet’s Communication Committee and a Steering Committee member, presented a conceptual framework for evaluating the IGF as a “whole network.”  Hans Klein’s poster presentation, "Comparing Internet Governance and Telecoms Governance: The Internet Revolution and the Ancien Regime" provided an opportunity for interaction with attending practitioners, including some staff from the European Commission and the International Telecommunications Union.

    In the afternoon emerging issues panel, IGP’s Jeanette Hofmann presented her paper, Before the Sky Falls Down: A ‘Constitutional Dialogue’ Over the Depletion of Internet Addresses.  Her paper examined the debate over the emergence of market-based transfer mechanisms and the risks the technical community perceives in doing nothing, or making major changes. Hofmann’s paper attracted most of the audience questions in the final session.

    The Giganet community is already evaluating this year’s event in anticipation of next year.  IGP’s Milton Mueller, the current Chair of the GigaNet Steering Committee, believes that there is a need to continue to improve the overall academic quality of papers, expand the number of senior scholars involved, and adjust the format to encourage more audience engagement.

    IGF main sessions and workshops

    IGP’s experts participated widely in this year’s IGF.  In addition to participating in a consultation with the European Commission, Multistakeholder Advisory Group member Jeanette Hofmann co-chaired the Day 2 Main Session on critical Internet resources.  As reported previously, contention over the institutional structure of IPv6 address allocation was a hot topic and drew strong remarks from ITU supporters and ICANN CEO Rod Beckstrom.  In this writer’s opinion, what was most fun was watching some of the ICANN staff cringe as Beckstrom pushed forcefully in what are usually staid, diplomatic like main sessions. The audience seemed engaged in the forthright debate, but perhaps ICANN staff were worried Beckstrom was burning the hard-earned social capital ICANN developed over the past few years at IGF.  Additionally, while there were congratulatory statements about the Affirmation of Commitments all around, there were calls by governments and civil society for discussions to begin regarding the current IANA contract between the U.S. Commerce Department and ICANN, which will expire in 2010.

    The discussion around critical Internet resources continued in the workshops on Day 3, with Milton Mueller participating in a panel on the adoption by the regional Internet registries of transfer mechanisms for IP address blocks.  What became clear in a debate with ARIN’s John Curran was that route aggregation, not conservation, is the predominant constraint going forward. Because it is ISPs that actually determine how and when route aggregation occurs, some participants in the debate wondered what exactly the role of RIRs will be in a world of plentiful IPv6 address blocks with no needs-based assessment.

    Hans Klein chaired a panel examining "Governance Issues of Country Code Top Level Domains.”  Klein observed that an earlier workshop had been held on the same topic, and that there seemed to be two views of ccTLD issues, with often competing versions of historical delegation events.  Klein’s panel included two senior ITU officials and included a lively discussion between ICANN-affiliated attendees and the ITU panelists.   If anything this demonstrated, yet again, the need to bring diverse viewpoints into workshop formulations.

    Day 3 also saw Michel van Eeten as a panelist in the workshop, Cyber Security: Strategy for the Future, which was co-organized by IGP, TechAmerica and Nominet.  DNS and IP address registries, ISPs, software providers, legislative bodies and regulators were also represented, and shared their perspectives on efforts to address problems.  While most called, as expected, for continued and improved collaboration efforts, van Eeten (who has done extensive research for OECD on the economics of malware) suggested that none of the current efforts scale to level of current problems faced.  Van Eeten also startled the group by suggesting that the efforts of formal law enforcement agencies in cyberspace were of limited relevance. Instead of myopically focusing on making the Internet secure, he said there should be more efforts to find optimal levels of insecurity, with solutions taking into the account the cost incentives of each actor.

    Another session examined "Implementing the WSIS Principles: A Development Agenda for Internet Governance." Hans Klein stood in for Prof. Hong Xue, and elaborated on some of Hong’s ideas during the discussion period. And Derrick Cogburn shared work examining how remote collaboration can broaden participation from developing countries.  Hofmann also presented at a UNESCO workshop on “Promoting freedom of Information in Internet Governance,” where she used Google Books as an example to suggest that new metaphors are necessary in the public debate on the regulation of access to knowledge.

    On Day 4, Hofmann and Kuerbis convened a break out group as part of a discussion on the "Code of Good Practice on Information, Participation, and Transparency in Internet Governance" – an effort put together by the Council of Europe, UNECE, and the Association for Progressive Communications.  The document is envisioned as “best practice” guidelines for institutions engaged in Internet governance.  Kuerbis noted that while participation guidelines are beneficial, the omission of accountability from the document was problematic.  At a minimum, the code could ask institutions to identify types of accountability they practice and how it’s implemented, following a typology outlined in the new IGP paper, “ICANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participation in the Governance of Critical Internet Resources,” released during the IGF.

  • Nov 2009
  • Upcoming Event: Global Internet Governance Academic Network ...

    The 4th Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) Annual Symposium will be held in Sharm-El-Sheikh, Egypt, on November 14th, 2009 - one day before the IGF official opening at Maritim Sharm El Sheikh International Congress Centre (SHICC).  The program includes presentations by IGP members Michel van Eeten, Jeanette Hofmann, Derrick Cogburn, and Hans Klein, as well as other recognized experts in the field.  The symposium is free to attend (in-person or remotely) but you must register.  Find out more about participating remotely.

    Established in 2006, the GigaNet is a scholarly community
    which aims: (i) to promote the development of Internet Governance as a recognized interdisciplinary field of study and (ii) to facilitate the informed dialogue on policy and issues in a multistakeholder approach. It has organized a collective premier research event, the GigaNet Annual Symposium at the Internet Governance Forum meetings, which is an opportunity to showcase some of the best current research on Internet Governance from around the world and provides a venue for scholars to discuss and debate these crucial issues.
    Prior successful symposia  have been held in Greece (2006), Brazil (2007) and India (2008).

  • Sep 2009
  • Internet Governance Forum-USA to raise awareness of debate o ...

    The first IGF-USA will take place this Friday, Oct 2 from 8:45-5:30 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, located at 1800 K Street, NW, in Washington, DC.  The forum will engage civil society, government, industry, technology/research and academia in workshops and plenary sessions covering a variety of Internet issues including: The Future of the Internet, GenNext's Online Future; Cyber Security; Freedom of Information in a Web 2.0 World; Critical Internet Resources; Privacy and Security Implications for Web 2.0; and Access Perspectives, Challenges and Opportunities. 


    Speakers in the morning plenary session will include Markus Kummer of the UN Secretariat for the global IGF, Larry Strickling of NTIA and Lee Rainie of the Pew Internet & American Life Project, with participants such as Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy Information Center; Phil Bond, TechAmerica; Lee McKnight, Internet Governance Project and others. The closing plenary will include Ambassador Phil Verveer and Richard Beaird, U.S. State Department, as well as other participants from business and civil society including IGP's Milton Mueller. This plenary will address the upcoming deliberations regarding the future of the global Internet Governance Forum - a process now in its fourth year that was originally chartered for an initial five-year period and whose future is being debated.

    Registration for the event is free and can be done on the IGF-USA website.  Remote participation is also available.

  • Upcoming Event: KJPS-SNU & GigaNet Regional Conference on I ...

    The Korean Journal of Policy Studies (KJPS) at Seoul National University (SNU) and the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) invite you to a Regional Conference on global Internet governance. The one-day event sponsored by Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) will be held in Seoul, Korea at Seoul National University on October 23, 2009 – the Friday before the Seoul ICANN meeting (25 October - 30 October) from 2:00 to 6:00 pm. View the program.

    The KJPS is published biannually by the Advanced Center for Administrative Development (ACAD), Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, to provide an international forum for academics and practitioners who are interested in public administration and policy. The KJPS publishes articles that examine a broad range of issues in public administration and public policy, drawing on a wide range of disciplinary perspectives and on both theoretical and empirical research. Although there is no limitation on subject areas, papers focusing on the East Asian countries and/or adopt a comparative perspective are particularly welcome.

    The Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GIGANET) is a scholarly community that promotes the development of Internet Governance as a recognized, interdisciplinary field of study and facilitates informed dialogue on policy issues and related matters between scholars and governments, international organizations, the private sector and civil society.

  • Jul 2009
  • Job Posting: Global ICT Policy Advocacy and Networking Coord ...

    The Association for Progressive Communications (APC) is seeking to fill a senior position for a “Global Policy Advocacy and Networking Coordinator” to manage and facilitate APC's participation in global public information and communication policy processes.

    APC is a global network of civil society organisations whose mission is to empower and support organisations, social movements and individuals in and through the use of information and communication technologies to build strategic communities and initiatives for the purpose of making meaningful contributions to equitable human development, social justice, participatory political processes and environmental sustainability. www.apc.org

    The Global Policy Advocacy and Networking Coordinator will join APC's Communications and Information Policy Programme (CIPP). For more information about the CIPP programme, please visit: http://www.apc.org/en/about/programmes/communications-and-information-policy-programme-ci

    View the full job description

    Application deadline: 31 July 2009

  • Jun 2009
  • Call for Papers: 4th Annual Symposium of Global Internet Gov ...

    The Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNET) is a scholarly community that promotes the development of Internet Governance as a recognized, interdisciplinary field of study and facilitates informed dialogue on policy issues and related matters between scholars and governments, international organizations, the private sector and civil society. On behalf of the Program Committee, we are pleased to announce the Call for Papers to the IV Annual Giganet Sympoium which will take place on November 14, 2009 - one day before the fourth UN Internet Governance Forum, in Sharm-El Sheik, Egypt. This year's symposium will cover such topics as:

    • What is Internet Governance?
    • Internet Governance, International Law and Multistakeholderism
    • Cyber-security and the Internet
    • New Approaches to Internet Governance and Social and Economic Development
    In addition, Dr. Ronald J. Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski will give the keynote presentation, “Beyond Denial: Introducing the Next Generation of Internet Controls.” Deibert is Professor and Director of The Citizen Lab, Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada and Rohozinski is CEO at Psiphon Inc., Principal and CEO at The SecDev Group, located in Ottawa, Canada. Attendance at the GigaNet Annual Symposium is free of charge, but requires advance registration. This year, facilities for remote participation will be provided so that those unable to physically attend can present or observe. Read the entire CFP here. [pdf] The deadline for submissions has been extended: Interested scholars should submit abstracts of research papers by July 15, 2009.

  • May 2009
  • Upcoming Event: ICANN Noncommerical Users Constituency (NCUC ...

    Please join the monthly ICANN Noncommercial Users Constituency (NCUC) meeting:

    Date: Monday 1 June 2009

    Time:
    07:00-09:00 California
    10:00-12:00 New York
    14:00-16:00 UTC
    15:00-17:00 London
    16:00-18:00 Geneva
    21:00-23:00 Phnom-Penh
    22:00-24:00 Singapore

    Via: Attendee(s) may join the meeting online using Elluminate online meeting software. Please click on this link to access the meeting. This is an open meeting. Attendees will need to provide their name, but won't need a password to login. (If this is your first time using Elluminate, view support information here.)

    Agenda:

    Draft Discussion Agenda for June NCUC Monthly Meeting

    I. Substantive Policy Discussions
    1. GNSO Restructuring Discussion
    2. Introduction of New gTLD Policy Concerns (IRT "team", MAPO)
    3. Registrant Rights Charter Discussion
    4. Update on other GNSO teams (whois, post-expiry domain names recovery, travel policy, RAA)

    II. NCUC Administrative / Constituency Business
    1. NCUC Representation on GNSO Committees / Working Groups
    2. Recruiting New NCUC Members & Participants
    3. Planning for 21-26 June Sydney ICANN Meeting
    4. Next NCUC Monthly Meeting: 23 JUNE 2009 (Tuesday "Constituency Day" at ICANN Meeting)
    5. Any Other Business

  • Apr 2009
  • Mueller wins 2009 ITERA Outstanding Researcher Award

    Mad props to IGP's Milton Mueller, who has been selected to receive the 2009 International Telecommunications Education and Research Association (ITERA) Outstanding Research Award. ITERA presents the award to individuals who have demonstrated excellence in academic research related to the telecommunications disciplines through publication, peer-review, and international recognition over time. And also a tip o' the hat to Milton's colleague, Martha Garcia-Murillo, director of the M.S. in Telecommunications and Network Management program at Syracuse's iSchool, who cited the founding of the Internet Governance Project, where "researchers can follow the discussion and decisions that are made at the international level on Internet governance," among the many reasons Milton deserved this special award. Way to go!

  • Feb 2009
  • Memo to John Markoff: There are no "do overs" in history

    Think for a moment of the enduring legacy of African slavery in America. Think of the way it tainted this country's culture and politics; think of the bloody Civil War, the ghettos and race riots after emancipation, the distorted interpersonal relations, the segregated housing patterns. What if we could roll back the clock and ensure that our society was "designed" so that slavery was never permitted and never happened?

    Would you give me 20 million dollars to conduct research on that possibility? Would you think I was an honest man if I implied that my research would "fix" racism?

    Probably not.

    But what if I told you that my computer science lab was working on a "new Internet" that would solve all the terrible security and privacy problems of the existing one? Would you find this claim more credible than a proposed retroactive solution to the problem of slavery?

    We all know that the Internet has problems. But the recent discourse around a new Internet, which reached its peak with a New York Times article by John Markoff a few weeks ago, seems to be based on similar false premises. I don't think it is unfair or too much of a stretch to suggest that the "we need a new Internet" folks are holding out the promise of a historical re-do.

    The TCP/IP protocols were (as the Economist wrote about a decade ago) an "accidental information superhighway." Society converged on the Internet as the basis for data communications because the information economy was at a critical juncture in its history. Personal computers were just beginning to spread. There were numerous competing technologies. Most of the serious contenders were proprietary standards. The 800 pound gorilla in this fight was IBM, and no one (save IBM itself) wanted it to dominate data communications with its proprietary protocols. Open source software communities or alternatives did not exist (or to put it more accurately, the Internet technical community was the first globally organized open source software development community). There was a pressing and immediate need for an open data communications standard. The OSI standards failed to meet that demand. So TCP/IP filled the gap. It became the victor in a global standards competition. We all converged on the protocols and benefited from the network effects.

    It was a set of historical conditions that cannot ever be reproduced, that cannot ever be "done over."

    Any "new" standards for data networking will not occupy a virgin field, as TCP/IP did. It will have to intervene into a global economy deeply locked into the old TCP/IP Internet; it must overcome massive inertia and convince people to assume additional cost burdens associated with migration to a new standard. Technological improvements in the Internet protocols are possible, of course, but they can only be implemented on a piecemeal basis, as they piggyback on existing protocols and networks. Any realistic estimate of the time scales for such a migration process should be placed in the range of 30 - 50 years. If you don't believe me, look at the progress of the existing "next generation" Internet protocol, IPv6, which is on its second decade. This is a standard that comes from the same community and is an evolution of the existing internet protocols - not a radically new one.

    One of the related fallacies of the "new Internet" argument is its assumption that the problems of Internet security are exclusively technological in origin and can only be fixed by changes in standards and protocols. But the stark fact is that there are known technological solutions to most if not all existing security breaches. The problem is that they are not implemented by people who don't know about them, or they are implemented incorrectly, or they are too costly, or they are incompatible with other applications or solutions. The same problems would face any new Internet protocols. And we haven't even mentioned the possibility that a new standard would be confronted with unanticipated security flaws.

    So here's the punchline: people who say that we can fix the problems of the Internet by developing a "new" Internet are saying, in effect, that we can undo history and start over again. Well, heck, if we can do that, why concentrate on little problems like Internet security? Let's take on the big ones. Let's develop a "new Europe" and avoid the slaughter of World War 2; let's develop a new America and erase slavery.

    Like it or not, there is no replacement of the old Internet with a new one. Promising it may be a great strategy for generating piles of government funding. But it ain't honest.

  • 2nd International Workshop on Global Internet Governance: An ...

    Preliminary Announcement and Call for Contributions

    The Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) invites you to participate in a scholarly workshop to be held in Brussels, Belgium, on 11 May 2009. This full day workshop is organized in cooperation with three thematic sections of the European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA): International and Intercultural Communication (IIC), Communication and Democracy (CD), Communication, Law and Policy (CLP) sections.

    Building on the success of its first edition in Paris, France, in June 2008, the purpose of this workshop is the presentation and discussion of work-in-progress in Internet Governance-related research with the aim to identify emerging research themes and design a research agenda. We are interested in exchanging information and ideas about national and regional projects and networks currently pursuing research on global Internet governance, but also in identifying academic syllabi or other education programs dedicated to these issues, in order to share ideas and forge possible collaborations. Scholars from various academic disciplines and all regions of the world are welcome to contribute to this reflexive exercise, with the long-term objective of collectively building this interdisciplinary research field.

    Rather than featuring academic paper presentations, the workshop aims at providing a survey of current academic activities in the field of global Internet governance. Submissions may address, but are not limited to, the following topics: involved actors and their interactions; Internet governance institutions and regimes; legal, socio-economical, behavioral and technical regulation means; Internet governance policy issues.

    Submissions should be sent by 20 March 2009 to Meryem Marzouki (Meryem.Marzouki [at] lip6.fr). They should include the name, affiliation, e-mail address and short bio of author(s), along with no more than 500 words of research work description. The program committee will notify applicants by 15 April 2009. To encourage knowledge dissemination, all relevant submissions will be published on the workshop website. Authors of selected submissions will participate at the workshop panel discussions.

    Program Committee
    Bart Cammaerts (ECREA-CD), London School of Economics, UK; Raquel Gatto (GigaNet), Pontifícia U. Católica de São Paulo, Brazil; Nanette S. Levinson (GigaNet), American U., USA; Meryem Marzouki (GigaNet), CNRS & U. Pierre et Marie Curie, France; Luciano Morganti (GigaNet & ECREA-IIC), Vrije U. Brussel, Belgium; Katharine Sarikakis (ECREA-CLP), U. of Leeds, UK; JP Singh (GigaNet), Georgetown U., USA; Leo Van Audenhove (GigaNet & ECREA-IIC) , Vrije U. Brussel, Belgium.

    There is no registration fee for this event. A registration form will be circulated with the program. Practical information on accommodation and low cost travel to Brussels are available on the workshop website.

  • Jan 2009
  • Top Internet Governance Issues to Watch in 2009

    Here it is: IGP's contribution to the beginning of the year forecasting. Note well: these are not predictions of outcomes but designations of critical areas of change and decision in Internet governance, where the outcome is still unknown. We are sure we've overlooked some critical arenas -- use our comments to tell us what they are!

    1. ICANN and its relationship to the USG
    A shift from Republican Party conservative nationalism to Democratic Party liberal internationalism, along with the expiration of the Joint Project Agreement between ICANN and the U.S. Commerce Department on September 30, makes 2009 a watershed year for ICANN’s tether to the U.S. government. Moves toward internationalization by the Obama administration could break policy logjams that date back to 2003 (if not earlier); on the other hand, reassertion of the status quo would put an end to the original Clinton Administration plans for a “transition” once and for all. As Harold Feld put it in a notable blog post, the USG has to “quit playing games” and fish or cut bait on the “transition” to nongovernmental adminstration of DNS. A lot of subtle repercussions will be felt either way; for example, international acceptance of a method for signing the root so that secure DNS can be widely implemented could depend on how the ICANN-USG relationship is reformed. It is also likely that there will be agency turf battles over ICANN policy within the US government.

    2. Deep Packet Inspection in the service of Internet control
    Concerns about copyright protection, terrorism, illegal content, efficient bandwidth management, intrusion detection, botnets and viruses are all converging to tempt various parties to experiment with Deep Packet Inspection (DPI). DPI is the technology that automatically opens all your packets in real time and looks inside them before it decides whether to forward them or not. Will 2009 be the year that DPI starts to settle into place as an integrated infrastructure of Internet control – the ultimate man-in-the-middle solution to Internet governance problems? Or, conversely, will it be the year that we learn it doesn’t really work as well as we think it does; that it can’t handle the capacity of higher speed networks; that principled ISPs and digital rights groups take DPI off the agenda by highlighting its hostile relationship to privacy and network neutrality? The Comcast incident and the Belgian court case were only the opening shots in this battle. DPI vendors take note: this is the year we will find out which of these scenarios is true (or, if we land somewhere in the middle, we should get a good glimpse of which end of the spectrum we end up on).

    3. The new Internet Protocol: Can the Net reproduce itself?
    Forget all that talk about a "clean slate Internet;" we're having enough trouble implementing a new IP standard that developed a decade ago. 2009 will mark a turning point in the most important technical standards migration on the Internet since its opening to the public in 1991 – the transition from IP version 4 to IP version 6. IPv4 is the original Internet protocol but it is running out of address space. IP version 6 is a new standard with a much bigger address space, but it’s incompatible with the older standard and has no major advantages over IPv4 other than its more capacious address space. For many years incompatibility, the lack of a reliable gateway protocol making v4 and v6 compatible, and the additional expense, risk and trouble of shifting to a new standard have created a “you first” game in which ISPs wait for someone else to take the lead. If that pattern breaks this year we could see a stampede toward IPv6. But if the holding pattern doesn’t break, then the regional address registries will be forced to make major changes in their policies to head off IPv4 address shortages in 2010 and 2011: legalized address transfer markets, tougher reclamation policies, pressure on pre-RIR legacy holders, higher fees, reservation policies, and so on.

    4. ICANN’s abysmal new gTLD process
    On December 18, the U.S. government gave ICANN a Christmas present: a letter containing a thorough trashing of its plan to open the DNS root to lots of new top level domains. The U.S. letter joined a chorus of big business and trademark interests who have always been against any new TLDs, but it also made some valid criticisms about the proposal’s incredible attempt to set up ICANN as global arbiter of “morality and public order,” suggesting that that function might be better left to local laws. Will the U.S. move succeed in intimidating the ICANN Board? It already seems to have produced a 4 month delay. Bad as the policy is, derailing it opens up a huge can of worms. While no one will rush to passionately defend a policy that institutes global censorship of TLD strings, imposes outrageously high entry costs, and gives any organized group in the world a hecklers veto, the fact remains that this Rube Goldberg contraption emerged (more or less legitimately) from ICANN’s policy process. The policy took full account of the “Principles regarding new TLDs” given to ICANN by its Governmental Advisory Committee (which includes the US) and bent over backwards to accommodate the concerns of the trademark owners who are now complaining about it. And what about the long-delayed internationalized domain names? If ICANN can’t close the deal on this one, people would have to start asking whether ICANN can succeed in making public policy about anything related to DNS or internet identifiers; one would have to conclude that there is something fundamentally unworkable about ICANN.

    5. IGF renewal
    By the end of this year it should be clear whether the Internet Governance Forum was a short, not too unpleasant footnote in the history of Internet governance or a relatively permanent feature of it going forward. The World Summit on the Information Society’s Tunis Agenda gave the IGF a five-year initial life span; by the end of 2010, the UN Secretary-General must “examine the desirability of the continuation of the Forum, in formal consultation with Forum participants,” and “make recommendations to the UN Membership in this regard.” This means that consultations on the future of IGF will take place in the second half of 2009, and that the issue of continuation will probably form a major part of the discussions at the Cairo IGF in November 2009. By the end of this year if should be clear whether anyone out to kill the IGF or not. We suspect that the IGF will be renewed; the more important issue, of course, is whether the IGF evolves into a more influential and meaningful forum. We have published some analysis of that question.

    6. VoIP and the mobile Internet
    2009 will be the year that the inherent tension between the broadband mobile internet and traditional mobile voice revenues becomes fully evident and starts to have major effects. The maturation of open source mobile platforms, such as G1 Android or OpenMoko, coupled with the spread of WiFi compatible phones, high-speed mobile networks, the explosion of the netbooks market this year and the greater adoption of data communication capabilities by consumers in developed countries, all will force mobile carriers to make a fateful choice. Either adopt net neutrality principles and allow widespread adoption of VOIP clients (e.g., Fring), or depart from NN principles and try to preserve the remnants of their higher-margin circuit-switched voice traffic. That policy issue will play out more in national arenas than in global ones, which means that the results will be diverse, but an increasingly globalized advocacy of NN as a principle could play an important role in the mix.

    7. Can the ITU World Telecom Policy Forum revive WSIS?
    The ITU is as determined as ever to retain its relevance in an Internet-dominated world. Its World Telecom Policy Forum, to be held in Lisbon, Portugal April 22-24, 2009, plans to deal extensively with Internet governance issues. If the ITU is smart, it will try to open these proceedings to civil society and lure other new actors into its venues, actors who may be less than thrilled with the progress of the Internet Governance Forum and less than supportive of ICANN. The WTPF could become a place for governments and other actors unsure about or dissatisfied with the IGF/ICANN-centered regime to air their grievances and attempt to develop an alternative center of policy discourse, if not policy power. Can the ITU really become multistakeholder? Granted, that will take more than one year…

    8. Will Governments make ISP intermediaries for security?
    Over the past years, there have been increasing calls for governments to put more pressure on ISPs to improve their security practices. After years of focusing on end users with awareness raising campaigns and education, it has become clear that such efforts cannot keep up with the changes in internet abuse and cybercrime. Now the focus is shifiting to intermediaries. ISPs are at the top of the list. The Dutch regulator OPTA threatened to introduce regulation, then backtracked and talked about a quality mark or certification scheme. The British House of Lords made similar recommendations. In Australia, ACMA already has enforceable codes of conducts for ISPs. It also notifies ISPs directly about abuse and requires them to act on these notifications. These examples are just the first steps of governments exploring what role they can have or want to have when it comes to internet security.

  • Dec 2008
  • IGF 2008: Epilogue

    While the uncertainty surrounding attendance at this year’s IGF was mostly unfounded (there were more than 1200 attendees despite the Mumbai attack, an amount comparable with previous years IGFs), the usual doubts surfaced about what the Forum is accomplishing. Nonetheless, it seems that more participants are pushing the Forum to engage in substantive policy debate, and to identify a process for producing tangible outputs.

    IGF Purpose: Education or policy debate?

    The quality of the workshops and main sessions continues to vary widely. Some were organized by likeminded entities intent on presenting an overview of an issue to educate its audience, while others assumed that bringing together participants with diverging opinions and engaging in an open and frank discussion of conflicting policy views could lead to greater understanding of an issue. (see this exchange between IGP's van Eeten/Mueller and Patrik Fältström) If one believes audience size to be an accurate reflection of the better approach, then the later format won hands down. For example, the ICANN-organized workshop where the speakers consisted only of a few members of its own Presidential Strategy Committee (which deals with internal reforms for improving accountability of the organization) drew few attendees, while the panelists of the IGP co-sponsored “After the JPA, What?” workshop, which included multiple independent perspectives, attracted nearly 100 attendees. Workshop moderator Lee McKnight even conducted a straw poll (see the results and the workshop report) among the audience on whether the JPA should expire, pushing expectations of what Forum workshops could actually do.

    It is clear that Forum attendees, while they are appreciative of informational efforts, are more inclined to hear about and discuss substantive policy debates. This feeling was also apparent in comments heard about workshop topics. Participants expressed a desire to move on from “hot-button” issues where there is largely consensus (e.g., child pornography is bad), to other issues within the ambit of the Tunis Agenda that are more controversial. The most notable of these, the control of critical Internet resources, was raised forcefully by the Chinese delegation in a main session. Going forward, Forum participants would be well advised to pressure the Secretariat to scrutinize and select workshop and main session proposals that support open and substantive policy discussion.

    IGF Outcomes: A push for consensus and beyond

    In the closing session, the representatives of three governmental bodies (Brazil, European Union, and Switzerland) clearly expressed their desire that the Forum identity those issues upon which there is “sufficient consensus,” and move beyond consensus to pursue some sort of output. Brazil’s Everton Lucero identified that the greatest challenge to, and in fact the future of, the Forum is related to its ability to identify “mature enough” discussion that could then “shift towards practical measures.” Bernard de le Chapelle, representing the French presidency of the European Union, suggested moving from “the mapping stage, where we explore the different dimensions” to “developing consensus” within a formalized group discussion, with the idea that this exchange could lead to better cooperation outside of the Forum. Thomas Schneider of Switzerland recognized the value of the Forum remaining “an open discussion platform” but argued its “outreach should be strengthened.”

    As one would expect, the current regime of Internet governance institutions took issue with any hint of broadening the Forum’s influence. In the words of ICANN’s Jean-Jacques Subrenat, the specific characteristic that “this Forum doesn’t lead to recommendations or resolutions” [has] “allowed everyone to speak frankly and openly.” While perhaps partly true, one must recognize that the current governance institutions will instinctively push back on any Forum outcome that might interfere with or threaten the status quo.

    In closing, Chairman Nitan Desai recognized the participants’ desire that the Forum evolve and suggested that it is already having influence. He summarized that the Forum should now “consciously focus on searching for consensus, on trying to narrow differences through our processes of discussion and dialogue” because this “process of dialogue and discussion helps in reaching decisions elsewhere.” But he asked participants if they could formalize the process, and “design something where, at least in a few limited, well-defined areas where a process has succeeded in narrowing differences, finding consensus, we can come up with something which carries a certain legitimacy because it has come from a broader multistakeholder process.” And, perhaps in attempt to defuse tension over control of CIRs, Desai suggested that any Forum outcome “must be a product which the people who have responsibility for decision take seriously”…and that “those people may well be Internet Service Providers rather than governments.”

    IGF 2009: What’s next?

    Regarding this last point, intermediary enforcement may become a point of contention at next years Forum. The pressure and burden currently being placed on ISPs by intellectual property rights interests to enforce copyright violations is enormous. And a large number of civil society groups are now pushing the theme of a rights-based approach to Internet governance. CS has consistently argued that there must be a balanced approach to IPR that takes into account fundamental, well-established rights, for instance freedom of expression and privacy. Interestingly, because IPR interests are largely absent from the Forum, a rights-based approach to intermediary enforcement might be an area where common ground could be forged between private sector ISPs, governments and civil society.

    So far the Forum has shown itself to be a valuable discussion space, bringing many parties together that would not otherwise interact regularly. However, if the Forum is to remain relevant, it will need to 1) consistently address and openly discuss issues that highlight substantive policy disagreements among the parties, and 2) where sufficient consensus is achieved in discussions, generate some sort of output that can be referenced by parties engaged in the relevant policy-making institutions.

  • Internet Governance Forum Opens in India

    The 3rd meeting of the UN Internet Governance Forum is now underway in Hyderabad, India, beginning with the Annual Symposium of GigaNet (Global Internet Governance Academic Network). Attendance has been affected by the violence in Mumbai, which is 700 km away. Life in Hyderabad, however, is quite normal, attendees are moving about the city and the suburban “Cyberabad” area where the Forum is being held with no problems, other than the sometimes horrific road traffic. The presence of Indian security forces at the hotels and conference venues is noticeable. Many Indian commentators take the same attitude toward avoidance as was taken by New Yorkers after 9/11: it is important to not be intimidated and to insist on going on with one’s life. I was especially moved by an opinion piece by Suketu Mehta in the Times of India: “The terrorists’ message was clear: Stay away from Mumbai or you will get killed. But the best answer to the terrorists is to dream bigger, make even more money, and visit Mumbai more than ever. If the rest of the world wants to help, it should run towards the explosion. It should fly to Mumbai, and spend money. … I’m going to go get a beer at the Leopold, stroll over to the Taj for samosas at the Sea Lounge and watch a Bollywood movie at the Metro.” Hyderabad is not Mumbai, but I can say that we are running to it and are not intimidated.

  • Nov 2008
  • Fellowship Opportunity: Yale Information Society Project Fel ...

    The Information Society Project (ISP) at Yale Law School is seeking applicants for 2009-2010 postdoctoral fellowships. The ISP resident fellowships are designed for recent graduates of law or Ph.D. programs who are interested in careers in teaching and public service in any of the following areas: law and innovation; Internet and telecommunications law and policy; intellectual property law; access to knowledge; first amendment law; media studies; privacy; civil liberties online; cybercrime and cybersecurity; social software; standards and technology policy; bioethics, biotechnology, and law and genomics; and law, technology, and culture generally.

    Information about applying is available at the ISP web site at: http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/6523.htm. Applications for 2009-10 ISP fellowships must be postmarked no later than Feb. 1, 2009.

  • NCUC/PIR Outreach Event at ICANN-Cairo

    Date: Nov 6th, 2008
    Time: 16:00-17:00
    Location: ICANN Cairo, Room TBD (if you're on the ground in Cairo, contact Robert Guerra, guerra at freedomhouse.org)

    The Noncommercial Users Constituency (NCUC) and The Public Interest Registry (PIR) invite you to attend a reception to meet Cairo based bloggers and local Internet users and experts who will discuss and share their perspectives and views of week's events at the ICANN meeting.

    In addition, a locally produced video, "Internet Freedom in Egypt," will be shown. The short piece explains how blogs are being used in Egypt to expose human rights abuses, and how Facebook and Twitter have been used to organize pro-democracy demonstrations and strikes. It also looks at the gov't crackdown and surveillance of bloggers.

  • Sep 2008
  • IGP Fellowships to Hyderabad awarded

    The Internet Governance Project has awarded two fellowships to young scholars from Poland and China to enable them to attend the Hyderabad Internet Governance Forum and present their research at the 3rd annual Symposium of GigaNet (the Global Internet Governance Academic Network).

    Dr. Joanna Kulesza, of the University of Lodz Faculty of Law and Administration, will present a paper titled "Internet governance and the jurisdiction of states." Kulesza's paper discusses the traditional principles of international jurisdiction, shows their practical applications and contrasts them with the new circumstances of the Internet. The paper analyses the principles of territoriality, effects, active and passive personality, protective principle and the universality principle and examines each of the discussed principles for their applicability to the Internet.

    Dr. Zhuo Zhang, of the Wuhan University School of Journalism and Communication, China, will present her paper (co-authored with Handong Wang): "Two Kinds of Violence: Internet Governance and Internet Mob in Mainland China." This paper probes the relationship between the Chinese government's attempts to control the internet and the formation of "internet mobs" among Chinese users. It argues that the peremptory blocking of international information sources functions objectively to promote excessive, "violent" reactions by internet users in China.

    "We were impressed with these paper proposals and the commitment of the applicants to engage with the international community forming around Internet governance," said Milton Mueller, chair of the IGP Scientific Committee.

    The GigaNet Symposium is in its third year and has quickly become one of the leading venues for presenting academic research on the Internet and its governance. Held the day before the annual UN Internet Governance Forum, the Symposium features a program of 15 paper presentations and several poster presentations.

    The fellowships were made possible by a grant from the Ford Foundation, Peace and Social Justice Program, Governance unit, and the Knowledge, Creativity and Freedom program, Media unit.

  • Aug 2008
  • Internet governance highlighted at 36th Research Conference ...

    Several papers on Internet governance will be presented during the 36th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC), which will be held September 26 - September 28, 2008 at The National Center for Technology & Law, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, VA. IGP's Milton Mueller will be moderating the "The Future of Internet Addressing" session (Saturday 2:00 PM EST) and Brenden Kuerbis will be presenting a paper, "Regional Address Registries: The New Center of Global Internet Governance" (Sunday 11:10 AM). In addition, there will be panels Friday on Jon Zittrain's recent book and the "Future of the Internet Economy: Developing a Medium Term Policy Research Agenda," as well as work presented on Saturday looking at the "Internet and Fundamental Human Rights" as well as "The Political Economy of Internet Governance." View the entire program.

  • IGP at IGF Open Consultation

    IGP's Milton Mueller, Jeanette Hoffman and Brenden Kuerbis will be attending the Internet Governance Forum open consultations that will take place on 16 September, in room XIX in the Palais des Nations. These consultations will be followed by a meeting of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) on 17-18 September. View the meeting agenda.

  • Does a change in the IGF invitation mean a change in priorit ...

    The invitations for the third Internet Governance Forum in Hyderabad were signed, on behalf of the UN Secretary-General, by Mr. Sha Zukang, the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, rather than the Secretary-General as had been the case at the two previous IGFs. Some have asked whether this represents a reduction in the importance of the Forums. The answer, like most for the United Nations, is yes and no. Or, more precisely, no and yes. Whenever the Secretary-General takes on a responsibility, its implementation on his behalf is assigned to a regular Secretariat department. From the very beginning, the IGF, while formally convened under the authority of the SG and having a small secretariat in Geneva, was actually supported by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). The Secretary-General's designated representative has been Nitin Desai, the former Under-Secretary-General (USG) for DESA, on a part-time basis. The IGF Secretariat reports to the Secretary-General through DESA. When Mr. Sha was appointed USG for DESA in July 2007, he replaced Mr. Jose Antonio Ocampo, who was less engaged with ICT. Mr. Sha has a personal interest in Internet Governance having been China's permanent representative to the UN in Geneva. He has obviously wanted to be more involved in the decision-making and it has been delegated to him. Initially, the DESA office through which IGF Secretariat reported was the Office for Economic and Social Council Support and Coordination. Mr. Sha has shifted the headquarters contact point to the Division for Public Administration and Development Management, which is the most Internet-involved Division in the Department, since it is responsible for e-government work. Does that mean that IGF has been downgraded? Here the answer is no. The substantive interest of the United Nations in the IGF is clearly greater. The change is more of form -- an invitation signed by a USG rather than the SG -- than of substance. On the whole I think it represents a greater institutionalization of the Forum in New York, while maintaining the general flexibility that has been achieved by the IGF Secretariat in Geneva.

  • Jun 2008
  • 2008 NCMR: Establishing links between Internet Governance an ...

    [Editor's note: IGP graduate intern Mark Costa, a doctoral student at Syracuse University's School of Information Studies, joins us today as a guest blogger. Mark recently returned from the 2008 National Conference on Media Reform, one of the largest annual gatherings of domestic media advocates in the United States.]

    I just got back from the National Conference for Media Reform, where the mood was vibrant and optimistic, yet filled with a deep sense of concern about the current state of the U.S. media industry and the administration in Washington. The general consensus among the conference goers was that the major media corporations trivialize issues of national concern and frequently disseminate incorrect information to their audiences. Bill Moyers spoke Saturday morning and summed up well what people were feeling when he said: "media consolidation is a corrosive force that trivializes democracy." In order to counter those trends, many people have taken the entrepreneurial route and begun providing alternative news services. While several of the entrepreneurs are using traditional media outlets (television and radio), a majority of them have opted to use the Internet to spread their message.

    Because of the increasing importance of the Internet in this movement, there is an increasing interest in concepts such as network neutrality. There was at least one session specifically about NN, with Susan Crawford and Tim Wu presenting. Additionally, Bill Moyers mentioned NN, referring to Comcast’s attempts to pack the FCC meeting this past year as an excellent example of corporate America's attempts to suppress alternative voices. Despite the attention given to NN debate by the presenters, very few of the conference attendees that I spoke to demonstrated much interest in the debate. I didn’t attend the sessions, so it is difficult to gauge the responses of all of the attendees, but based on the discussions I had at the booth, not many people consider the debate to be immediately relevant.

    I was able to generate some interest in the IGP's work by discussing the increased role of governments and corporations in Internet governance. I had the opportunity to discuss with several people how policies set in international forums could impact domestic policies and agendas and why that impact is important. This involved explaining basics of political economy (i.e., who is interested in the Internet as a manageable resource, what their objectives are, and how they plan on achieving them), as well as some additional concepts such as policy laundering. Once again this met with only moderate success, which I believe is primarily due to the fact that many of the attendees were more interested in addressing the content of the messages being disseminated by the large media corporations versus being interested in the political, economic, and institutional factors that impact communication infrastructures. That was somewhat disappointing because, as the IGP members and other scholars have demonstrated, regulatory frameworks can have a significant impact on what information does get published.

  • GigaNet Workshop on Global Internet Governance

    Initiated in spring 2006 in conjunction with the UN Internet Governance Forum, the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) is hosting several events this year, including an upcoming international workshop on "Global Internet Governance: An Interdisciplinary Research Field in Construction" in Paris, 23 June 2008, from 08:30 to 13:30, concurrent with the ICANN-Paris meeting. [invitation-fr] [invitation-en]

    The program includes scholars from around the world and several academic backgrounds. The registration form is now available online. Attendance at the workshop is free and open to all interested parties, but registration is required. Please send completed registration forms to Meryem.Marzouki@lip6.fr

    The purpose of the workshop, the first of its sort, is to allow scholars involved in Internet Governance related research to describe their ongoing research projects to other scholars in the field, in order to share ideas, forge possible collaborations, and identify emerging research themes in the field. Scholars from various academic disciplines and all regions of the world are expected to contribute to this reflexive exercise, with the long-term objective of collectively building this interdisciplinary research field.

    Rather than featuring academic paper presentations, the workshop aims at providing a survey of current academic activities in the field of global Internet governance. The workshop is mainly organized around 3 roundtables, fostering lively and fruitful discussions. Panelists selected among the authors of submitted contributions will discuss global Internet governance research activities dealing with: models, players and democratic principles; regulation policies and regulatory issues; and regional perspectives and sociocultural issues.

    Visit the workshop website for more detailed information, including directions, maps and other practical information. French co-organizers and sponsors are: GDR-CNRS TICS, DEL-CNRS network, Sciences Po, Univ. Paris 3 Sorbonne Nouvelle, Univ. Pierre et Marie Curie and LIP6 Laboratory.

  • Apr 2008
  • Call For Papers: Third GigaNet Annual Symposium

    Call For Papers: Third GigaNet Annual Symposium
    2 December, 2008
    Hyderabad International Conference Center (HICC)
    Hyderabad, India
    Call For Papers [pdf] [html]

    The Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) is a scholarly community that promotes the development of Internet governance as a recognized, interdisciplinary field of study and facilitates informed dialogue on policy issues and related matters between scholars and governments, international organizations, the private sector, and civil society.

    Each year, GigaNet organizes a one-day research symposium in conjunction with the United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and in the same premises. After the first two editions in Athens, Greece (October 2006) and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (November 2007), the third GigaNet Annual Symposium will be held on December 2, 2008, in Hyderabad, India, the day before the 3rd IGF meeting. Attendance at the Symposium will be open to all and free of charge. The Symposium will be at the same location as the IGF and registration with the UN as an IGF participant may be necessary to gain entry to the building.

    This is a call for papers from scholars interested in presenting an original research paper at the conference.

    Important dates:

    • 15 July 2008: abstract submission deadline (to be sent to: Meryem.Marzouki@lip6.fr)
    • 15 September 2008: notification to applicants
    • 10 October 2008: full papers due
    • 15 October 2008: 2008 GigaNet symposium program finalized
    • 2 December 2008: 2008 GigaNet symposium, HICC, Hyderabad, India

    Submission topics:

    In addition to papers on methodological aspects of Internet governance-related studies, this year's Symposium particularly encourages submissions on the following themes, which are described in more detail below:

    1. Comparing Internet Governance to other Global Governance Domains
    2. Networked Governance Theories and the Institutionalization of Internet Governance
    3. The Role of NGOs, Social Movements and Civil Society in Internet Governance
    4. Year 3 of the UN Internet Governance Forum: Assessing its Structure, Process and Impact
    5. Law and Jurisdictions in Internet Governance
    6. Copyright Protection, Internet Service Providers and Technical Mechanisms of Control
    7. Internationalized Domain Names: Expanding Access or Tower of Babel?

    Submission requirements:

    Applicants should submit: 1) an abstract of 800-1000 words, in English, of the proposed paper that describes the main research question(s), methods employed, and the paper's relevance and value to the thematic area; and 2) a one page summary curriculum vitae listing in particular the applicant's current institutional affiliation(s), advanced degrees, scholarly publications relevant to Internet governance, and web sites, if available.

    Submission materials should be emailed directly to the chairperson of the 2008 Program Committee, Dr. Meryem Marzouki, at Meryem.Marzouki[at]lip6.fr by no later than July 15, 2008, midnight GMT.

    Members of the 2008 program committee will review submissions according to the same criteria. In order to ensure fairness of the evaluation process, submissions that do not conform to the requested format will not be considered.

    The Program Committee will notify applicants of its decisions via email by September 15, 2008.

    A full paper upon which oral or poster presentation will be based must be delivered to the same address by October 10, 2008, midnight GMT in order for the author(s) to be included in the program.

    While GigaNet asserts no copyright to authors' work, it is expected that the version of the paper presented orally or as poster will be made available for posting on the GigaNet website.

    Travel scholarships for a few outstanding accepted papers may be available for scholars who would otherwise be unable to attend. Applicants who are accepted will be informed of these opportunities after September 15.

    2008 GigaNet Symposium Program Committee:

    • Ana Abreu, Labeurb/Unicamp and Paulista University, Campinas (SP), Brazil
    • Slavka Antonova, Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand
    • Meryem Marzouki, LIP6/PolyTIC-CNRS Laboratory, Paris, France (Chair)
    • John Mathiason, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse (NY), USA
    • Milton Mueller, Syracuse University School of Information Studies, Syracuse (NY), USA
    • Max Senges, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
    • Rolf H. Weber, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

    Topics Description:

    1. Comparing Internet Governance to other Global Governance Domains
    The concept of global governance has flourished in a number of fields: trade, security, environment, development -- as well as Internet. However, most general analyses of global governance ignore global Internet governance. Conversely, very few Internet governance analyses are conducted through comparative frameworks. Submissions are invited to help frame Internet governance in a broader, global governance perspective. What could be learnt from experiences of global governance in other fields? Are there any general instruments and methods of global governance, irrespective of the domain area it addresses? Could some similarities or invariants of a global governance process be identified?

    2. Networked Governance Theories and the Institutionalization of Internet Governance
    The global policy discourse on Internet governance involves more diverse actors and newly created institutions. There is a need to explore the dynamics of this changing institutionalization process through theoretical and empirical analysis. Recent work explores network forms of organization in political and governance contexts, at national and international levels, most notably with the concept of "transgovernmental networks" to solve sector-specific problems. We call for papers that apply, test and criticize ideas of "networked governance" in the context of global Internet governance. We encourage submissions that analyze collaborative policy-making in related institutions and interactions between them. We are especially interested in papers that critically analyze these forms of governance in terms of fairness and accountability and their relationship to democratic principles. Can presently excluded or minority communities enhance their participation? Beyond the expert discourse and the interplay amongst dedicated stakeholders, can networked governance represent people, rather than just established interests and agencies? What are the available tools and practices to facilitate their participation and deliberation, in terms of discourse, collaboration and decision-making?

    3. Role of NGOs, Social Movements and Civil Society in Internet Governance
    Important but subtle transformations have occurred in the role and participation of non-governmental and non-business actors in the 6 years since the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS). WSIS witnessed a somewhat usual situation, where organized social actors participated from inside the process through structured non-governmental organizations, and social movements exercised some more radical pressure from the outside. Since the creation of the UN Internet Governance Forum (IGF), this mode of participation has turned into a "consensus-based cooperation", where civil society actors are supposed to contribute on equal footing with governments and business actors, in most cases in their individual capacity and rather disconnected from social movements. We seek papers that analyze the evolution of involved social actors and their structuring, especially with regards to the historical evolution of the concept of civil society, and to explore in which ways and to what extent these transformations may be related to the move from government to governance.

    4. Year 3 of the UN Internet Governance Forum: Assessing its Structure, Process and Impact
    The WSIS created and mandated the IGF to address critical, value-adding global Internet governance functions that cannot be entirely performed by any existing institution. This includes: highlighting emerging issues, assessing the embodiment of WSIS principles, and strengthening the participation of stakeholders in Internet governance mechanisms. Furthermore, the IGF was defined as "multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic and transparent" body; it has been structured through a Secretariat, a multi-stakeholder advisory group (MAG), and a special advisory group to the MAG's chair; and for 3 years, it has been operating as an open discursive space, prepared through open consultation sessions. Submissions are invited to explore whether the IGF has fulfilled its mandate at this step, which difficulties can be identified and how they could be solved. Has the IGF structure, management and advisory mechanisms proven to be adequate and compliant with the WSIS Tunis Agenda requirements? What strengths could be reinforced and weaknesses overcome?

    5. Law and Jurisdictions in Internet Governance
    The Internet must now be considered a major factor when elaborating regulatory principles to deal with the circulation of content and data and with the protection of the general communications infrastructure. This is not an easy task because of its implications on the respect for universal human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, where States differ widely on their implementation of these international standards, even among coherent regional entities. The task becomes even more complex due to conflicts of competences among overlapping jurisdictions. We seek papers that identify and explore conflicts among national laws and attempts to harmonize them. We also seek papers that explore the relevance to the global Internet of public and private international law currently in force or being considered in ongoing international negotiations. Submissions analyzing the role and positions of various players in these processes are also encouraged.

    6. Copyright Protection, Internet Service Providers and Technical Mechanisms of Control
    We encourage papers that examine attempts to impose copyright protection on the Internet through the intermediary of Internet service providers. This theme bridges the topics of network neutrality and intellectual property, inspired by recent incidents, such as a Belgian ISP's order by a court to use deep packet inspection to catch copyright infringement in transit, and Comcast's notorious interference with BitTorrent, which also was probably stimulated in part by copyright protection concerns. Papers can explore the feasibility and "state of the art" of packet inspection and other relevant techniques, analyze copyright industry and ISP industry interactions from a political economy standpoint, or examine appropriate policy responses to new and powerful packet inspection techniques.

    7. Internationalized Domain Names: Expanding Access or Tower of Babel?
    We encourage papers on the economic, cultural and compatibility issues raised by the migration to a new standard for Internet domain names that allows them to reflect non-Roman scripts such as Chinese or Cyrillic. Internationalized domain names (IDNs) have a double-edged effect: they widen access for non-English or ASCII readers by making domain names easier to use, but they also introduce compatibility problems among people communicating across language boundaries, as one party may not know how to read or input the address of the other party. There are also interesting questions of competition policy, as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) must decide whether to give new generic top level domains (TLDs) in IDN scripts to incumbents operating ASCII TLDs with similar meanings, or to new competitors. Issues of consumer confusion and cross-linguistic disputes can also arise.

  • Nov 2007
  • GigaNet Panel on Critical Policy Issues Well Received

    The final of three panels at the 2007 GigaNet Annual Symposium was convened to address the distinct set of policy issues critical to the global Internet Governance debates. GigaNet Steering Committee member, Seiiti Arata, Jr., moderated the panel, and it consisted of four excellent papers (Ian Brown/Chris Marsden were not present).

    The first paper was presented by Virginia Paque from Argentina, who stood in for a DiploFoundation colleague, Alfonso Avila, on his paper, "Identity Theft in Developing Counties' Banking Industry." This fascinating paper raised the issues about the far-reaching impact of identity theft, and addressed the perspective that identity threats and phishing scams are coming primarily from developing countries. Paque presented empirical evidence that the vast majority of identity theft scams are coming from the developed countries (with only Nigeria and South Africa figuring at all). IGP Partner Milton Mueller, from the School of Information Studies at Syracuse University, presented his paper on, "Net Neutrality as a Global Norm for Internet Governance," simultaneously released as an IGP Issue Paper. Dr. Mueller re-defined Net Neutrality and sketched its progression from national policy spaces to global spaces. Leo Van Audenhove from the Department of Communication Studies at the Vrije Universiteit in Brussels, presented an empirical co-authored paper on the mechanisms for regulation and self-regulation in the cultural industries. Finally, Adilson Cabral, from the Universidade Federal Flumienense, presented a co-authored paper entitled, "Broadening Voices: Grassroots Tech Groups and Policy Objectives for Internet Governance."

    Audience questions included questions about how can national Net Neutrality principles coexist at the global level; how do we deal with the coordination issues at a global level; how do we deal with the issue of Google as a dominant player in this space?

  • GigaNet Annual Symposium 2007 Now Underway in Rio

    The 2nd Annual Symposium of the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) is now underway in the Windsor Barra Hotel in Rio de Janeiro Brazil. About 100 scholars and interested participants from around the world are participating in the all day meeting.

    Development was the focus of the first panel was on the creation of a "Development Agenda" for Internet Governance, one that draws upon previous relevant examples such as the WIPO Development Agenda, the WTO Doha Round Development Agenda, and other relevant processes. IGP Partner, Derrick Cogburn, served as moderator for the first panel, which included four outstanding papers/presentations (most of which are available on the GigaNet portal (http://www.igloo.org/giganet).

    The first paper/presenter was William Drake from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Dr. Drake helped to shape the framework for the panel by laying out the overarching rationale for creating a Development Agenda for Internet Governance. He particularly highlighted the lessons learned from the Doha Round within the WTO, which focused on the better inclusion of developing countries into the benefits of global trade, including trade in services. He also raised the question about what institutional configuration within the IGF would be most appropriate for advancing this Development Agenda for Internet Governance, and suggested that perhaps a Dynamic Coalition for Development within the IGF framework might be the most appropriate way to proceed.

    Next, Viviana Munoz Tellez, from the South Centre, also based in Geneva, further illustrated the potential of this "Development Agenda" approach by highlighting ten lessons from the corresponding process within WIPO. She highlighted in great detail her analysis of ten key components of the process of creating the WIPO Development Agenda, and their relevance for the IGF and Internet Governance. These ten components included: (1) building momentum; (2) conceptual framework; (3) identification of key problems; (4) leadership; (5) sustained commitment; (6) Coordination amongst developing countries; (7) prioritization and focus of initiatives; (8) the role of civil society; (9) collaboration amongst developing countries and civil society, both North and South; and (10) the strategic choice of forum for the agenda.

    Deepening the analysis, Laura DeNardis, from the Yale University Law School, Information Society Project, focused her analysis on the impact of the formal and informal standards setting processes on development interests. She highlighted the potential importance of multiple devices, including multimedia handheld computing devices, for promoting and sustaining development. She illustrated the process of standards setting, including the informal market entry/dominance approach to establishing de facto standards. She highlighted the political effects on development of these processes and explored how it might be possible to get greater and more diverse development interests "at the table" during the standards setting processes. In closing, she advocated an "openness" approach; meaning that both the standard setting processes should be more open in terms of allow for greater participation - including civil society and developing countries - and that they should attempt to harmonize their processes and standards where possible.

    Finally, Olga Cavalli, from the Universidad de Buenos Aires and the Instituto Technologico de Buenos Aires, Argentina, illustrated the perspectives of the Latin American and Caribbean Region towards a development agenda. She used data from Telegeography and the World Bank to highlight the disparities in bandwidth and income inequalities in the world. She also asked about how to get rural considerations into the development agenda process. Interestingly, she raised the issue of telecenters, and their impact on the enabling public inclusion in formulating the development agenda for Internet Governance, and the degree to which they can be made more economically sustainable. On this latter point, she highlighted some of the successes and failures of Universal Service funds. In closing, she highlighted some of the activities to build capacity for Internet Governance, including within ICANN and their fellowships and the DiploFoundation training processes.

    The audience raised important questions for the panel, including the "real" relevance of the WIPO and WTO processes for Internet Governance, the potential challenge of fragmentation in these processes, and the degree to which these multiple actors with divergent political perspectives can be harmonized and included in the same process.

  • Oct 2007
  • ICANN as Fake Institution: WHOIS, Privacy and Credible Commi ...

    Q: When is a policy adopted unanimously in ICANN not really a consensus policy?
    A: When the US Government says it isn't.

    Case in point. A new top level domain registry, TELNIC, has been authorized to run the .tel domain. Their idea is that .tel will "allow and encourage individuals and corporations to manage a universal identity" on the Internet. If its idea works, lots of ordinary people will register under the .tel domain and combine their telephone numbers, email addresses, and other identifiers. The company is based in the UK.

    TELNIC has a problem: ICANN's contracts require it to display all the personal contact data of its registrants through a service known as "Whois." But unrestricted access to personal contact data, aside from being a rather bad idea, is against the law in the UK. It follows European, not American, privacy and data protection rules. So after consulting with the UK's data protection authorities, TELNIC asked ICANN to modify its Whois requirement.

    One would think that that request would be easy to honor. ICANN has, after all, already passed a Whois Procedure for Conflicts with National Laws" that allows registries to apply for such exceptions. In December 2003, the second Whois Task Force of the GNSO recommended the development of a procedure to allow gTLD registries and registrars to demonstrate when they are prevented by local laws from fully complying with the provisions of ICANN contracts regarding personal data in Whois. The policy was passed by the GNSO Council, ICANN's domain name policy development organ, in November 2005. In May 2006, the ICANN Board adopted the policy and directed ICANN staff to develop and publicly document a conflicts procedure. In both cases, the policy was passed unanimously.

    Fast forward to the middle of 2007, when TELNIC actually attempted to get an exception. Out of the blue, we were told that "The Whois Procedure for Conflicts with National Laws is not yet implemented pending GAC input." GAC is the "Governmental Advisory Committee," ICANN's liaison with the world's governments. But what is the hold up, what is stopping GAC from its input? Any idea that the the world's governments as a group want to stop the national exceptions policy is obviously false. The GAC has already adopted a set of public policy principles on Whois that stated bluntly, "gTLD Whois services must comply with applicable national laws and regulations."

    No, it is only one government -- the USA -- that doesn't like its implications. US policy has always been that all personal contact data must be open to anyone on the Internet who wants to view it, for any purpose. Any why does the USG feel that way? When TELNIC applied to restrict access to its registrants' private data, the trademark and copyright interests kicked up a huge fuss. They bullied TELNIC into making major concessions -- allowing, for example, trademark lawyers to get much broader access to registrant records. No other constituency, such as privacy advocates, were allowed to enter into these negotiations. Still, they were not satisfied. They know that any exception to Whois, no matter how small, sets a precedent and confirms what everyone else in the world knows -- that ICANN's contracts violate national privacy laws around the world.

    In other words, the consensus policy is not really a policy. Why? Because the USG (and the trademark lobby that dictates its policy on these matters) doesn't want it to be a policy. These kinds of manipulations confirm the world's worst fears about Internet governance and the American role in it. We are presented with a frighteningly clear picture of a rigged game, a violation of the credible commitment to rules and process that must underpin international institutions. For years now, the US government and the trademark lobby have been trying to play a "heads I win, tails you lose" game with Whois. This is just the latest, albeit one of the most blatant, examples. Sustained protests of this policy are expected at ICANN's upcoming annual meeting in Los Angeles.

  • IGF Rio to be Supported by Online Community

    As most of you know, the Inaugural Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Athens spawned a number of "Dynamic Coalitions.” These multisakeholder Dynamic Coaliations (DCs) were designed to include all interested parties from both developed and developing countries, and to advance the work of the Forum.  One of these DCs, the Online Collaboration Dynamic Coalition (OCDC), has developed a suite of collaboration tools to facilitate a degree of online participation at the upcoming Internet Governance Forum in Rio.  While there are still some ongoing debates about the specific modalities for remote participation, the site is designed for all IGF stakeholders, and registration is open to any interested party from around the world. For more information, or to register for the site, go to: http://igf-online.net; or see the attached flyer (in pdf). For additional means of participating remotely in the IGF Workshops co-sponsored by the Internet Governance Project and other partners, please check the IGP events page.

  • Feb 2007
  • IGF Stock-Taking Meeting - and Webconference Wrap-Up Discuss ...

    On 13 February 2007, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) will convene a "stock-taking" session, which is open to all stakeholders who were WSIS accredited, and to individuals with "proven expertise and experience in Internet Governance related issues. The meeting will be held at the Palais des Nations, United Nations Office in Geneva (Room XX) from 10:00-13:00 and 15:00-18:00 hours. Interpretation in all UN languages and real-time transcription will be available during the meeting. For more information and to register for the session, download the IGF registration form. Also, at the closing of the session, we will host a brief wrap-up discussion with colleagues on the ground in Geneva. Cotelco Research Associate and intern at the IGF Secretariat, Sonia Arenaza, will host the webconference and provide feedback from the stocktaking session. Participants from IGP Partner Derrick Cogburn's Globalization Seminar will also participate in the session from South Africa, Syracuse, and other parts of the world. To join the webconference, held from 10:00 - 11:00 EST, please go to the Cotelco Web Conferencing Server and click on the link for the meeting when active. Please use your firstname and lastname as username, and no password.

  • Busy week for NSF as it also convenes "Cyberinfrastructure f ...

    Last week was a busy one for the US National Science Foundation (NSF).  In addition to the meeting reported on by IGP Partner Milton Mueller, NSF also convened a major conference from 29-30 January entitled, "Designing Cyberinfrastructure for Collaboration and Innovation."  The meeting, organized by Brian Kahin and sponsored by the Committee for Economic Development, Council on Competitiveness, National Science Foundation, Science Commons and the University of Michigan, was held at the National Academy of Science in Washington, D.C.  The meeting focused on using the Internet to create geographically distributed environments for collaborative research, and the soci-technical challenges involved in such approaches.  The program, which featured an interesting array of speakers from industry, academia, government, and international organizations, was organized around five themes: (1) Infrastructure for Knowledge and Innovation; (2) Designing the Virtual Organisation; (3) Technology-Enabled Knowledge; (4) The Ecology and Design of "Open," and (5) Public and Private Cooperation.  Most of the slides, supporting documents, and additional resources are also made available on the conference website.  The meeting was attended by IGP Partner Derrick Cogburn, as well as GigaNet member Nanette Levinson. Interestingly, at one point a speaker from the audience expressed his desire to "keep fighting those who want the UN to take over the Internet," which was met with limited applause from the participants.

  • A "clean slate" redesign of the Internet: NSF/OECD Workshop

    On 31 January the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the OECD held a joint conference on "social and economic factors shaping the future of the Internet." Attendance was restricted to about 20 full participants selected by OECD/NSF and another 30 attendees who were allowed to ask questions.

    For NSF, the meeting promoted their effort to incorporate "social and economic factors" into the research around their Global Environment for Network Innovation (GENI) initiative. GENI is a major new NSF initiative to fund a "clean slate" redesign of the Internet. The intellectual driver of this initiative seems to be David Clark, who was also one of the leading protocol architects of the old Internet. Suzi Iacono, the NSF program officer who concentrates on the social, economic and behavioral aspects of information systems within the NSF's CISE division, believes that GENI can create a "testbed" that will allow social scientists to experiment with the way various protocol or network designs interact with social factors.

    My first observation about this meeting is that aside from David Clark's always-interesting ruminations on what problems a clean-slate resdesign of the Internet might involve, very few new ideas were bruited. Almost all of the discussion revolved around the social, economic and political problems of the "old" Internet. More importantly, I wonder whether the desire to link analysis and understanding of social problems to the engineering or redesign of a new Internet is unambiguously a good thing.

    The tension between the desire to "design" a new Internet and at the same time take into account social and economic factors was confronted directly at one point. Clark was asked by Harvard's Jonathan Zittrain about the ITU's Next Generation Network (NGN) initiative. An excellent question -- isn't that also an attempt to do a clean slate redesign?  Clark answered that the ITU's effort was "doomed" because "people are watching." By that he meant that the basic design issues that would really have an effect on social factors would be "torn apart by advocacy." In other words, assuming that social effects can be controlled by means of technical design (a very big and mostly false assumption) interested social actors will not stand passively by and let those design decisions be made without their input.

    Now if the outcomes of NGN will be torn apart by advocacy, why not also the results of GENI? All Clark could say was that one should "design the levers of control so that you've got the right balance of power over the controls." But won't those design decisions be influenced by existing inequalities in political and economic power?

    My point is not that we should throw up our hands and say that nothing can be done or that none of this should be carefully studied. Rather, my target is the assumption that one can "design" large-scale technical systems in ways that avoid future political and economic problems. If engineers try to take "social and economic factors" fully into account as they design technical systems, it is inevitable that the design will reflect a status quo oriented equilibrium among existing vested interests. The technological design will embed rules and restrictions based on protection of today's business models and political interests.

    Engineers and scientists can be much more revolutionary (in both a good and bad sense) by solving technical problems in complete disregard of their social and economic consequences. Or by paying attention to some social factors and disregarding others. This is what as happened with the original Internet. It is the job of social, political and economic institutions, not technologists, to respond to the problems of technological innovation as they arise. It is a false and technocratic assumption that engineers and social scientists can embed these decisions in technological design. Indeed, this widespread belief that beneficial social consequences can somehow be "embedded" in technological design is one of the truly bad consequences of the Lessig meme that "code is law."

  • Nov 2006
  • IGP at the Forum (Eminence Grise)

    The Internet Governance Project was prominent at the Forum. Below is a summary of our activities.

    IGP partners Mueller, Hofmann, Mathiason and Cogburn participated in the successful pre-Forum conference of the Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet). See story below.

    IGP partner Jeanette Hofmann was selected by civil society groups to speak in the slot for civil society at the concluding session of the Forum. Her comments can be seen here. Hofmann also co-facilitated, with Elizabeth Longworth of UNESCO, the joint IGP-UNESCO workshop on content filtering and blocking.

    IGP partner Milton Mueller moderated the intense and exciting workshop on DNS root zone file management. A short written summary of the DNS workshop is available here.

    IGP partner Derrick Cogburn made it possible to include remote presenters in both of our workshops. Professor Ron Deibert participated in the Freedom of expression panel from Toronto, and technologist Thierry Moreau participated in the DNS workshop from Montreal. The experience provided valuable lessons on enhancing virtual participation in global policy dialogues. Further refinements in implementation will be made in Rio. While the sessions that IGP co-sponsored were not recorded due to technical difficulties, furture sessions will be archived on the IGP website.

    IGP partners Derrick Cogburn and Lee McKnight linked the IGF in Athens with the Caribbean Internet Forum in Grenada. The session, "Building Bridges from Athens to Grenada to Syracuse" had five speakers from Athens -- Dr. Cogburn, Dr. Alex Trigona (Diplo), Jenniffer Britton (Caribbean Telecommunications Union), Theresa Swinehart (ICANN), Ambassador Clark (Barbados) -- providing an overview of the substantive discussions and tone of the Athens meeting; one speaker from Grenada, providing feedback on what was happening in Grenada; and questions from students and faculty from Syracuse.

    IGP partner John Mathiason spoke at the Framework Convention Workshop, and IGP partner Milton Mueller was a panelist on the main plenary session on Access, where he discussed issues of telecommunication policy.

  • Oct 2006
  • GigaNet Conference Brings Academics Together

    GigaNet is the "global internet governance academic network," a new network of researchers in the field of internet governance. GigaNet plans to hold annual conferences preceding the forum and engage in research collaboration and discussion around IG issues. The first GigaNet pre-conference vastly exceeded the expectations of its organizers, filling the room to capacity (80+ people) and provoking many compliments about the value and quality of the presentations and discussions.

    About 40 eligible academic members will be added to the group as a result of the meeting. At the business meeting, chaired by William Drake, important decisions regarding the governance of the group were mooted for final confirmation on the group's listserv. The meeting proposed to use the IGLOO content sharing tool as its public face and space for private interaction for a year. It will retain its current mail list and add all members meeting the eligibility requirements quickly. Eligibility will be for individuals, not institutions, although methods of cooperation with organizations were discussed. In particular, UNESCO expressed considerable interest in working with the group.

    The need to set up a decision making structure or "executive officers" was discussed. W. Drake suggested a number of committees or sub-areas, such as a web space mgmt group, membership, constitutional. Nanette Levinson proposed to make the existing startup group, plus some new volunteers, as the Executive committee for another year.

  • Jun 2006
  • Mathiason and Cogburn appointed to Global Alliance Advisory ...

    IGP Partners John Mathiason and Derrick Cogburn will serve in a high-level Panel of Advisors, providing policy and expert advice to the Steering Committee and Strategy Council of the UN's newly created Global Alliance for ICT and Development. The Strategy Council consists of 60 members representing governments and non-governmental stakeholders and will identify priorities and themes to be addressed. The mission of the Global Alliance is to facilitate and promote integration of ICTs into development activities by providing a platform for open, inclusive, multi-stakeholder cross-sectoral policy dialogue, thereby linking the outcomes of the WSIS with the broader United Nations development agenda.

  • 6.2006 Internet Governance Wars, Episode II: the Realists St ...

    [Abstract]

    Author: John MathiasonJohn Mathiason examines the international relations theory underlying the book and likens it to Episode 2 of Star Wars: "The Realists Strike Back."Suggested citation: John Mathiason, "Internet Governance Wars, Episode II: the Realists Strike Back: A review of Goldsmith and Wu's 'Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World'" (June, 2006). Internet Governance Project. Paper IGP06-004. Available at https://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/JM-IGWars.pdf

  • May 2006
  • Jeanette Hofmann selected to IG Forum's MAG

    IGP Partner Jeanette Hoffman was selected to serve on the Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG), which will assist the Secretary-General's Special Adviser Nitin Desai in convening the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a new forum for a multi-stakeholder dialogue on Internet governance. The Advisory Group will meet on 22 and 23 May in Geneva, following an open consultation on 19 May, also in Geneva. Its main task is to prepare the substantive agenda and program for the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum, which is to be held in Athens from 30 October to 2 November.

  • December
  • November
  • October
  • September
  • August
  • July
  • June
  • May
  • April
  • March
  • February
  • January
  • Feb 2005
  • 2.2005 A Global Alliance for ICT: Bringing Policy Making to ...

    [Abstract]

    Authors: John Mathiason and Derrick CogburnThe Project releases a new paper calling for the use of Internet-based collaboration technologies and a Global Alliance as a new institutional framework for multistakeholder policy development in communication and information policy. The paper, by IGP partners John Mathiason and Derrick Cogburn, views a Global Alliance as a successor to the role filled by the UN ICT Task Force, which is due to cease existence at the end of 2005.Suggested citation: John Mathiason and Derrick Cogburn, "A Global Alliance for ICT: Bringing Policy Making to the Public and the Public to Policy Making" (February 8, 2005). Internet Governance Project. Paper IGP05-001. Available at https://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/igp-ga.pdf

  • December
  • November
  • October
  • September
  • August
  • July
  • June
  • May
  • April
  • March
  • February
  • January
  • Dec 2004
  • 9.2004 Internet Governance: the State of Play

      [Abstract]

    Author: John Mathiason, Milton Mueller, Hans Klein and Marc HolitscherA comprehensive overview of Internet governance regimes, organizations, issues.Suggested citation: John Mathiason, Milton Mueller, Hans Klein and Marc Holitscher, "Internet Governance: the State of Play" (September 9, 2004). Internet Governance Project. Paper IGP04-001. Available at https://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/mainreport-final.pdf